




## Evaluation of the UNHCR Shelter Assistance Programme

### Executive Summary



The **Maastricht Graduate School of Governance (MGSOG)** is the Public Policy Graduate School of Maastricht University, combining high-level teaching and research. The institute provides multi-disciplinary top-academic training. Doing so, it builds on the academic resources of the different faculties at Maastricht University as well as those of several foreign partners. In January 2011, the School became part of the United Nations University, strengthening further its international training and research network while building on the expertise of [UNU-MERIT](http://www.unu-merit.nl) the Maastricht based research institute of the UNU. One of the key areas of education and research is Migration Studies, where MGSOG has gained a strong reputation.



**Samuel Hall.** ([www.samuelhall.org](http://www.samuelhall.org)) is a research and consulting company with headquarters in Kabul, Afghanistan and a regional presence that spans the Middle East, Central / South Asia and East Africa. We specialise in socio-economic surveys, private and public sector studies, monitoring and evaluation and impact assessments for governmental, non-governmental and international organisations. Our teams of field practitioners, academic experts and local interviewers have years of experience leading research in Afghanistan. We use our expertise to balance needs of beneficiaries with the requirements of development actors. This has enabled us to acquire a firm grasp of the political and socio-cultural context in the country; design data collection methods and statistical analyses for monitoring, evaluating, and planning sustainable programmes and to apply cross-disciplinary knowledge in providing integrated solutions for efficient and effective interventions.

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

With more than 2.7 million Afghan refugees in the region, and an estimated 3 million globally, Afghanistan has the largest refugee population in the world. Since the fall of the Taliban, the country has witnessed massive return, with 5.7 million refugees returning and 4.6 million assisted by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Yet, Afghanistan in 2012 reflects drastically different trends from the year the repatriation process started, a decade ago, in 2002. One common and continuous trend, however, is the overwhelming need for shelter and land for displaced populations – whether returning refugees or internally displaced persons (IDPs).

UNHCR's Shelter Assistance Programme (SAP) has provided, since 2002, more than 220,000 units of shelter to vulnerable returnees and IDPs throughout Afghanistan. The programme's design and implementation procedures have been improved over the years. To date, only one internal assessment of the programme has been conducted by UNHCR – with a limited scope, in 2005. A 2012 evaluation of the Danish Regions of Origin support to Afghanistan also touched upon the shelter programme.<sup>1</sup> Several other studies have researched the needs and vulnerability of returnees and IDPs in the country<sup>2</sup>, but the SAP's contribution to reintegration outcomes, defined as achieving sustainable return and parity between returnees and other members of the local community, has not been researched.

The present study conducted by researchers at the Maastricht Graduate School of Governance (MGSoG) and Samuel Hall Consulting aims at filling this important gap with the following objectives:

1. **Assess the shelter programme contribution to reintegration outcomes** and in achieving parity between returnees and others;
2. **Evaluate the shelter programme design in terms of performance** at the beneficiary level and its effectiveness according to UNHCR guidelines;
3. **Assess the relevance and sustainability of the shelter programme** in the broader context of humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan.

The study's scope covers UNHCR shelter beneficiaries and communities targeted between 2009 and 2011 only; but the relevance of its findings will inform future shelter strategies. The evaluation covers the socio-economic aspects of shelter assistance on four levels – (1) household level, (2) community level, (3) institutional level, and finally (4) the macro-level.

This executive summary presents the result of the evaluation – covering an overall positive assessment of the SAP's reintegration outcome for returnees, discussing key weaknesses and areas for future improvements in developing improved guiding principles and strategy for the shelter programme in 2013 and beyond. The summary is organized in four parts: (1) UNHCR'S SAP: An effective contribution to reintegration; (2) UNHCR'S position as a leader on shelter intervention-unmatched by other stakeholders; (3) weaknesses of the shelter programme; and (4) conclusions and recommendations.

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<sup>1</sup> COSGRAVE J, BRYLD E, and JACOBSEN, L (2012), *Evaluation of the Danish Regions of Origin Support to Afghanistan*.

