

# Labour Market Survey in North-West, South-West Regions of Cameroon for the Humanitarian Development Peace Nexus



FINAL REPORT



*Picture taken during Samuel Hall field study in Yaoundé, December 2021.*

April 2022

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## LIST OF ACRONYMS

CDC	Cameroon Development Corporation
COVID-19	Coronavirus Disease
CS	Case Study
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HDPN	Humanitarian Development Peace Nexus
ICT	Information Communications Technology
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
ILO	International Labour Organization
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IR	Inception Report
KII	Key Informant Interview
LMA	Labour Market Assessment
NEF	National Employment Fund
NDP	National Development Plan
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NSAG	Non-State Armed Group
NWSW	North-West, South-West
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PPRD	Presidential Plan for Reconstruction and Development
TVET	Technical and Vocational Education and Training
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

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## GLOSSARY

Anglophone Crisis	The crisis occurring in the Anglophone region of Cameroon, where separatists are in conflict with government forces. The conflict emanated from 2016-17 protests but has its roots in the colonial division of Cameroon into Anglophone and Francophone regions.
Civil Society Organisation (CSO)	"Internationally civil society refers to a wide array of non-governmental and not-for-profit organisations that have a presence in public life, expressing the interests and values of their members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations." <sup>1</sup>
Humanitarian Development and Peace Nexus (HDP)	A concept focused on the work needed to coherently address people's vulnerability before, during and after crises by increasing more systematically the coordination and synergies between humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding actors to help communities transition out of humanitarian aid dependence and take a more holistic view to preventing crises from becoming further protracted and long-term. It advocates the need to understand that humanitarian crises can be caused and/or heightened by poor development policies and a lack of inclusive and appropriate development investment. <sup>2</sup>
Labour Market	The International Labour Organization defines the labour market as "the relationship between the supply of and demand for labour, in which employees provide the supply and employers provide the demand. It is a major component of any economy and is linked to markets for capital, goods, and services."
Labour Market Analysis (LMA)	The process of identifying the appropriate labour market for various labour force employment profiles, including the understanding of market trends such ancillary pay, and merit and pay practices. <sup>3</sup>
Labour Force	According to the ILO Resolution concerning statistics of work, employment and labour underutilization adopted during the 19th International Conference of Labour Statisticians "the labour force comprises all persons of working age who furnish the supply of labour for the production of goods and services during a specified time-reference period. It refers to the sum of all persons of working age who are employed and those who are unemployed." <sup>4</sup>
Livelihood	A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (including both material and social resources) and activities required for a means of living. A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stress and shocks and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets both now and in the future, while not undermining the natural resource base. <sup>5</sup>
Non-State Armed Group (NSAG)	Any group: "(i) willing to and capable of using violence for pursuing their objectives and (ii) which is not integrated into formalised state institutions such as regular armies, presidential guards, police or special forces. Such a group, therefore, (iii) possesses a certain degree of autonomy with regard to politics, military operations, resources and infrastructure. [...], and (iv) is shaped through an organisational

1 World Bank, Civil Society Profile, 2021, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/about/partners/civil-society/overview>,

2 Oxfam, The Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus, 2019 [https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/dp-humanitarian-development-peace-nexus-260619-en\\_0.pdf](https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/dp-humanitarian-development-peace-nexus-260619-en_0.pdf)

3 UC Merced, Labour Market Analysis Definition, 2021, <https://hr.ucmerced.edu/compensation/compensation-tools/labor-market-analysis>

4 ILO Resolution concerning statistics of work, employment and labour underutilization, 19th International Conference of Labour Statisticians, 2013

5 Chambers, R., & Conway, G., Sustainable Rural Livelihoods, 1991



	relationship or structure that exists over a specific period of time (spontaneous riots would not qualify)” <sup>6</sup>
North-West, South-West Cameroon (NW/SW)	The North-West, South-West regions of Cameroon are the Anglophone regions of Cameroon, where a socioeconomic crisis is currently ongoing, also termed the “Anglophone crisis”, and non-state armed groups compete for power over different territories. The present study will focus on these two regions.
Recovery	Recovery is “not about simply building back, but about building back differently and better. As such...it is essentially transformative, requiring a mix of far-reaching economic, institutional, legal and policy reforms that allow war-torn countries to re-establish the foundations for self-sustaining development.” <sup>7</sup>
Return	“Return is the act or process of going back or being taken back to the point of departure. It is also often associated with the process of going back to one’s own culture, family and home. This could be within the territorial boundaries of a country, as in the case of a person who has been internally displaced returning home, or across international boundaries, between a host country and a country of origin.” <sup>8</sup>
Resilience	“In the context of exposure to significant adversity, resilience is both the capacity of individuals to navigate their way to the psychological, social, cultural and physical resources that sustain their well-being and their capacity individually and collectively to negotiate for these resources to be provided and experienced in culturally meaningful ways.” <sup>9</sup>
Vulnerability	“The conditions determined by physical, social, economic and environmental factors or processes which increase the susceptibility of an individual, a community, assets or systems to the impacts of hazards.” <sup>10</sup>

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6 Schneckener, U. (2009). “Spoilers or Governance Actors?: Engaging Armed Non-State Groups in Areas of Limited Statehood”. SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 21,P8-9

7 UNDP, Post-Conflict Economic Recovery Enabling Local Ingenuity, 2008

8 IOM, Return and Reintegration: Key Highlights, 2019

9 Ungar, M (2008) Resilience across Cultures, The British Journal of Social Work, Volume 38, Issue 2, February, Pages 218–235

10 UNDRR, Terminology list, 2021

# INTRODUCTION

## Background

Since 2017, a humanitarian crisis has erupted in the North-West and South-West (NWSW) regions of Cameroon, also known as the Anglophone regions of Cameroon. The humanitarian crisis draws its origins in clashes between the government defence forces and non-state armed groups (NSAGs), which pursue a separatist battle. While back in 2016 peaceful protests were held against the government's marginalisation of the Anglophone regions, the opposition between the Cameroonian state and non-state actors has morphed into an armed conflict.<sup>11</sup> In practice, the conflict translates into generalised violence and recurrent lockdowns, with severe impacts on the local economies, together with a deterioration of security and livelihoods.

The ongoing conflict, commonly referred to as the Anglophone Crisis,<sup>12</sup> dates back to the colonial era when European countries were laying claim to parts of Africa. Cameroon was a German colony until the end of the First World War, following which the country was divided in two, between the United Kingdom and France, which resulted in one part speaking English and adopting British governance structures<sup>13</sup>, and the other speaking French and adopting French governance structures. Although tensions between the two regions have generally been high since their unification in 1961 when the United Nations organised a plebiscite, the crisis has claimed more lives and displaced even more people than any other prior conflict the two regions have experienced.

Among the 4.4 million people in need in Cameroon, it is estimated that at least 1.4 million people in need are located in the Anglophone regions, 837,000 in the North-West and 625,000 in the South-West, according to UN OCHA's Humanitarian Needs Overview for Cameroon, published in March 2021.<sup>14</sup> The ongoing crisis has also led to the massive displacement of local populations, reaching 1.1 million people as of August 2020, based on estimated figures from multi-sector needs assessments (MSNAs) conducted under the leadership of OCHA in August and September 2020.<sup>15</sup> According to the OCHA situation report for March 2022, there were about 574,000 IDPs within or displaced from the NWSW and 383,000 returnees (former IDPs) in the NWSW.<sup>16</sup>

Significant socioeconomic impacts can also be observed in the NWSW regions. Large agricultural businesses, which the economies of the North-West and South-West are heavily dependent on, have been targeted by militias and forced to close down due to persistent insecurity. For instance, the banana plantations that used to be managed by the Cameroonian Development Corporation, one of the SW region's largest public employers, were abandoned because of the crisis.<sup>17</sup>

The socioeconomic impacts of the crisis can also be assessed through a gender lens. The crisis has increased the risk of sexual and gender-based violence (GBV) for women and young girls, especially among forcibly displaced women. In its latest monthly situational report, OCHA reports 2,460 GBV cases.<sup>18</sup> 62 per cent of all cases were reported in the Donga-Mantung division in the NW, 13 per cent in Lebialem and 11 per cent in Fako in the SW.<sup>19</sup> Men and young boys too have become more vulnerable, with more than 9 out of 10 individuals exposed to arbitrary arrests, beating, illegal detention, torture, kidnapping, extra-judicial executions and disappearance in the NWSW regions being males.<sup>20</sup> The "patchy attention" given to men, who have also been suffering the

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11 Mimi Mefo Takambou, From peaceful protests to war: The evolution of Cameroon's Anglophone conflict, DW, October 2021.

12 This research recognises that the terminology "Anglophone crisis" is loaded with meaning and potentially negative connotations, and could thus be instrumentalised by the parties involved. As pointed out by one of our key informants, it would make more sense to talk about "the crisis taking place in the Anglophone regions" to avoid any misinterpretation. For ease of writing, however, this research will stick to the terminology "Anglophone crisis", which appears to be widely-used in the literature, by specialists and political analysts, and by the populations themselves.

13 International Crisis Group, Cameroon's Anglophone Crisis: How to Get to Talks?, 2019

14 UN OCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview 2021: Cameroon.

15 It is important to note however that the Cameroonian Ministry of Territorial Administration uses lower IDP and returnee figures.

16 UN OCHA, Cameroon Situation Report, March 2022

17 World Bank Group, The Anglophone Crisis in Cameroon: Assessing the Economic and Social Impacts and Implications for the World Bank Group, p.44

18 UN OCHA, Cameroon Situation Report, March 2022

19 The report notes that the influx of refugees fleeing the conflict in Nigeria to Donga-Mantung contributed to the rise in cases.

20 Delphine Brun, A failure to address the vulnerability of men and adolescent boys, NRC, March 2021.

consequences of the ongoing crisis through physical and psychological violence, has weakened the ability to map out and understand existing vulnerabilities across population subgroups.

Besides local-level impacts, shock waves have also been felt at the national level. The NWSW regions make a significant contribution to the national economy, with 12% of all nationally registered firms in the agricultural sector located in SW. Cameroon is therefore reliant on the Anglophone regions for its production and export of cash crops. The World Bank estimates that, without the crisis, a GDP growth of 4.5% in 2019 would have been recorded, instead of the 3.8% registered that year.<sup>21</sup>

To appease tensions and better measure the challenges to long-term development in the NWSW regions, the Government of Cameroon launched a national dialogue in October 2019.<sup>22</sup> This resulted in the drafting of the Presidential Plan for the Reconstruction and Development of the NWSW (PPRD) which flagged three priority areas, namely 1) restoring social cohesion, 2) reconstruction and rehabilitating basic infrastructure, and 3) revitalising the local economy.

Against this backdrop, the International Organisation for Migration has commissioned Samuel Hall to conduct a Labour Market Assessment in the NWSW regions of Cameroon, with the financial support of the Government of Japan. The aim of this assignment is to assess the needs and challenges of the demand-side (employers), the supply-side (employees and job seekers), and of labour market intermediaries in the regions to ensure that the interventions offered to vulnerable persons and returnees effectively create sustainable livelihoods and youth engagement opportunities. Further to this, the assignment will also strive to support the Government of Cameroon to collaborate with national and local partners to encourage social cohesion efforts in crisis-affected communities where grievances, displacement, and returns may undermine the social fabric and increase the risk of continued conflict.

### North-West and South-West regions: An Overview

To analyse the labour market dynamics in the North-West (NW) and South-West (SW) regions of Cameroon, it is important to first get a sense of their respective economic landscape, their levels of economic development prior to the crisis, and their defining economic characteristics, such as for instance their main sectors of activity. The report compares baseline information with the data gathered to highlight how each region has been affected by and adjusted to the crisis differently.

Prior to the crisis, the NW and SW regions embarked on distinct economic development paths, the SW managing to secure greater economic development than the NW. The SW has seen a rapid decline of its poverty rate from 34% in 2001 to 18% in 2014, ranking it after Douala and Yaoundé in terms of poverty levels. Meanwhile, the NW has seen a slight increase, from 52% in 2001 to 55% in 2014.<sup>23</sup> The NW and SW regions do not benefit from the same endowment in natural resources, which can help explain the SW's faster development. The SW is home to large industrial plantations such as the Cameroon Development Corporation and PAMOL, as well as hydrocarbon and oil refineries. Thanks to its productive base, it managed to secure a prosperous agro-industry before the crisis began.

There are notable differences in the economic make-up of the two anglophone regions. While agriculture remains the largest employment sector across the two regions, employing 47% and 44% of workers in NW and SW respectively, larger cash crop plantations tend to be located in the SW while the NW mainly relies on small-scale farming. In 2014, local production of palm oil, cocoa, coffee, and bananas in the SW represented respectively 35%, 71%, 14%, and 18% of national production. Comparatively, production in the NW accounted for only 9% of the national production of palm oil, 6% of coffee, and 4% of bananas.<sup>24</sup>

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21 World Bank Group, The Anglophone Crisis in Cameroon, p.19

22 Cameroon Tribune: Presidential Plan for Reconstruction of NW/SW: Development Peace Oriented Concept, 2020

23 World Bank Group, The Anglophone Crisis in Cameroon

24 Ibid.

Wholesale and retail trade make up just under 50% of the NW's regional turnover.<sup>25</sup> This can explain why 40% of the National Employment Fund's placements took place in the commercial sector in the NW in 2021. The commercial sector is nonetheless mainly characterised by informal activities, in the absence of large industries. Conversely, around 80% of the SW's turnover comes from crude oil and gas extraction and the refining of crude oil.<sup>26</sup>

Prior to the crisis, there were both issues of unemployment and underemployment on the respective labour markets of the NW and SW. Invisible underemployment, which is defined as earning below the minimum wage was estimated at 69% for the SW and 90% for the NW in 2014 according to the Enquête Camerounaise Auprès des Ménages (Cameroon Household Survey).<sup>27</sup> At the same time, informality remains high in the NWSW regions, although the regions accounted for 6-7% of all registered enterprises in Cameroon,<sup>28</sup> which represents twice the share of other regions that are just as populated, if not more. These figures are to be compared with the percentage of formal enterprises located in Douala and Yaoundé, which amount to 57% respectively. Both invisible underemployment and informality indicate that the issue of job quality was already central prior to the crisis, especially in the highly informal NW region. The precariousness of jobs can be seen as one of the main drivers for migration to larger cities such as Douala and Yaoundé and a key driver for affiliation with non-state armed groups (NSAGs) in the region.

## RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND APPROACH

The main objective of this mapping exercise is to ensure that the assistance delivered to vulnerable persons, IDPs and returnees effectively contributes to creating livelihood and youth engagement opportunities that are sustainable and that facilitate wider discussion on the humanitarian-development-peace (HDP) nexus, social cohesion, and peacebuilding approaches for durable solutions.

The present report uses the Labour Market Assessment (LMA) approach to better understand the dynamics between labour supply and demand in the NWSW regions, investigate their specificities across localities as well as how these dynamics have been affected by the ongoing crisis, and come up with a series of recommendations on ways to improve the labour market integration of vulnerable groups, while creating synergies with the fields of humanitarian action and peacebuilding.

### Box 1: What is the "labour market"?

The term 'labour market' refers to the interactions between those in need of labour (demand side / employers and clients), and those who can supply labour (employees or jobseekers). Both supply and demand are strongly impacted by knowledge, skills, attitudes, and practises in the whole labour market system. Employers might not be able to grow where they operate as they face challenges in filling vacant positions because of skills shortages or skills mismatches. Meanwhile, people of working age may lack the necessary skills to enter specific sectors of activity or may possess skills that are not "in demand" on the labour market. The absence of intermediation between labour supply and labour demand, and information asymmetry can create an unbalanced labour market. This points to the importance of the public employment service (National Employment Fund) and the labour

25 Ibid.

26 Government of Cameroon, Appropriation by the private sector of the Presidential Plan for the Reconstruction and Development of the North-West and South-West Regions, 2021, p.5

27 Institut National de la Statistique (INS), Quatrième Enquête Camerounaise Auprès des Ménages, 2014


28 Institut National de la Statistique (INS), Deuxième recensement général des entreprises, 2016

market information and analysis system (National Observatory of Employment – ONEFOP - and National Observatory of – ONT).

## The Labour Market Assessment approach

The Labour Market Assessment (LMA) approach is a form of analysis used to analyse the supply and demand side in a labour market and the interactions between the two. In doing so, it aims to identify needs and opportunities in the labour market, which can feed into effective policy design. Figure 1 below provides a visual representation of the labour market system and its inner workings.

Figure 1: Labour market system diagram<sup>29</sup>



The importance of the LMA methodology lies in the fact that the analysis goes beyond examining the supply-side and the demand-side and maps out the wide-range of labour market institutions, both formal and informal, that contribute to facilitating the interactions between supply (employees) and demand (employers).

An effective LMA thus requires a thorough examination of the following:

- The demand-side by looking at the needs, challenges, and growth prospects of employers. These will be placed in the context of the ongoing crisis and the COVID-19 crisis.
- The supply-side by gathering data from employees and job seekers, notably the ones benefiting from existing support services. While the supply-side may include people who are not in employment and nonetheless not seeking a job either, such as discouraged people or the “potential labour force”, the data collected points to the fact that people who consider themselves as unemployed in our sample are running own-account activities. This shows that, in the context of the Anglophone crisis, people cannot afford to be discouraged given their financial situation.

<sup>29</sup> The Labour Market System diagram is borrowed from the ILO and UNHCR (see for instance A Guide to Market-Based Livelihood Interventions for Refugees).

- Labour market institutions, both formal and informal, that play a key role in shaping the interactions between supply and demand. Such actors include public and private employment service providers, TVET institutions, BDS providers, microfinance institutions (MFIs), business associations, social partners, but also informal brokers, and civil society organisations (CSOs), namely women and youth organisations.

While the LMA methodology is quite straightforward and implies predefined areas of analysis (demand-side, supply-side, labour market institutions), it also can and needs to be tailored to each market that will be studied. During the data collection and analysis phases, the research team therefore made sure to adapt the variables and indicators that will be assessed to each market (or locality) as their weight and significance can vary from one place to another, from a macro market to a micro community, from an urban setting to a rural one, from a conflict-driven locality that is subject to the high presence of NSAGs to a more peaceful, less volatile community.


### Focus areas

The present labour market assessment differs from more “traditional” labour market assessments insofar as:

1. The research intends to analyse labour market dynamics in regions (North-West and South-West Cameroon) that are affected by a protracted crisis. The assumption is that labour market dynamics evolve differently in insecure and volatile political contexts. This can be explained by several factors: 1) the risk premium for investors is high in volatile settings which makes them reluctant to invest in affected areas; 2) the infrastructures and support systems that enable markets to function are destabilised, the regulations and norms that normally govern the markets are upended; 3) the temporality of labour market decisions is altered preventing both businesses and workers from developing long-term strategies.
2. The analysis aims to inform future programming and policy design in the region. The report therefore concludes by offering actionable recommendations on how labour market interventions, among others, can become an entry point to foster social cohesion and address the needs of vulnerable communities in a more holistic manner.

With these elements in mind, IOM and Samuel Hall agreed on five key areas of interest that can help contextualise this labour market assessment. The focus areas are summarised in Figure 2 below.

Figure 2: The IOM Cameroon LMA's five focus areas



### Focus 1: Anchoring the research in the HDP nexus

The research examines the links between the ongoing conflict and the labour market(s) in the NWSW regions. Closer attention is paid to how political instability, lack of employment opportunities and peace, or the absence

thereof, mutually reinforce one another. On the one hand, the research sheds light on how the practical realities of the crisis are impacting access to jobs and employment status and whether these impacts vary from one locality to another. On the other hand, the analysis and recommendations offer some perspectives on how employment creation initiatives can be used as a peacebuilding tool, or a vehicle to promote social cohesion, especially among the new generations.

### Focus 2: Considering the effects of COVID-19

The research also considers how the COVID-19 pandemic is affecting local communities, especially those living at the borders. It focuses on the compounded effects of both the ongoing political crisis and the global health pandemic. Ultimately, it maps out coping strategies that people prioritise and support systems they rely on to adjust to the disruptions they are witnessed in their local labour markets.

### Focus 3: Economic gap between the NW and SW regions

Prior to the crisis, the NW and SW regions were not on equal footing in terms of their economic development. While the SW has managed to cut down its poverty level by more than half and benefits from natural economic assets such as hydrocarbon, oil and agriculture, the NW has struggled to reduce its poverty rate and diversify its economy. The research takes stock of the current economic situation in the NWSW regions in light of this baseline assessment and underlines the similarities and divergences in how the regions are coping with the crisis at the socioeconomic level.