<sup>2</sup> See for example: CMI (2008); De BREE (2008); LUMP et al.(2004); BARAKAT et al. 2012); Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement - TLO (2010); MAJIDI, N. (2011); Samuel Hall/NRC/IDMC/JIPS (2012).

## 1. UNHCR'S SAP: AN EFFECTIVE CONTRIBUTION TO REINTEGRATION

The socio-economic impact of the SAP has been assessed on a sample of 4,488 respondent households in 15 provinces and all regions of Afghanistan, including 2,035 UNHCR shelter beneficiaries, 1,990 non-beneficiaries and of 463 shelter beneficiaries from other shelter agencies in the East – the region representing the largest share of shelter activities.

### Shelter beneficiaries fare better than non-beneficiaries

The results from multi-dimensional poverty and cross-sectional regression analyses show:

- **Highest rates of poverty among non-shelter beneficiaries:** 86 per cent of non-shelter beneficiaries are multi-dimensionally poor, as opposed to 71 per cent of UNHCR shelter beneficiaries and the lowest numbers, 68 per cent, among non-UNHCR shelter beneficiaries.
- **A lower probability of being poor and lower degrees of poverty for beneficiaries** compared to non-beneficiaries.

Using a difference in difference analysis across time – comparing two periods: after return from abroad and after receiving assistance – the research concludes that:

- The data collected provides solid evidence that **UNHCR's SAP has had a significant and positive impact on reducing household deprivation along indicators of interest** including access to a house, electricity, sanitation and access to a mobile.

### IDPs fare worse than returning refugees in the reintegration process

However, these positive results should be weighed against two important findings:

- **First, over three quarters – 78 per cent – of the overall sample are multi-dimensionally poor.** Concerning the individual dimensions most households are deprived in education, followed by economic well-being, social capital, housing and health. In terms of reintegration, this means that returnees are reintegrating in deprived communities. They fare better than non-shelter beneficiaries, but the context weighs in negatively on all. The aim of reintegration being to achieve parity is therefore not systematically relevant – the end result is that beneficiaries surpass the conditions seen in other groups; however, they also remain multi-dimensionally poor.
- **Second, main differences across groups show that the positive reintegration impact is mainly true for returning refugees and not for IDPs.** IDPs are noticeable more deprived than any other group while refugee returnees are the least deprived.

Comparisons between shelter beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries show, across a range of models, that the probability of being multi-dimensionally poor is significant and positive for nearly all non-beneficiary sub-groups in relation to the reference group. This means that beneficiaries are less deprived on a range of socio-economic indicators. However, IDPs remain a

marginalized population whose reintegration has not materialized as they fare worse than all other sub-groups in the sample.

## Positive impact of the Shelter Assistance Programme on intra-community relations

Overall, most stakeholders expressed their satisfaction with – and even sometimes their gratitude for – the fact that the shelter programme had been implemented in their community. This positive assessment is linked to two major effects that the programme has on the community as a whole: i) supporting the development of villages, and ii) easing potential tensions within the community – as long as the selection process is seen as fair and transparent.

Among the surveyed households less than 1 per cent do not perceive the impact on the community of the programme as positive. Among the community leaders this number is higher at 10 per cent. Nevertheless, the subjective opinion of the impact on the communities is very positive.

## 2. UNHCR'S POSITION AS A LEADER ON SHELTER INTERVENTION – UNMATCHED BY OTHER STAKEHOLDERS

By looking at changes over time – a month before assistance and one month after assistance – differences between UNHCR beneficiaries and non-UNHCR beneficiaries arise. Looking at access to housing for example UNHCR beneficiary households are 36 per cent less deprived compared to before receiving the assistance, as opposed to 20 per cent of non-UNHCR beneficiary households. **Overall, a higher percentage of households which were assisted by UNHCR are less deprived on nearly every indicator, aside from “Heating” and “Flooring”, over the two periods in comparison to households assisted from other organizations that were not UNHCR.**