### Focus 4: Job quality

The research goes beyond the binary analysis of the labour market, which disaggregates the economic landscape into employed vs. unemployed people. It challenges these predefined notions and tries to capture the "in-between" or the wide spectrum of possibilities that separate employed from unemployed people. A specific focus is placed on underemployment, self-employment and entrepreneurship, or other forms of revenue-generating models that people may embrace in the context of political uncertainty.

### Focus 5: Inclusivity and social cohesion

The research takes an intersectional lens to examine the impacts of the ongoing conflict on different demographic groups, including by disaggregating data by gender, age, migration status and other inclusion indicators. Specific questions around the employability, skills development and access to training are addressed using an intersectional approach, underlining on how these dynamics can play out differently according to one's individual characteristics. While it is important to analyse the disproportionate effects of the crisis across demographic groups, the research recommends maintaining a holistic perspective when developing labour market interventions by recognising the existence of a spectrum of vulnerabilities and avoiding exclusive targeting that could reinforce these vulnerabilities.

### Project cycle

It was agreed that the project would be carried out over four phases, as can be visualised in Figure 3.

Figure 3: IOM Cameroon LMA Project Cycle



### Phase 1: Inception phase

The Inception Report laid the foundations of the Labour Market Assessment by providing a rapid desk review of the socioeconomic and political situation in the NWSW regions, conceptual framework, methodology and timeline.

### Phase 2A: Data collection and Fieldwork Report

Data was gathered in specific localities in the North-West and South-West following partner consultations on a targeting strategy as described in the next sections, namely in the divisions of Fako, Ndian and Manyu in the SW and Mezam, Momo and Donga-Mantung in the NW.

The research team used a mixed methods approach: it conducted quantitative surveys on the demand-side (businesses) and the supply-side (employees and jobseekers), and deployed a set of qualitative tools (KIIs, FGDs and case studies) with employers, employees and jobseekers, and labour market intermediaries to further explore socioeconomic indicators.

### Phase 2B: Samuel Hall's mission to Yaoundé

Samuel Hall and IOM agreed on a second phase of data collection. One of the research team members travelled to Yaoundé to conduct additional interviews with government officials, UN agencies and senior experts, and to facilitate a workshop with CSOs and NGOs coming from Buea (capital of the South-West) and Bamenda (capital of the North-West) where participants had the opportunity to react and give feedback on preliminary research findings.

### Phase 3: Analysis and drafting

The analysis aimed to triangulate findings from the literature review and data collected in the NWSW regions as well as in Yaoundé. It concluded with a submission of the draft report.

### Phase 4: Final Report and Validation.

The Final Report is structured into the subsequent sections and will be followed by a validation workshop.

The report begins by providing a general overview of the situation in the North-West and South-West, using a comparative lens. It then breaks down into the demand-side analysis and supply-side analysis.

On the demand-side, assessment sheets are developed for each division to nuance findings on the overall economic landscape and delve into the specific challenges and opportunities business-owners face.

On the supply-side, the challenges employees and jobseekers face to find and retain employment are assessed against specific indicators, including gender, age, and other sources of exclusion. Looking at potential sources of labour market exclusion, rather than focusing on specific demographic groups, is in line with the report's main recommendation to adopt a holistic, inclusive approach when designing labour market interventions.

The report then turns to identifying some of the main coping mechanisms and support systems that businesses and people in the NWSW regions rely on to navigate the crisis. It finally concludes with some recommendations to guide programme design in the two regions based on an understanding of the local context, the needs on the ground as expressed by employers, employees and jobseekers, and the support structures that IOM and other organisations can tap into.

## METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS

### Selecting research locations: a consultative process

To shortlist the research locations where fieldwork would take place, IOM initiated a consultative process where Samuel Hall could meet and discuss with development and humanitarian partners operating in the NWSW regions of Cameroon. As a result, Samuel Hall met with UN OCHA and the Food Security Cluster to present potential research locations and obtain feedback on their conceptual and pragmatic relevance. Exchanges took place on whether the research locations would offer interesting insights in line with the study's objectives, while at the same time being accessible to fieldwork teams and minimising security risks.



During the discussions, it became clear that, due to access, security, and timing concerns, a more effective approach would be to concentrate our efforts in 6 of the NWSW divisions, 3 in the North-West and 3 in the South-West.

From an operational point of view, research locations needed to have an appropriate level of stability and accessibility, so as to minimise potential security implications for researchers and impediments to the research timeline. Our discussions with UN OCHA and the Food Security Cluster were particularly helpful in this regard, as both organisations were able to pass on their knowledge of the local context, which enabled us to identify feasible locations in each region. Once we had selected a provisional list of locations, our implementation partner (IP) was also helpful in providing their intimate knowledge of the region and our Security and Access Leads, recruited through the same IP, provided us with constant updates of any changes in the security situation during the fieldwork process.

With regard to the research rationale, our selection of the 6 divisions and corresponding sub-divisions rested on a number of criteria, as outlined in Table 1 below, including striking an urban-rural balance, a stable-unstable balance and selecting research locations where future labour market interventions could have long-lasting effects.

Table 1: Research location criteria

Criteria	Explanation
Urban-rural balance	We were conscious that whilst selecting the major cities may be easier from an access perspective, it would not provide a representative sample of the region as a whole. It was therefore agreed that a mix of urban, semi-urban and rural localities would be identified to grasp the specificities of labour market dynamics across different contexts as well as allow for data disaggregation by type of locality, e.g., assessing whether the skills that are in demand vary across localities. Ensuring our sample is representative in this aspect will enable us to provide recommendations which are relevant both to large, urban centres like Bamenda, as well as more rural areas, such as Nkambe and Ndu in Donga Mantung.
Stable-unstable balance	During consultations with humanitarian and development actors, it also became clear that different areas were affected to varying extents by the ongoing crisis. For instance, Buea, Tiko and Limbe in the Fako division represent a so-called "peaceful triangle" where the political situation is relatively stable, in comparison to other localities, where "ghost town Mondays" are not always effective, such as in Limbe and Molyko (Buea Town), and where local lockdowns are less severe. This diverges from the divisions of Ndian and Momo that are volatile and prone to sporadic insecurity. By including areas which had experienced both severe and lesser impacts of the conflict, the aim was to effectively isolate the impacts of the crisis on the labour market and its actors (employers, employees and the wider ecosystem).
Sustainability	It was also decided that our efforts should be focused on areas where the implementation of sustainable livelihoods programmes stood a realistic chance of success. Accordingly, areas with pressing security concerns were dropped.

A full breakdown of each division, locality, and our rationale for their selection is included in Table 2 below, followed by a map of the North-West and South-West regions of Cameroon.

Table 2: Research locations

Selected divisions	Selected localities	Rationale for selection	Rural or urban
SOUTH-WEST			

Fako	Buea, Limbe, Tiko	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Buea: capital city of the SW region, urban area, relatively populous.</li> <li>• Limbe: capital of the Fako division, home to one of Cameroon's major employers - the Cameroon Development Corporation (CDC)</li> <li>• Tiko: industrial area where the CDC also operates.</li> <li>• Peaceful triangle as a basis for comparison with other less politically stable localities.</li> </ul>	Urban
Ndian	Mundemba, Ekondo-Titi	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mundemba: capital of the Ndian division, home to the biggest local employer PAMOL.</li> <li>• Ekondo-Titi: located on the coastal southwest littoral region, also home to PAMOL operations.</li> </ul>	Rural
Manyu	Mamfe, Eyumojock (Ekok)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mamfe: capital of the Manyu division, located in the Cross River region, benefited from improvements to its infrastructure. It used to be known for bad infrastructure (tarring roads).</li> <li>• Eyumojock: largely rural area, only 15 km away from Ekok, border post located on the Nigeria-Cameroon road.</li> </ul>	Mamfe semi-urban, Eyumojock rural
<b>NORTH-WEST</b>			
Mezam	Bamenda, Santa	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Bamenda: capital city of the NW region, insecure but major economic hub.</li> <li>• Santa: at the borders with the Western region of Cameroon, located on the Western highlands which are characterised by an ecological fragility and a multifaceted socioeconomic dynamism at varied levels of poverty, malnutrition, and underemployment.</li> </ul>	Urban
Momo	Batibo, Guzang	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Batibo/Guzang: located on the Mamfe-Bamenda road, at the junction between the equatorial forest in the south and the savannah in the north.</li> </ul>	Batibo semi-urban, Guzang rural
Donga-Mantung	Nkambe, Ndu	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Nkambe: lies at the north edge of the Bamenda Grassfields (or the Western Highlands), known for their savanna vegetation, farming (mainly of cash crops) and cattle-grazing.</li> </ul>	Rural

Figure 4: Map of North-West, South-West regions of Cameroon<sup>30</sup>

30 OCHA, Cameroon Situation Report January 2022



### Sampling strategy

The sampling strategy was defined during the inception phase and is summarised in Table 3 below. The sample sizes had already been agreed upon prior to the launch of the project together with IOM.

Table 3: Overall sampling strategy

Tool	Target Group	Disaggregated Sample Size	Total Sample Size
Demand Survey	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Employers (private sector)</li> <li>Self-employed persons</li> </ul>	62 in SW 69 in NW	131
Supply Survey	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Employees</li> <li>Jobseekers</li> <li>Vulnerable persons, including IDPs and returnees</li> </ul>	125 in SW 135 in NW	260
Key Informant Interviews (KIIs)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Government officials (national and regional levels)</li> <li>Labour market intermediaries (training centres, credit unions, service providers etc.)</li> </ul>	9 national KIIs (Yaoundé) 4 regional KIIs, 2 per region	49

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Private sector actors/NGOs</li> <li>Senior experts</li> <li>UN agencies</li> </ul>	36 local KIIs, 18 per region	
Focus Group Discussions (FGDs)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Demand-side: private sector/employers</li> <li>Supply-side: employees and jobseekers (men and women), including IDPs</li> </ul>	9 per region	18
Case studies	Selected young men and women during FGDs	3 per region	6
Civil Society Workshop	CSOs from Buea and Bamenda	1 workshop	13 participants

### Quantitative surveys

A total of 391 quantitative surveys were conducted, 131 surveys on the demand side with both employers and self-employed people and 260 surveys on the supply side with employees and jobseekers. On each side, the number of surveys was first split between the North-West and South-West regions, then distributed across divisions, and finally distributed across sub-divisions.

Slightly larger demand-side and supply-side samples were envisioned for the NW region as its total population is larger than that of the SW region (it was estimated at nearly 2 million inhabitants in 2015, compared to 1.6 million in the SW). In addition, the sample sizes at the division level were obtained by calculating the ratio of surveys in relation to the division's population. The number of surveys, both at the demand-side and supply-side, are therefore proportional to each division's population.

In addition, target quotas were determined for both surveys at the division level. On the demand-side, data collectors were asked to aim for an equal distribution of male and female respondents (business-owners). On the supply-side, enumerators were given specific targets to reach for the following parameters: gender, employment status (employees vs. jobseekers), migration status (IDPs vs. hosts). It should be noted that the actual distribution of respondents across these parameters may slightly differ from the targets that were initially set due to the insecurity and communication challenges that were faced across research localities. Furthermore, some locations suffered from a loss of population, forcing enumerators to travel longer distances to get as close to their targets as possible.

Table 4: Demand-side summary table

Demand-side summary table						
Divisions	Fako	Manyu	Ndian	Momo	Mezam	Donga-Mantung
Total respondents	29	12	21	12	34	23
Employment status						
Self-employed	6	7	1	6	25	7
Employers	23	5	20	6	9	16
Gender						
Female	15	7	8	6	16	11

Male	13	5	13	6	18	12
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Table 5: Supply-side summary table

Supply-side summary table						
Divisions	Fako	Manyu	Ndian	Momo	Mezam	Donga-Mantung
Total respondents	59	22	44	22	68	45
Employment status						
Employed	31	15	27	15	40	37
Jobseekers	28	7	17	7	28	8
Gender						
Female	30	12	17	13	34	23
Male	29	10	27	9	34	22
IDP						
IDP	10	3	9	3	13	7
non-IDP	49	19	35	19	55	38

12 groups of enumerators (6 on the demand-side and 6 on the supply-side) were responsible for administering the surveys in person. Businesses and individuals were sampled through a stratified random approach. Each group of enumerators was assigned one division and requested to reach its target quota one subdivision at a time. Each group was only in charge of administering one survey, either the supply-side or the demand-side, to ensure consistency and time-efficiency.

In each subdivision, they sampled respondents at random in areas of the subdivision where economic activities tend to be concentrated. A fixed-point, fixed-interval approach was used where enumerators started their sampling from one fixed geographical point (usually a mosque, market or church) and selected respondents using a predefined rule (e.g., odd doors every even street; every third door starting from the mosque) to ensure the selection was done in a systematic manner.

### Key informant interviews

49 Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) were held at the national, regional and local levels with various stakeholders. The sample distribution of the KIIs is summarised in Table 6 below.

Table 6: Summary table of the KIIs distributions

Category/Location	National	Regional	Local
Government	2	4	4
IOs/UN	4	n/a	n/a
Senior experts	3	n/a	n/a

Private sector intermediaries (farming, retail, services...)	n/a	n/a	18
NGOs/Associations	n/a	n/a	4
TVET institutions/training centres/employment agencies	n/a	n/a	6
Microfinance institutions	n/a	n/a	4
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>36</b>

Speaking with labour market intermediaries including those with TVTE institutions, microfinance institutions, private sector actors and NGOs/associations offered insights into the formal and informal mechanisms at play to match labour supply and demand. Their performance was assessed in light of the ongoing crisis, and the research highlights how their mandate, the availability and quality of their services have been affected by the volatile environment, leading to the emergence of needs on the labour market that can hardly be fulfilled.

### Focus group discussions

18 Focus group discussions (FGDs) were conducted across the NWSW regions, amounting to 3 per division. The FGDs involved separately employers and employees or jobseekers. Different groups were organised for female and male participants to ensure that the research grasped their individual perceptions and needs, as well as whether they have developed different coping mechanisms to adjust to the crisis. On the supply-side, the FGDs were geared towards understanding the skills level of participants using an intersectional lens, as well as their attitudes/motivations towards existing training or job placement programmes.

### Case studies

In each division, one individual case study was conducted with jobseekers, with a focus on youth jobseekers. This enabled the gathering of information on participants' employment status before the crisis and since it began, as well as information on people's job search strategies and how these have evolved with the crisis.

### Workshop

A civil society workshop was organised in Yaoundé with a total of 13 civil society organisations, majoritarily from Bamenda as well as from Buea. The aim of the workshop was to have grassroots organisations from the NW and SW regions engage with some of Samuel Hall's research findings and provide their feedback on those based on their own experiences working with unemployed people, jobseekers and precarious workers from different population subgroups. Participants shared their own insights from the field on how the Anglophone crisis is affecting communities in terms of accessing employment and sustainable livelihood opportunities. Participants also helped Samuel Hall understand how the different vulnerabilities people face and their limited socioeconomic integration capacity ultimately affect social cohesion in the communities of concern.

### Methodology limitations

The following section details some of the methodological limitations of this research. The limitations mostly concern quantitative data collection.

Limitation and/or caveat	Description
Small sample sizes	It should be noted that, when broken down by region or by division, the quantitative surveys render small sample sizes that lack representativeness. This is especially the case for the demand-side survey (n=131) which disaggregates into samples of between 12 and 34 respondents, limiting the ability to generalise observed trends. In addition, small samples make it hard to compare the distribution of enterprises across economic sectors between divisions as 1) the sample distribution is not representative of reality in the actual population and 2) some economic sectors might be more represented than others, undermining the usefulness of comparisons.

Random sampling	Besides the need for a gender balance, demand-side survey respondents were selected on a random basis. No specific quotas were given on the distribution across economic sectors nor across employment status (self-employed vs. employer) and size. This means that the distribution obtained of respondents across economic sectors and across employment status is a purely random one. In some instances, this may render interesting findings that fit with the overall narrative and are coherent with the qualitative data and desk review. This is the case for the differences we find in the proportion of self-employed economic units in the North-West (where it is larger) vis-a-vis the South-West (where it is relatively smaller). However, it also means that, as researchers, we need to systematically triangulate the results we have, notably when comparing the effects of the crisis on enterprises across divisions, as division samples may include enterprises operating in divergent sectors and which are not equally vulnerable to the crisis.
Quotas were not always met	Survey quotas were given for variables like gender, employment status and migration, but it was hard for the enumerators to always stick to the target quotas given security challenges. People who refused to take part in the research, sometimes on a short-notice, had to be substituted. Finding new respondents proved challenging in places like Momo and Donga-Mantung due to a lot of people moving out of the community. When people refused to take part in the research, enumerators went an extra mile to meet their quotas by travelling longer distances and identifying respondents in smaller villages and communities.
Reluctance to participate and potential self-censorship	Team Leaders reported that, in general, people were reluctant to take part in the research and to share specific information about themselves, more specifically on their financial situation with the enumerators. This can be attributed to the fact that people associated this study with the ongoing crisis and were afraid their participation could have life-threatening consequences for them and their families. Indeed, our field teams and some research participants reported that flourishing businesses or individuals with the reputation of being economically successful can be subject to severe reprisals, such as kidnappings and vandalism. It is therefore important to demonstrate caution when examining the findings as research participants may have censored themselves on certain topics or may have felt uncomfortable being completely transparent about their socioeconomic situation.
Perception bias	Perception bias is a major caveat of this research, especially in the qualitative data. Most of the questions posed to research participants were about perceptions, such as questions on the perceived impacts of the crisis, or on the beliefs people had of how different divisions/population subgroups were faring relative to one another. It should therefore be stressed that some of the findings are based on people's personal accounts, and thus on their subjectivity, and that comparative aspects are anchored in people's perceptions. At the same time, subjectivity can serve as an inestimable tool to understand the intricacies of a conflict and thus draw informative observations.

## SOCIOECONOMIC LANDSCAPE IN THE NORTH-WEST, SOUTH-WEST REGIONS

### The North-West and South-West regions are facing a common tragedy

Since 2016, the Anglophone crisis has been affecting businesses, people and other labour market institutions across the North-West and South-West (NWSW) regions of Cameroon. While the impacts of the crisis cannot be considered homogenous, as detailed later in this section, data shows that labour market actors have had to adjust to several common impacts. One of the major challenges people are confronted with across the NWSW is the atmosphere of fear and uncertainty that poses a constant threat to individual security. As one respondent

explains: *“I strongly think that people living across the NWSW are all in the same boat because they are all experiencing the same crisis with the same effects. But, if we compare ourselves to people living outside the NWSW regions, these people are extremely better off.”* (FGD9, Eyumojock, Manyu). Some practical implications of the crisis are commonly shared across the NWSW regions.

Table 7: Summary table on practical implications of the crisis across the NWSW regions

Practical implications commonly shared across NWSW	
Lockdowns and road closures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Disruption of supply chains</li> <li>• Rural workers/businesses are more affected as cannot transport goods or buy supplies</li> <li>• Jobseekers reluctant to look for opportunities in areas with high insecurity</li> </ul>
Fluctuation of prices	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Businesses either take longer routes to circumvent roadblocks or have to pay a tax to NSAGs to let them pass; in both cases, this increases transportation costs</li> <li>• High transportation costs translating into increased prices</li> <li>• Sometimes farmers forced to sell their produce at a loss before it goes bad</li> </ul>
Sustained losses and mutually reinforcing impacts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The practical effects of the crisis thwart profit-making.</li> <li>• Losses are sustained in time and businesses and workers are forced to deal with the ripple effects of the crisis.</li> <li>• Yet, despite the absence of an enabling business environment, people have no choice but to continue working, even if this seriously affects their mindset and may lead to situations of despair.</li> </ul>


### Lockdowns and road closures

Across localities, participants have reported the closure of roads as one of the biggest practical implications of the crisis. Roads are generally blocked due to the local lockdowns and ghost towns imposed on a sporadic basis. As one FGD participant describes, *“You go to the farm and harvest but you can’t sell because of the gunshots and the fact that the roads are blocked.”* (FGD15, Batibo, Momo). Businesses lament how these disrupt their supply chain and force them to put their operations on hold. Smallholder farmers and people working in rural areas seem to be disproportionately affected by the restrictions on movement. With the crisis, they are unable to transport their products to urban markets, customers are less likely to travel to buy their products and they cannot supply themselves with raw materials or inputs. *“Business has really been slow because at times. As a builder, I have difficulties getting materials. Due to ghost towns and road blockages, materials cannot be easily transported to Guzang and sometimes, their quantity even decreases along the way.”* (FGD13, Guzang, Momo)

Meanwhile, jobseekers are also finding it harder to look for and find a job. On the one hand, this can be explained by the shortage of jobs available locally, as businesses are forced to close either temporarily or permanently, or reduce their workforce as a direct consequence of lockdowns. On the other hand, the movement restrictions and roadblocks NSAGs imposed on local populations contributes to their reluctance to actively seek employment in unstable areas. This is notably the plea of a young female jobseeker in Ekondo-Titi, Ndian: *“I feel insecure and unsafe to work in certain areas like Lobe Estate and Bekora due to constant clashes, so I don’t source for jobs located in these areas, and this has made it difficult for me because there are more opportunities in those areas than where I am now.”* (CS2, Ekondo Titi, Ndian) Ultimately, these restrictions are forcing people to move to a different area to avoid conflict which, according to supply-side survey respondents, is an indication of how the crisis is affecting job retention and job search (see Figure 5 below).