An important feature of shelter assistance conducted in the country is the very small number of actors involved in it. No other organisation active in Afghanistan is able to implement a shelter programme that is comparable in size and scope to UNHCR's. There have been considerable changes since 2008. A large shelter coordination system in 2002-2008 has decreased due to worsening security, funding cuts, lower interest and the dominance of NGOs as implementing partners. The Government of Afghanistan has never had a housing policy for rural areas and has suffered from 7 ministerial changes since 2002, and failing communications lines between provincial directorates and the Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation. Partners have come and gone – UNDP, UN Habitat, have implemented shelter without sufficient sustainability due to reductions in funding. UNHCR remains the only leader in the humanitarian stakeholder landscape that has provided shelter to all regions of Afghanistan.

**This means that UNHCR holds a distinct leadership in shelter provision and that any reduction of the scope of UNHCR's SAP will hardly be covered by other partners.** The potential impact of UNHCR's changes in strategy on the lives of vulnerable households is therefore significant – an important factor of consideration for donors, as well as for UNHCR's strategic review of its SAP.



Furthermore, most other stakeholders (IOM, OCHA, CARE, ZOA, InterSOS and ACTED for instance) focus on natural-disaster IDPs or on natural-disaster affected populations. Only NRC and UNHCR have a specific focus on shelter assistance for conflict-induced IDPs and returnees. Limiting the scope of the UNHCR shelter assistance programme would therefore have particularly negative impacts for conflict-induced IDPs. Taking into account the growing numbers of conflict-induced IDPs throughout the country, and the fact that IDPs were marginalized in the reintegration progress assessed in this sample, this is a group that should be the focus of increased attention— and shelter a cornerstone of durable solutions for IDPs.

Additionally, UNHCR is the organisation with the widest geographical coverage of its shelter programme, through all regions of Afghanistan and especially in the South. Southern regions are where most IDPs are located<sup>3</sup>, something that UNHCR acknowledged as the central level authorized a specific focus on IDPs for the shelter programme in the South. This means that even more than anywhere else in the country, the UNHCR shelter programme answered to specific local needs with the shelter programme. The gap left by a reduced shelter programme will therefore be particularly acute in the South.

Clearly, UNHCR has a crucial role in terms of shelter assistance, that is unmatched by any other actors in the country. Any evolution of the programme should take this central role and responsibility into account.

### 3. WEAKNESSES OF THE SHELTER ASSISTANCE PROGRAMME

Stronger beneficiary selection and greater inclusion of the most vulnerable households are the two priorities for ensuring the programme is inclusive of all Extremely Vulnerable Individuals (EVIs).

#### Financial burden of SAP on beneficiaries

Both quantitative and qualitative data showed a high level of satisfaction of beneficiaries with the shelter package, which provides good quality material that most beneficiaries would otherwise not have been able to afford. The distribution process works efficiently with 93 per cent of beneficiaries having received all the necessary materials for their shelter. **Yet, the construction process is a difficult and costly process** for beneficiaries as:

- 972 of the beneficiary households (48 per cent) ran into problems during construction.
- 89 per cent of the households with problems ran out of money during construction (this corresponds to 42 per cent of all UNHCR beneficiaries) with
- Significant disparities in household contribution according to provinces/location.
- 47 per cent of households that ran into problems (22 per cent of the beneficiaries) reported a lack of sufficient access to water to build shelters and rely on costly solutions.

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<sup>3</sup> See for example, Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement-TLO (2010), *Beyond the Blanket: Towards more effective protection for internally displaced persons in Southern Afghanistan*.

The lack of money was mentioned as by far the main challenge faced by beneficiaries when building their shelters. Almost all beneficiaries mentioned **that they had to take up loans to cover** labour costs and wall components. Additional costs were also necessary for buying stones for foundations and, depending on the availability of material in a given area, bricks, cement or clay.