Figure 5: Percentage of people answering, *“Forced to move due to the conflict”* when asked *“In what ways has the crisis impacted your ability to find or keep work?”* across divisions





### Fluctuation of prices

The disruption to supply chains and regular roadblocks has contributed to the fluctuation of prices. On the one hand, insecurity has increased transportation costs which in turn has translated into repercussions for consumer prices. This is because businesses are forced to take longer routes to buy or sell products. At the same time, getting through roadblocks is often conditioned on paying a tax to NSAGs. As one female IDP living in Bamenda reports, *“Transportation has become challenging. You cannot go from Bamenda to Nkambe passing through Wum as you did before. Instead, with the road being blocked, you have to go around. And when roads are not blocked, you have to use a bike and pay a very very high amount of money.”* (FGD11, Bamenda, Mezam). Other respondents argue that the unannounced lockdowns push them to sell their products, especially food supplies, at a loss before they perish.

### Sustained losses and mutually reinforcing impacts


The atmosphere of uncertainty and the practical ways in which the crisis is playing out across local economies drastically hinders profit-making. For instance, one employer in Mamfe states *“I cannot supply myself since they [NSAGs] usually intercept the goods, neither can I buy from big business partners and my income has reduced due to the fear of investing much capital with the risk involved.”* (FGD7, Mamfe, Manyu)

Moreover, the challenges businesses and workers face are often mutually reinforced and generate ripple effects. Loss of profits become sustained in time, making it more difficult for people to navigate the crisis and find effective solutions. For instance, in one KII, the participant describes how he had to abandon his crops because *“the ‘Ambas’ came and took them as their zone”* and even after the NSAGs had left the area the farms had grown wild and chemicals were needed to spray them. Yet, in times of crisis, these chemicals are harder and more expensive to obtain, providing an example of how communities are often trapped between multiple concurrent impacts of the crisis: *“They have now moved up to 4,500-5,000 CFA for chemicals to spray the farms, how many containers will you buy to spray the farms that you have? Where is the money? There is no money.”* (KII32, Nkambe, Donga Mantung).

Yet, despite the significant drops in revenues, business-owners report having no choice but to keep their business afloat, even if it means losing their entrepreneurial appetite. *“Yes, I can say the business is sustainable, but I would not say I am enjoying it. I just try to save as much as I can. For instance, I try to save 2,000 XAF to allow me to buy small materials like zips and threads.”* (FGD14, Guzang, Momo) This has translated into mounting psychological impacts, as business-owners describe the stresses of the crisis in vivid terms: *“Sometimes I feel like crying when talking about this crisis. I am a married man with children; life is so difficult for me because my business has really dropped.”* (FGD3, Tiko, Fako). This is mirrored in the quantitative findings,

where over 90% of respondents said they had been feeling anxious or stressed because of the impacts the conflict could have on their business (Figure 6).

Figure 6: Business-owners strongly agree when asked “Have you been feeling anxious or stressed because of the crisis?”



### Crisis increases the feeling of us vs. them

Participants have described these impacts as uniting the NWSW regions and differentiating them from Francophone Cameroon. According to a business-owner, “You cannot compare the businesses here with those in Douala, because in Douala, businesses are flourishing” (KII24, Santa, Mezam). Likewise, a jobseeker laments the lack of opportunities available to her and compares her situation to those in the Francophone region: “What we face here is common all over the Anglophone regions, the francophone[s] are the ones with all the opportunities in the country.” (FGD2, Limbe, Fako). This sense of differentiation is further exacerbated by the discrimination participants reported being victims of from the Francophone region. One respondent described how they are charged different prices for goods, “They will sell to you very high and sell to their people very low”, whilst another participant describes the verbal abuse she has received “They call us “anglofools” [pejorative terminology to qualify the inhabitants of the Anglophone regions and ask us to go back and fix our problem in our community” (FGD12, Santa, Mezam).

### Comparing the North-West and South-West

Despite the NWSW regions sharing common experiences of the Anglophone crisis, data reveals that each region is also confronted with specific challenges rendering the North-West region more vulnerable to the crisis than the South-West. The nuances in how the crisis plays out in each region can firstly be explained by the distinct socioeconomic and geographical composition of the NW and SW regions.

As highlighted in the introduction, the NW and SW regions were not on an equal footing economically prior to the crisis: the SW had experienced a decline in its poverty rate between 2001 and 2014, while poverty gained some ground in the NW over the same period.<sup>31</sup> Both the NW and SW primarily rely on agrarian activities, but the type of crops and the scale at which crops are cultivated significantly varies from one region to another. The NW lies in the Grassfields (or Western Highlands), a region characterised by heavy rainfall, savanna vegetation and

31 World Bank Group, The Anglophone Crisis in Cameroon

cool temperatures that make the soils particularly fertile. While this has favoured the expansion of some large-scale plantations, including tea and coffee, the NW remains predominantly reliant on smallholder farming.<sup>32</sup>

Meanwhile, the SW has proven more capable of investing in cash crops, such as cocoa, palm oil, bananas and coffee which accounted for respectively 71%, 35%, 18% and 14% of national production in 2014, compared to proportions that do not exceed 10% of national production in the NW.<sup>33</sup> This can be attributed to the existence of large government-run agri-businesses that have managed these plantations for decades, such as the Cameroon Development Corporation.

Participants equally highlighted how the differing compositions of the region in terms of geography, natural resources, and demographics shape their economies and labour markets. According to one participant in Donga-Mantung, *“the South West has the natural resources and the North West has the human resources”* (KII36, Nkambe, Donga Mantung). The presence of natural resources and the openness to maritime trade are thought to make a difference in the economic development of the two regions. As one key informant in Buea puts it, *“there is a high level of economic development in Limbe thanks to the good state of the roads, the presence of the Atlantic Ocean and to the CDC which employs three quarter of the population.”* (KII4, Buea, Fako)

Respondents also seem to recognise the demographic specificities of the NW and SW regions. A consensus exists on the fact that the NW is more populous than the SW, which may have repercussions on the region’s capacity to develop economically and to absorb the growing labour force. As one respondent puts it, *“we need to talk about demography in the North-West. There is a real problem, the size of households continues to grow, the labour force continues to grow and a lot of young people are turning 16 [and thus officially entering the labour market], all of this exacerbates the pressures on existing resources.”* (KII44, Yaounde) Another respondent reveals the other side of the medal by discussing the implications in terms of internal migration patterns: *“I am tempted to say that the South West may be more developed because we have fewer South Westerners moving up North West as compared to those coming to the South West.”* (KII8, Buea, Fako). This is however not to say that internal displacement to the SW region is more acute. According to the OCHA’s latest figures, the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) was more pronounced in the NW compared to the SW as of December 2021<sup>34</sup>, leading to the two following hypotheses: 1) demographic growth in the NW is accompanied by increasing internal movements within the region, 2) which may in turn put more strain on limited resources.

Data collected shows that own-account workers<sup>35</sup> seem to be more prevalent in the North-West region compared to the South-West region with 55% of enterprises in the NW being led by a single person working on their own account and without employees compared to only 23% in the SW.

*Figure 7: Prevalence of own-account workers in the NW vs. SW regions*

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32 A factor that could explain why the NW region, despite being fertile, has not managed to industrialise its agricultural sector as much as in the SW region is the adverse effects of climate variations and changes (CVC), which smallholder farmers are highly vulnerable to. For more information on why smallholder farmers in the Western Highlands of Cameroon are highly vulnerable to CVC, see Awazi et al. (2020). Appraisal of smallholder farmers' vulnerability to climatic variations and changes in the Western Highlands of Cameroon. *Scientific African*. 10.

33 World Bank Group, *The Anglophone Crisis in Cameroon*

34 UNHCR, Cameroon: Locations of UNHCR Persons of Concern, December 2021, <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/POCs%20Decembre%202021.pdf>

35 The ILO classifies employment into six categories namely employees, employers, own-account workers, members of producers’ cooperatives, contributing family workers and workers not classifiable by status (see the 1993 International Classification of Status in Employment ICSE-93). Own-account workers are defined as “those workers who, working on their own account or with one or more partners, hold the type of jobs defined as “self-employment jobs”, and have not engaged on a continuous basis any employees to work for them.”



This is in line with qualitative findings which suggest that: *“The SW region is more formal, which can be explained culturally by the fact that the SW population is located closer to the coast with access to natural resources and fishing. The NW is different, the informal sector there is significantly larger, the NW does not have big state-led enterprises, the economic fabric is mainly constituted of smallholder farmers and agricultural cooperatives, they have a strong learning by doing culture.”* (KII44, Yaounde)


Among own-account workers in the NW, a bigger proportion had established their business before 2016, or prior to the crisis, signalling that the NW region already had a strong self-employment, less formalised base before the crisis began. It is however important to note that businesses that were launched during the crisis are more likely to take the form of own-account workers than businesses established before 2016. This is particularly true for the NW region where 75% of businesses (12 out of 16) established during the crisis are own-account workers, compared to 40% (6 out of 15) in the SW region.

Table 8: Distribution of enterprises based on enterprises status and period during which they were established

	Established Pre-2016	Established Post-2016	Total
North-West	53	16	69
Self-employed	26	12	38
Not self-employed	27	4	31
South-West	47	15	62
Self-employed	8	6	14
Not self-employed	39	9	48


The impacts of the crisis seem to have been felt harder in the NW compared to the SW: *“the ongoing Anglophone crisis is more heated in the NW region compared to the SW region, [which in turn] limits economic development in the NW.”* (KII12, Mundemba, Ndian). When asked to compare their turnover before the crisis to now, 81% of businesses established prior to 2016 in the NW (n=53) said that their turnover was “significantly higher” before 2016 compared to 67% of businesses in the SW (n=46). At the same time, a higher percentage of businesses in the SW (13%) reported that their turnover was significantly lower, compared to the NW (8%), implying that some businesses experienced a positive evolution since 2016.

Figure 8: How was enterprise turnover before the crisis compared to today?



This is consistent with the more pessimistic outlook North-West enterprises have expressed in comparison to enterprises in the South-West. When asked how much work they would have next year compared to this year, 30% of businesses in the NW said that they were uncertain compared to only 18% in the SW indicating that economic actors in the NW, namely own-account workers, are unable to project themselves in the future. On average, businesses in the SW seem to be more optimistic about their workload in the next year as seen in Figure 9 which associates answers on a spectrum going from “a lot less” to “a lot more” with a 5-point scale. The higher the average, the more optimistic respondents are - in this, respondents in the SW record an average of 4.4 compared to 3.6 in the NW.

Figure 9: Workload next year compared to this year, distribution on a 5-point scale



Respondents in the NW also depicted a more discouraging picture of the future of the private sector in their region. 78% of businesses in the NW were unable to say how long they could stay operational if the crisis would continue, compared to 53% in the SW. Similarly, only 19% of businesses in the NW believed that they could stay operational for at least 4 months, compared to 35% of businesses in the SW. Thus, a correlation could be posited between the economic make-up of each region and their capacity to cope with the crisis, which will further be explored in subsequent sections.


## DEMAND-SIDE ASSESSMENT

The demand-side assessment breaks down into six assessment sheets, one for each division surveyed during this research. The aim is to examine the specific challenges and opportunities businesses face in each division, looking particularly at their geographic and socioeconomic characteristics. The criteria used in the selection of the research locations, namely urban vs. rural, stable vs. unstable and the capacity of each division to provide an entry-point into sustainable labour market interventions will be used to guide the location-specific analysis. As much as possible, the analysis will be the outcome of triangulated data to nuance regional findings on the practical implications of the crisis for business actors.

### FAKO DIVISION (SW)

FAKO DIVISION DEMAND-SIDE ASSESSMENT	
Safety of doing business	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Urban centres</b> such as Buea, Limbe and Tiko - also known as the peaceful triangle - are relatively safer than other areas in the NWSW regions. Businesses operating in these cities (e.g., provision stores, bars, restaurants) are less likely to be targeted by NSAGs.</li> <li>• Security challenges are however prominent in <b>rural areas</b> where rural workers and entrepreneurs risk their lives if they decide to continue operating.</li> </ul>
Agro-industrial sector	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The crisis provoked the <b>collapse</b> of Cameroon's second biggest employer, the Cameroon Development Corporation (CDC).</li> <li>• Farmers working for the CDC were forced to <b>abandon palm oil, rubber and banana plantations</b>, some of which are now controlled by NSAG, mainly out of fear and life-threats.</li> <li>• Many businesses that <b>depended on the CDC</b> for their survival are now struggling to stay afloat.</li> </ul>
Labour market dynamics	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Two of the major impediments to business expansion are the <b>"lack of demand"</b>, cited by <b>62%</b> of business respondents and <b>"market closures"</b> cited by <b>55%</b> of respondents.</li> <li>• Fewer business closures were reported, compared to other divisions, but employers are <b>forced to reduce work hours</b>.</li> </ul>

Figure 10: Fako radar chart




In general, the data gathered leads to conclude that businesses in Fako do not fare as bad as businesses operating in other divisions of the NWSW regions. Yet, this conclusion is nuanced after examining more closely how different economic sectors are affected by the crisis to different extents and how labour market dynamics, especially between supply and demand, are more generally affected.

At a first glance, Fako seems to be faring better than other divisions


Data collected from the three main urban areas in Fako - Buea, Limbe and Tiko or the so-called "peaceful triangle" - gives the impression that businesses in these localities are faring better than their counterparts in other areas of the NWSW. Research participants report the area is relatively stable compared to other localities, contributing to the creation of a more enabling environment for business development than elsewhere. *"I think the economic development in Fako is better compared to other communities in the region due to the fact that it is relatively calm and hasn't been hit as hard as other places. For this reason, it can still benefit from different economic assets like jobs, fertile soil for agriculture, ports, touristic centres which other communities like Mamfe, Kumba, Kumbo, Bamenda are not privileged to have as the crisis has really impacted the population negatively there."* (Kiló, Limbe, Fako). Respondents to the demand-side survey equally share the perception that tensions are more appeased in Fako. Only 52% of respondents claimed that the ongoing crisis acted as one of the main barriers to business expansion, which constitutes one of the lowest rates together with Mezam, and marks a striking difference with Ndian, Manyu and Momo where all respondents agreed with this statement.

Figure 11: Do you feel that the ongoing crisis is one of the main barriers to the expansion of your business?



The relative political stability in Fako also translates into more favourable socioeconomic indicators in comparison to other divisions. When asked how their income changed with the advent of the crisis, 20% of supply-side respondents - employees and jobseekers - said that their income slightly increased compared to an average of 8% across other divisions, and 24% claimed that it significantly decreased compared to an average of 40% across divisions. Supply-side respondents were also asked what impacts “ghost town” days and imposed lockdowns had on their employment. Low percentages were gathered in Fako on indicators such as “reduced the amount of jobs available” which only 12% of respondents agreed with, “employer forced to close permanently” which only 3% of respondents agreed with, and “employer forced to close temporarily” which only 5% of respondents agreed with. These percentages are to be compared with significantly higher percentages in divisions such as Donga-Mantung and Ndian (usually exceeding 50% of respondents). However, 64% of respondents in Fako admitted that NSAG restrictions contributed to reducing working hours, an indication that businesses may be suffering less severe impacts than in other divisions (see Figure 12).

Figure 12: Are reduced working hours one of the ways NSAG restrictions are impacting employment?



A sectoral analysis however brings nuance to the primary assumption



Looking at how different sectors of activity are more or less affected by the crisis can help nuance the initial assumption. Some research participants point to the gap that exists between how the crisis is playing out in the agricultural sector in comparison to the services sector. To exemplify this, the founder of a palm oil milling company stressed that businesses are not on an equal footing regarding the safety of their operations and staff. *"To a certain extent, whether an environment is safe for doing business depends on the type of business we are dealing with. For example, oil milling businesses are not safe because you are mostly at the farm but provision stores businesses can be safe because they are in town."* (FGD3, Tiko, Fako)

In Fako, it appears that entrepreneurs operating in the services sector or in major towns are more likely to keep their business afloat than people operating in rural areas. The quantitative data equally confirms this: on the supply-side, the fact that economically active respondents are predominantly involved in professional jobs and services activities may have contributed to the more positive socio-economic assessment previously presented.

Major industries and occupations in the division, including IT and communications, beverages and transportation face fewer challenges than rural-based activities. As one respondent puts it, *"Buea is a student community so we have lots of IT and communication services and the beverage sector has a large presence [...]. If I had to compare with other communities in the NW, I would say that the two major sectors are transportation and beverages. These are very prominent, every neighbourhood has at least 3 bars."* (KII37, Buea, Fako). A provision store owner also explains that *"we do not face many challenges when it comes to how safe our environment is for doing business. What we struggle with however are the many lockdowns that are imposed sporadically"*. (FGD3, Tiko, Fako) This testifies to the fact that small-scale entrepreneurs located in urban centres are less of a target for NSAGs than rural entrepreneurs and workers.

Meanwhile, businesses and workers in rural areas are experiencing the effects of the crisis in a more drastic way. Rural operators are more likely to become a target of NSAGs. Thus, choosing to pursue any kind of work or business can easily turn into a life-threatening situation in rural areas of Fako. The unsafe environment thwarts business expansion and undermines the long-term visibility businesses need to run their activities over an extended period. This is notably the case for small-holder farmers who were employed by the Cameroon Development Corporation (CDC), one of the South-West region's major agribusiness, or used to work closely with the company.

The CDC experienced a steep decline in its operations and revenues since the onset of the crisis. Once the second biggest employer in Cameroon (after the state), employing over 15,700 people including seasonal workers prior to the crisis, the CDC was forced to lay off most of its workers as a result of the crisis and after prolonged delays in salary payments.<sup>36</sup> The CDC abandoned many of its plantations in response to the heavy fighting. This had led to a significant drop in the company's production capacity, including in products such as banana, palm oil and rubber, up to the point where major state-owned enterprises (e.g., CDC and Pamol) incurred heavy financial losses estimated at FCFA 269 billion (€410 million) in July 2018 by the Gicam (Groupement interpatronal du Cameroun).<sup>37</sup>

When separatist fighters claim control of the CDC's plantations, sometimes turning them into separatist camps, they threaten workers to either leave the plantations or be killed. With this, thousands of workers have escaped for safety and abandoned plantations for fear of being attacked. Others, working in different parts of the SW region, have simply left in response to the rampant insecurity. Others have resigned after cases of CDC personnel being kidnapped and not receiving any assistance from the CDC administration to pay the ransoms.

The decline of a major agroindustrial business brought about the collapse of an entire ecosystem of subcontractors who depended on the CDC to stay operational. The crumbling down of the "CDC empire" was summarised as follows by a key informant in Yaoundé: *"As the CDC halted its operations, all of the formal SMEs*

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<sup>36</sup> Dinsi Stanley Chung, The Impact of Armed Conflict on Agro-Industrial Development in Cameroon: The case of the Cameroon Development Corporation (CDC) within the context of the Anglophone crisis, *Journal of Agricultural and Crop Research*, Vol. 8(12), pp. 279-288, December 2020.