### ***Household contributions***

Almost all beneficiaries, 93 per cent, had to contribute to the shelter construction as per SAP guidelines. However, the amount of funds contributed varies significantly with urban UNHCR beneficiaries spending significantly more out of their own pockets than rural beneficiaries. The data shows a 13,000 AFN (260 USD) gap between urban and rural households, and a smaller, yet sizeable gap of 6 810 AFN (136 USD) between urban and semi-rural households. This is due to the higher costs of materials and labour in urban areas – higher costs that will have to be taken into account in developing an urban strategy for the shelter programme, discussed in the recommendations chapter. Moreover, this is also due to the fact that urban households on average earn a higher income than those of rural or semi-rural areas. To speak in relative terms, the ratio of amount paid on the shelter to household monthly income of beneficiary households, providing evidence that while UNHCR beneficiary households located in an urban context spend more in absolute terms, semi-rural households spend slightly more in relative terms.

### ***Indebtedness***

When asked about the impact of the shelter assistance programme on household debt 47 per cent of all beneficiaries indicated that it increased. This appears to be a bigger problem for beneficiaries of other programmes (54.4 per cent) than for the UNHCR beneficiaries (34.5 per cent). However, no abandonment of shelters due to debts contracted because of the programme were noticed in the field, a potential sign that this is not a major threat to sustainability in the short term, but might become one if sufficient income opportunities are not secured.

### ***Community support***

UNHCR mainly relies on *ashar*, or community assistance, to support the most vulnerable households. However, this was not a practice noticed in the field, with community members mentioning *ashar* could not be an option, as most villagers were faced with difficulties in sustaining their own household. Community representatives, however, indicated that community members did assist the beneficiaries in building their shelters in 60 per cent of cases. Mainly this was assistance in the form of unskilled labour; in rare cases community members also provided skilled labour and materials.

It is important to stress the very high completion rates of the shelters; only 2 households out of a sample of 2,035 beneficiaries sampled had not completed their shelter – although qualitative fieldwork urges to be cautious as field observations reported a higher number of incomplete shelters, not covered in the quantitative sample. This was mainly due to the incapacity of the beneficiaries to finish building the shelter and earn a living at the same time.

## Selection Process: Vulnerable groups side-lined

The selection process clearly appeared as the main weakness in the implementation of the shelter programme as it failed to integrate the most vulnerable. Many flaws in the process were identified during qualitative fieldwork and confirmed by quantitative analysis. These include:

- Exclusion error: Insufficient focus on and inclusion of vulnerable groups as put forward in the UNHCR Shelter Guidelines.
- Inclusion error: More than half of non-refugee returnees receiving UNHCR assistance are not considered to be in the “extremely vulnerable” based on the EVI categories<sup>4</sup>, indicating a misallocation of assistance as this group does not present the migratory profile nor signs of vulnerability that would make them eligible.

The main factor explaining these failures is the significant gap between the SAP guidelines on paper and the reality of selection as it is conducted on the ground, where the Voluntary Repatriation Form (VRF) and land ownership take precedence over any other criteria of selection.

The overreliance on the VRF as the main basis for selection has in certain cases led to the underrepresentation of particularly vulnerable displaced households. The Multi-dimensional Poverty Index used in this study shows that the most vulnerable – “the vulnerable within the vulnerable” – are IDPs, landless households, female-headed households and those households showing illness or disability.

- i. **IDPs were underrepresented in the selection process, or only included in small proportions: just above 11 per cent of UNHCR beneficiaries in 2009-2011 were IDPs<sup>5</sup>.** In our own sample, just above 9 per cent of UNHCR beneficiaries were IDPs and 84 per cent of them are deprived on a range of socio-economic indicators compared to 77 per cent of non-IDP households. We find clear targeting of IDP households for shelter assistance in Takhar and Helmand, followed by Faryab, Hirat and Kandahar. However in all other provinces this clear targeting of IDPs did not take place.
- ii. **Landless vulnerable households** were underrepresented in the selection process. This is not surprising given land ownership is in most cases a requirement for receiving shelter assistance. As such, only a small percentage of UNHCR beneficiaries, 17 per cent, did not own their land before becoming a beneficiary. This is in contrast to other programs, where 27 per cent of households were landless before assistance. Community representatives mentioned that the proposed solutions for providing land to the landless were applied in a very limited number of cases. In 27 of the 60 communities vulnerable landless people applied to the shelter assistance programme. Less than half of the communities were able to provide shelter assistance to those without land ownership.