<sup>37</sup> International Crisis Group, *Crise anglophone au Cameroun : comment arriver aux pourparlers*. Report 272, May 2019.

that it attracted, both the subcontractors and the suppliers, will now find themselves destitute from major employment opportunities. They will suffer more in terms of poverty and the decreasing quality of jobs.” (KII44, Yaoundé)

As an example, a provision store owner working in Tiko shared his personal account : “The crisis has really affected me because my business here in Mudeka-Tiko has really dropped. [...] We depend so much on CDC workers, but since the CDC has been affected, we too have been affected because our capital has dropped. Money is not circulating.” (FGD3, Tiko, Fako) The respondent goes on to explain that the closure of the CDC, on which a considerable share of the population depended for jobs, provokes spillover effects on the local ecosystem, with shop-owners losing the bulk of their customers. “We used to make so much gain, especially at the end of the month when CDC workers would get paid. But now my business has dropped to level zero. We rely on CDC workers to progress or succeed with our businesses because they are our customers.”

The indirect effects of the crisis on businesses in Fako were also found in the quantitative data. While the crisis is less likely to affect small urban businesses directly by shrinking their production or technical capacity, it nonetheless indirectly affects businesses through the dysfunctions it creates in local markets. 62% of businesses in Fako reported that one of the main barriers to business growth is the lack of demand, the highest percentage across divisions (Figure 10). Similarly, 55% of businesses in Fako claimed that market closures was one of the main ways their business was affected by the crisis. This points to the fact that, in major urban hubs like localities like Buea, Limbe and Tiko, the main impediment to business development for small-scale sellers and service providers is the shortage of customers. One employer in Buea pinpoints the shrinking customer base as one of the main reasons for her enterprise’s declining profitability: “For me the environment [for doing business] is 50-50 [...]. Most of my customers have lost interest in my goods due to insecurity. Sometimes I even have to give away the goods because my clients are afraid to come collect them. So I have dropped my supply because the environment is not safe. (FGD1, Buea, Fako)

Figure 13: Do you feel that lack of demand is one of the main barriers to the expansion of your business?




## MANYU DIVISION (SW)

### MANYU DIVISION DEMAND-SIDE ASSESSMENT

<p>Manyu is on the “receiving end”</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The economies of localities like <b>Mamfe</b> and <b>Eyumojo</b> are predominantly built on the <b>agrarian</b> sector and the harvesting of <b>cash crops</b>. Little to no transformation/processing industries exist.</li> <li>• Manyu therefore depends on other regions and cross-border trade with Nigeria to supply itself with primary and manufactured goods.</li> </ul>
<p>The crisis and Manyu’s economic decline</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The tarring of the Cameroon section of the <b>Trans-African Highway</b> spurred economic growth in <b>Manyu</b>. But those effects were short-lived because of the crisis.</li> <li>• <b>Businesses have relocated</b> and investors are reluctant to put money in the division.</li> <li>• Businesses and workers suffer from <b>difficulties sourcing goods</b> from outside Manyu and are forced to increase production cost as a coping strategy.</li> </ul>
<p>Existing sectors, emergent sectors and areas with investment needs</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• There is a need to <b>upscale agricultural production</b> and support rural workers in moving up agricultural value chains.</li> <li>• <b>Investments are needed in local infrastructures</b>, including roads, schools and health facilities. This can contribute to creating an enabling environment for businesses and bridge the gap between supply and demand of labour.</li> <li>• The transportation sector is currently used to make “easy money” in the case of commercial bike-riding and is restricted to men. There could be room to structure this sector using a <b>gender-sensitive lens</b>.</li> </ul>

Figure 14: Manyu radar chart



### Manyu is on the “receiving end”

Most participants argued that Manyu’s economy is predominantly built on the agrarian sector, with little to no transformation industries available to process harvested crops. Indeed, Manyu is located at the border with Nigeria and shares borders with two divisions from the North-West region. It is also home to the city of Mamfe which connects Manyu to the North-West through the Mamfe-Bamenda road, and to Nigeria through the

Mamfe-Ekok road, both constituting parts of the Lagos-Mombasa Trans-African Highway.<sup>38</sup> It is through this highway that Manyu is able to supply itself with primary and secondary goods. A bread producer located in Mamfe summarised the state of the local economy as such:

*“Mamfe is on the receiving end. It depends on goods from Nigeria, Bamenda, Buea, Kumba and Douala while other parts of the [NWSW] region have industries and other economic sectors that make it easy for them to get access to the goods they need. Mamfe solely depends on the transport and agriculture sectors as well as small-scale businesses like the sale of petrol, unlike in the other regions where they have a wide-range of sectors to choose from.”* (KII15, Mamfe, Manyu)

### The short-lived effects of tarring the Ekok-Bamenda road

The crisis began soon after the tarring of the Cameroon section of the Lagos-Mombasa Trans-African Highway had been completed<sup>39</sup>, wiping out five years (2010-2015) of road rehabilitation and infrastructural investments. The rehabilitation of the Ekok-Bamenda road which began in 2010 - the Ekok-Mamfe border section was completed in 2015 or a year before the crisis ensued - paved the way for the socioeconomic and physical transformation of the city. Elvis Kah and Gregory Ndip Bate (2020) highlight some of the major socioeconomic outcomes of the infrastructural investments in a recent paper, summarised in Table 9 below.

Table 9: Main outcomes of the tarring of the Ekok-Bamenda section of the Trans-African Highway

Main outcomes of the tarring of the Ekok-Bamenda section of the Trans-African Highway	
Increased mobility and expansion of transportation sector	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• It increased people’s mobility and acted as an economic booster for Mamfe’s transportation sector.</li> <li>• Mamfe became a transit town for pilgrimage routes to and from Nigeria as well as a centre for religious activities in the midst of the Ebola outbreak and in response to the threat of violent extremism in the region.</li> </ul>
Economic growth and flourishing of small- and large-scale businesses	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• It accelerated the economic development of Mamfe and encouraged the establishment of various businesses, small shops and retailers.</li> <li>• Considered as a potential market centre, Congelcam, one of the country's main dealers in frozen fish, opened up a branch in Mamfe in 2015. This opened the door for the development of a wider fish selling ecosystem and drove up the services sector with the multiplication of bars and restaurants.</li> <li>• Suppliers also benefited from the tarring of the road as raw materials could circulate more easily, enabling the expansion of beer brewing companies, cement companies, warehouses and hardware stores.</li> </ul>

38 The Lagos-Mombasa Trans-African Highway, or Trans-African Highway 8 (TAH 8) is the main highway linking West and East Africa. It is part of the transcontinental road network funded and spearheaded by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), the African Development Bank (ADB), and the African Union.

39 Until 2010, the Cameroon section of the TAH 8, specifically the Ekok-Bamenda section passing through the town of Mamfe (179 km) remained untarred. This represented great economic losses for Mamfe; it enclaved the town and hindered the development of cross-border economic linkages with Nigeria as well as linkages with other regions in Cameroon.

Source: Kah, E., & Bate, G. N. (2020). Socio-Economic Impact of Tarring the Cameroon Section of the Lagos-Mombasa Trans African HighWay through Mamfe in Manyu Division. *Open Journal of Social Sciences*, 8, 393-411.

<p>Acceleration of cross-border trade and increased customs revenues</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• It bolstered cross-border trade, especially for foodstuffs like yams, maize, groundnuts, palm oil and tomatoes, preventing food shortages in the region, and increased customs revenues in the border town of Ekok.</li> <li>• In 2016, approximately 350 tonnes of primary goods were on transit at the Ekok frontier market (mainly heading to Nigeria), while imported primary goods were estimated at 150 tonnes in 2008 (Nigeria to Cameroon).</li> </ul>
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
The economic growth opportunities the tarring of the Ekok-Bamenda road created in the division of Manyu were however short-lived and could not resist the Anglophone crisis. As one respondent explains, *“the road between Bamenda and Ekok has been destroyed by the NSAGs and ongoing political tensions. The service industry is limping and infrastructures are very poor.”* (KII16, Mamfe, Manyu)

### Manifestations of an economic decline

Since the onset of the crisis, Manyu has therefore been witnessing an economic regression. This decline translates first and foremost into business relocation and investor withdrawal. *“Most big business-owners in town, some who have thrived in Mamfe for more than 15 years, have relocated to other regions due to insecurity. There are very few startup businesses because people are afraid to invest and some even lack the finance to make these businesses grow.”* (KII16) The fear of uncertainty and not being able to predict return on investments is thwarting business development in the division. This observation is not specific to Mamfe, as the division’s capital, but equally shared by research participants in Eyumojock: *“There are no longer many enterprises in Eyumojock since most business-owners have relocated to other parts of the country. And the very few small-scale businesses that are left are not doing very well due to the crisis situation.”* (KII17, Eyumojock, Manyu)

Moreover, people are experiencing increased difficulties to source goods from other regions and neighbouring Nigeria. This forces them to find alternative means to continue feeding Manyu’s economy - even if this implies negative externalities for consumers. As seen in Figure 11, 75% of demand-side respondents in Manyu stated that they are struggling to supply themselves with the raw materials they need to run their business effectively.


Figure 15: Has your business had difficulties in procuring raw materials/components/ingredients?



In addition, 42% of business respondents in Manyu reported that their cost of production had increased as a result of the crisis (see Figure 12). This suggests that soaring production costs may be the only viable solution for businesses to continue operating in the current context. Consequently, market prices are on the rise and consumers have to cope with a diminishing purchasing power: *“the border to Nigeria was locked and goods*

could not leave Nigeria for Cameroon and vice versa [which] led to a hike in prices for goods coming into Mamfe.” (KII15, Mamfe, Manyu)

Figure 16: Would you say that one of the main ways your business was affected by the crisis is due to increased production cost?



### Existing sectors and sectors with growth potential

In this context of dependency on imported goods, business-owners lament the lack of transformation or processing industries: *“Mamfe needs transformation industries for their primary products.”* (KII15, Mamfe, Manyu). Agricultural production in localities such as Mamfe and Eyumojock does not seem to be well-anchored into local or cross-border value chains. These localities find themselves at the lower end of value chains, carrying out low-value activities with limited growth potential. One respondent describes the situation as follows: *“Eyumojock is progressing in terms of development but neighbouring communities [in Manyu] are still struggling to get to a certain level. With the coming of the crisis in NWSW, most of the development has come to a standstill. Development in Eyumojock is different from other parts of the NWSW; here we almost exclusively rely on farming and small-scale business, while in other regions you have bigger industries and large-scale businesses.”* (KII18, Eyumojock, Manyu). There is therefore a need to upscale agricultural production and further build the local capacity to transform and process raw materials, which could eventually help the division progress economically.