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<sup>4</sup> In 2012 the term ‘Extremely Vulnerable Individuals’ has been replaced by People with Specific Needs (PSN). According to the PSN guidelines PSN are defined as ‘persons who, due to their specific physical, psychological, mental and social situation are not able to cope with new circumstances or be integrated or reintegrated without external support’. These include women at risk, unaccompanied children, disabled persons... As UNHCR was still using the EVI terminology between 2009 and 2011, we will keep this term throughout this report.

<sup>5</sup> UNHCR Assisted IDP families: 2009, 2010, 2011”, UNHCR Data Unit, Kabul.



- iii. **Female-headed households:** The fact that women were not included in the beneficiary selection in several areas (only 13 out of 60 communities included women in their Beneficiary Selection Committees) raises concern about the effective access to female-headed households, but also about the assessment of the living conditions of potentially eligible families, since, as it was noticed in the field for our own staff, only women are allowed to enter private areas. Aside from including female IP staff in selection in some of the provinces, none of the procedures mentioned in the guidelines for inclusion of females in the selection process have been mentioned either by sub-offices, IPs or community members. When women were involved, it was often in marginal roles.
- iv. **Households with Ill or Disabled members:** households with a member who is physically, mentally or chronically ill are also considered extremely vulnerable. Within our sample, we find that 35 per cent of households of this type are UNHCR beneficiaries compared to the 38 per cent from other organizations. While the representation of households with ill or disabled members is on par with the entire sample, they are more likely to be deprived than the average shown again by the Multi-dimensional Poverty Index.

## Insufficient support to beneficiaries and EVIs

Almost one in three beneficiary households stated not having received any complementary training. When comparing training provided by UNHCR vs. other shelter agencies, findings show that UNHCR beneficiaries are worse off in terms of the support they receive. While one in three UNHCR shelter beneficiaries did not receive any training, this number drops to one in seven in other shelter programmes. Within the training sessions conducted, most concerning was the gap on hygiene promotion. While 54 per cent of beneficiaries receive complementary training on construction, less than 20 per cent of them receive hygiene promotion training. UNHCR shelter beneficiaries are significantly less likely than other shelter beneficiaries to receive any hygiene support.

The research team observed that **the link between protection and the shelter programme is insufficient at the sub-office level**, as the mechanism in place to identify and provide additional support to EVIs is inefficient. The programme guidelines and UNHCR's EVI programme plan for additional cash assistance for EVI beneficiaries, but the research team found very rare examples of this practice actually implemented in the field.

Overall, complementary support to beneficiaries, and particularly to EVIs, is insufficient. The research shows **inefficient mechanisms to provide additional assistance to EVIs** to build their shelter. There is therefore no conclusive finding that shows that additional support and complementary training are made available to EVIs more than the average beneficiary. This shows that the shelter programme can aim to focus more on EVIs not only in the selection process, but in the support trainings provided as well.

## Beneficiary complaints / Urban dissatisfactions

The main complaints raised – by all shelter beneficiaries, UNHCR and non-UNHCR alike – are:

- **The quality of technical assistance** – the highest level of dissatisfaction raised by 14 per cent of UNHCR beneficiaries, and even more – 22 per cent – in other shelter programmes.
- **The quality of latrines** – raised by 12 per cent of UNHCR beneficiaries, less than the 18 per cent of other programme beneficiaries.
- **The size of the shelter** – complaints were greater among UNHCR beneficiaries (11.5 per cent) than other shelter beneficiaries (5.8 per cent).

Urban beneficiaries were more critical of the quality of technical assistance and the quality of latrines provided by the shelter programme. Specifically, their dissatisfaction ranked twice as high as their rural counterparts, and three times that of their semi-rural counterparts.

As such, the data underlines an expectations gap between what the shelter programme offers and urban households' needs. There is an added pressure in urban areas to have adequate housing – in terms of quality but also in terms of appearance, to blend in more effectively within the urban landscape. The UNHCR shelter model was seen as being too rudimentary for urban households. The latrines provided proved ill-adapted and will be considered in the recommendations section. An added focus will be needed in future shelter strategies on the ways the SAP can be adapted to an urban context that is increasingly home to internal displacement and refugee return.

Beyond the urban specificities, semi-rural households also raised concerns – above that of their counterparts – on the size of the shelter, the quality of windows and the design of the shelter.

## Inadequate risk mitigation and prevention mechanisms

**Risk mitigation measures are not properly integrated in the implementation** of the shelter programme, limiting sustainability of the SAP. Preventive measures imposed by the programme's guidelines are limited and only cover earthquake-mitigation measures.

In earthquake-prone areas, risk mitigation is solely taken into account through the inclusion of wood-bracing which were often removed by beneficiaries, due to a lack of awareness of their use. This emphasizes the need for proper awareness training about the importance of such elements.

Preventive measures against floods are also seriously lacking, including proper risk assessments and the possibility not to include a village in the SAP if it is located on flood-prone areas. This was notably the case in Nangarhar, Hirat and Jawzjan. In the latter, despite high risks in the province, the only measure recommended in practice by UNHCR was to build the shelters 60 cm above the ground, which was not systematically implemented across the province and is insufficient in case of serious flooding. In Kandahar, Hirat, Jawzjan, Parwan and Nangarhar inhabitants insisted on the need to build retaining walls to support the sustainability of the shelters.

## 4. CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

Security has deteriorated consistently in Afghanistan since 2005 making it more difficult – and costly – for UNHCR to undertake extensive project monitoring, visiting the field and beneficiaries directly. Related questions of access, costs, logistics and UNDSS restrictions are now part of the operational framework limiting UNHCR in its work in Afghanistan.

In addition, the partnership opportunities of the shelter programme have not increased, to the contrary – the Government of Afghanistan does not have a housing policy for rural areas and communications between provincial directors and Kabul-level representations of ministries remain a key challenge; coordination systems on shelter alone have been discontinued due to lower funding, interest and access of international humanitarian actors; and national NGOs now dominate the implementation field. UNHCR is the sole humanitarian actor with an uncontested leadership of shelter activities.

This study takes into consideration this changing humanitarian context, and the unchanged humanitarian needs of the displaced in Afghanistan – with land and shelter being the priority needs for returning refugees and IDPs. This study also takes into account decreasing funding available to UNHCR – and will therefore frame recommendations that are deemed to be ‘implementable’ for UNHCR as of 2013. UNHCR will have to focus on activities that are “on budget” and activities that have shown their success. In an environment of limited funds, access and time, **the overarching recommendation of this report is to continue the SAP, on a nationwide scale, investing resources on shelter (with better targeting)** rather than on new initiatives that are not ‘on budget’ that have not proven their success, and that reach lower numbers of beneficiaries, thereby potentially creating inter-community tensions.

The SAP focus on vulnerability in its guidelines has been to assist those that showed the greatest needs. A qualitative rather than quantitative approach, a needs-based rather than location-based approach is at the core of the objectives of the SAP – and should remain at its core in future strategies.

Given the key findings of this research and the evidence of SAP’s contribution to reintegration, the question can no longer be *‘Should the shelter programme continue to be implemented in Afghanistan?’* but rather *‘How should the programme evolve to:’*

1. Better adapt to the current migratory trends of the country;
2. Better fit the needs of the most vulnerable;
3. Be more inclusive of IDPs and other vulnerable segments of the population;
4. Be sustainable in an increasingly complex humanitarian context?’

**The study’s main findings point to the need for a more protection-focused, needs and evidence-based approach to the shelter programme in Afghanistan.** Current plans to limit the SAP to ‘reintegration sites’ across the country are unrealistic and counter-productive, as they tend to increase tensions between communities. The main recommendation of the research is to continue implementing the Shelter Assistance Programme as a cornerstone of UNHCR’s activities, as a humanitarian agency, with a necessary update of the existing UNHCR Shelter Programme Guiding Principles (2011).

## REINFORCING SAP'S GUIDING PRINCIPLES

The recommendations of this research are based on the existing SAP Guiding Principles – elements highlighted in bold/orange are the recommended additions to the Guiding Principles for 2013 and beyond. From 8 main Guiding Principles, the research team proposes a set of 11 Guiding Principles. These include two types of recommendations are presented:

*First, the addition of new Guiding Principles* – such as the need to integrate Impact and Needs Assessments (item 1), IDPs' direct participation (item 4), a Partnership Strategy (item 10) and a Monitoring Framework (item 11). These additions are both the most relevant to the project planning cycle and to the changing humanitarian context of Afghanistan. Impact, Needs assessments and Monitoring frameworks are prerequisite for any accountable and transparent implementation process, while IDPs' direct participation and a solid Partnership Strategy are requirements imposed by a humanitarian context defined by increasing internal displacement and lack of access.

*Second, the strengthening of already existing Guiding Principles* – Our recommendations seek to improve, and often breakdown in more detail, principles such as the Community-based approach (item 2), Women's direct participation (item 3), Access to land (item 5), Focus on vulnerability (item 6), Environmental concerns (item 7), and the Preservation of cultural and regional preferences (item 8). These are principles that were found, in our research and fieldwork, to be weak in their implementation – and hence need to be strengthened by better adapting to the challenges at the field level.

The proposed set of 11 SAP Guiding Principles below – detailed in the core recommendations chapter of the report – is a “ready to use” revised set of guidelines for UNHCR's 2013 programmatic review.

### **2013 SAP GUIDELINES – 22 PRINCIPLES and RECOMMENDATIONS**

#### **1. Impact and Needs Assessments**

- a. Baseline**
- b. Calendar and flexibility of construction process**
- c. Setting standard for household contribution**

#### **2. Community-based approach**

- a. Increasing the degree of transparency of the selection process**
- b. Impact on non-beneficiaries**
- c. Complementary assistance**

#### **3. Women's direct participation**

- a. Include women and gender criteria in the selection of beneficiaries**
- b. Include gender criteria in the selection process of IPs**

#### **4. IDPs' direct participation**

- a. Increasing the proportion of IDPs**

- b. Include IDPs in the selection of beneficiaries**
- 5. Access to land
  - a. Evidence of land ownership or NOC
  - b. Legal assistance in cases of land dispute, inheritance, *mahr***
- 6. Focus on vulnerability
  - a. Beneficiary Selection Committee
  - b. No family overlooked
  - c. No contribution requirements for EVIs**
  - d. Training / sensitization workshops**
- 7. Environmental concerns
  - a. Alternative materials
  - b. Latrine per family
  - c. Hygiene and Sanitation Training**
  - d. Adopting a regional risk mitigation approach**
- 8. Preservation of cultural and regional preferences
  - a. Flexibility in design
  - b. Adopting an urban approach**
- 9. Contribution to local economies
  - a. Reviving local economies
  - b. Local procurement of raw materials
- 10. Partnership Strategy**
  - a. Involvement of local authorities**
  - b. Involvement of CDCs**
  - c. Linkages with civil society**
  - d. Linkages with development actors**
- 11. Monitoring Framework**
  - a. Internal monitoring - Increase involvement of UNHCR staff**
  - b. Community-based monitoring**
  - c. Guidelines on corruption and fraud**
  - d. Monitoring framework and follow-up mechanisms**





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