Besides agriculture, there seems to be growth potential in the transportation sector and care economy. A male employee in Eyumojock claimed that *“most people are interested in the transport sector because they believe they will be able to realise a quick turnover.”* (FGD9, Eyumojock, Manyu) One respondent further describes a growing phenomenon, which can also be observed in other divisions, whereby young people, especially young men, resort to commercial bike-riding as an easy way to make money without having to demonstrate any particular skills or qualifications. *“There are many young men who are equipped with agricultural skills and work in large cocoa farms. Meanwhile, others are interested in riding bikes [motorbikes] because they do not want to involve themselves in any form of education.”* (KII16, Mamfe, Manyu) This solution also becomes viable in contexts where jobs are scarce and young people struggle to find employment that reflects their competencies.

However, in Manyu, the transportation sector has also been growing thanks to the transportation of oil. Just like commercial bike-riding, gender stereotypes render this activity exclusively available to men. *“Young men are likely to be involved in the informal sector and, in Mamfe, the informal sector primarily relies on the sales of petrol and car repair shops.”* (KII14, Mamfe, Manyu) ) One female jobseeker in Eyumojock shares her story in this area: *“My experience has not been very easy in Ekok [...]. Oddly, the very profitable jobs here involve petrol*


transportation. This is not easy for my gender because petrol is heavy so most employers reject female employees.” (CS3, Eyumojock, Manyu)

When it comes to social services, including sectors like education and health, the data reveals an important skills mismatch between supply and demand. Participants reported that there is a drive among young people to work in the field of education and health: “Most job seekers are interested in sectors like teaching, nursing and local businesses. Lately, a few young people are beginning to express interest in the culinary sector.” (KII16, Mamfe, Manyu). However, there seems to be limited demand for these types of positions owing to the poor state of local infrastructures, including roads, schools and hospitals. This is further explained by the director of a vocational training centre in Mamfe: “The supply and demand sectors do not match. Mamfe community does not have many schools and hospitals to employ graduates from these sectors [...]. To address this gap, the sociopolitical conflict has to come to an end, more schools need to be built, and hospitals and health centres need to be further improved.” (KII16, Mamfe, Manyu). Prospects in this area are not entirely bleak, as the respondent seems to suggest “the social sector is slowly getting back up on its feet because children are going back to school.” Rehabilitation of local infrastructures therefore represents an evident entry points into job creation and enhancing the enabling environment for businesses and workers as a whole.

### NDIAN DIVISION (SW)

NDIAN DIVISION DEMAND-SIDE ASSESSMENT	
Widespread insecurity undermining business	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• There is a consensus that businesses and workers are experiencing <b>acute insecurity</b> that destabilises local labour markets.</li> <li>• This leads participants to establish a binary distinction between how things were (before the crisis) and how they are now.</li> </ul>
Varying impacts from one economic sector to another	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Businesses involved in local or regional value chains are <b>both directly and indirectly affected</b>: when one segment is affected, the whole value chain suffers. This leads to 57% of businesses in Ndian reporting that they had to close their business temporarily.</li> <li>• Service operators cannot pursue their activities due to the <b>unsafe environment</b> and the shortage of customers.</li> <li>• Farmers, especially in the <b>palm oil sector</b>, cannot access big urban markets and subsequently experience <b>severe revenue losses</b>.</li> </ul>
Displacement and reduced workforce	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The high insecurity is thought to <b>drive people out of the division</b>.</li> <li>• With Ndian emptied of its population, businesses suffer from a <b>shortage of workers</b>.</li> </ul>
Positive prospects ahead?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A few respondents noted some improvements with the <b>back to school campaign</b> and the rehabilitation of major roads.</li> </ul>

Figure 17: Ndian radar chart



## Widespread insecurity undermining business

Located in the humid tropical rainforest zone and bordering Meme on its East and Nigeria on its West, Ndiian has been at the centre of an armed conflict between separatist groups and the Cameroon Defence Forces. The division has been suffering from severe political instability, which has equally hampered business development and job creation in the region.

Several respondents, on both the demand and supply sides, have been explicit about the acute insecurity and political destabilisation challenges they have been facing. One electronics shop owner, who previously owned and managed a farm, openly explained how the crisis has taken a toll on local businesses: *"Periodically, the ongoing crisis has really affected my business, sometimes, bandits in the name of fighters, storm our business premises and forcefully collect finances from us, and most of the time, it becomes a "right" for them. The profit is somehow limited but the little we sometimes obtain from our business can be taken from us by force."* (KII10, Ekondo-Titi, Ndiian) The same respondent goes on to explain that some places in Ndiian are "no-go zones", citing communities like Ikassa where, compared to Ekondo-Titi, the security situation is much more precarious, thus inhibiting any form of economic activity. Likewise, employers based in Mundemba also deplore the lack of security that renders the environment unappealing for businesses and investors: *"the environment is not safe because of constant attacks and kidnappings for ransom, it has negatively affected my operations because I can't go far, I always need to be cautious in my operations due to the insecurity."* (FGD4, Mundemba, Ndiian)

This had led many respondents to establish a clear distinction between how things *used to be* and how things are *now*. The state of economic affairs before the crisis began is usually positively qualified, whereas Ndiian's economy is currently going through a period of decline, affecting various areas of activity in a different manner. One respondent depicts the "old" Ndiian in positive terms, claiming that *"Ekondo-Titi was a very decent place for business. Businesses were mounting, and I appreciated how businesses were before and that is why I left farming and chose to launch my own business [electronics shop] but as I joined, the crisis started and I didn't know I would get affected this much."* (KII10, Ekondo-Titi, Ndiian)

Businesses have nonetheless developed some coping mechanisms to overcome the insecurity. One provision store owner explains that her alternative strategy has been to buy supplies from across the border (in Nigeria) to avoid travelling to unsafe zones in the SW region: *"I mostly buy from Nigeria now because it has become very dangerous to travel to Kumba and other towns."* (FGD6, Ekondo Titi, Ndiian).

## Varying impacts from one economic sector to another

Depending on their characteristics and sector of activity, businesses suffer from widespread insecurity in varying ways. Businesses that are part of local or regional value chains used to be profitable. Yet, the crisis has hindered their ability to remain operational either directly, through reducing their ability to go to their job site, or




indirectly, by affecting other segments of the value chain. Maritime transporters notably report downscaling or halting their operations because the businesses they depended on cannot function anymore:

*"My business has witnessed a lot of difficulties since the crisis started . It was better before the crisis because people could come from Kumba and other towns heading to Nigeria for their business, we had a lot of goods and passengers to carry, [but now] people don't travel as often, and businesses who used to export rice and palm oil have either stopped or reduced their scale."* (FGD6, Ekondo-Titi, Ndian)

*"I do transportation between Mundemba and Nigeria. I carry goods like palm oil to their markets, it was a profitable business until the advent of the crisis. It caused a turn down in many sectors like agriculture thereby affecting my sector too as most times the farmers are not able to produce and so I have nothing to transport."* (FGD4, Mundemba, Ndian)

The snowball effects of the crisis are also reflected in the quantitative data. 57% of business-owners in Ndian reported that they had to shut down their business temporarily, a phenomenon that is also particularly prominent in Donga-Mantung, but not as prevalent in other divisions (Figure 18).

Figure 18: Have you had to temporarily close your business as a result of the crisis?



Meanwhile, businesses in the services industry are equally hampered because the staff feels threatened and unsafe to work. The manager of a wildlife conservation organisation underlines that *"Before the crisis, my business was flourishing, I could go even to the hinterlands to train locals on conservation, but can't do that now, because it is very risky to go to some areas."* He adds that *"even the grants I used to have from sponsors no longer come [as sponsors are] scared to put in resources thereby making our business now less profitable than before."* (FGD4, Mundemba, Ndian) People engaged in court services and the judiciary sector are also in a vulnerable situation. On the one hand, they are easily associated with the central government and therefore at the risk of reprisals. On the other hand, their activity has significantly dropped as a result of the separatist groups' call to boycott state institutions: *"We hear that the NSAGs now settle issues in the villages and have given embargoes to villagers not to come to Courts thereby making our business unprofitable."* Other service providers see their customer base shrink, like this hairdresser in Ekondo-Titi who claims that *"if you don't have money, you can't do your hair"*, hinting at the fact that people's dwindling purchasing power has repercussions on businesses like hers (FGD6, Ekondo-Titi, Ndian).

In the agricultural sector, rural businesses and farmers have seen their turnover plunge for the past five years. *"My operations have dropped drastically since the crisis. I am in the agriculture sector, where we carry out planting and harvesting of palm to make palm oil for sale both at home and in Nigeria. In fact, our main market*

has been in Nigeria. Before the crisis, we used to carry oil to Nigeria on a daily basis and this meant a serious turnover and a steady increase in our profit margins that kept us comfortable.” (FGD6, Ekondo-Titi, Ndian) This is particularly the case for the palm oil sector, as the foothold large agroindustrial companies like Pamol had gained in the South-West, especially in Ndian, is being jeopardised by the crisis. According to a Pamol representative, “the crisis has drastically reduced our yields and income, thereby causing a great loss to the company. Moreover, the little oil produced and stored at the reserve tanks, there is not just no means to evacuate it to the market. This is because NSAGs have taken our main farm to market roads hostage.” (KII13, Mundemba, Ndian) This has provoked a drop in the company’s production rate of “around 86%”, the respondent claims.


The main challenge farmers have been facing, both in the palm oil sector as previously decried and beyond, is the reduced ability to transport and sell their crops on bigger urban markets. One male farmer notably reports that, to adjust to the crisis, farmers are compelled to “consume a greater part of our produce ourselves as a means of our own gains from our activities, because this crisis has caused us not to be able to access certain markets we used to. With the crisis, accessing bigger markets has become challenging for us and limits our potential for expansion.” (FGD4, Mundemba, Ndian)

### Displacement and reduced workforce

The challenges businesses are facing and the high insecurity are thought to drive people out of the division in search for a safe haven. The perception that places like Ekondo-Titi and Mundemba have been emptied from their inhabitants and economic assets is a perception shared by many. The relationship between insecurity and the exodus of people from Ndian to other regions is clearly established in different accounts, like the following one: “There are times you want to go to the farm but gunshots will disturb you and even sales, so many people have left our community and moved to other towns and cities in the Southwest Region, especially places like, Kumba, Buea and Limbe.” (KII10, Ekondo-Titi, Ndian) For South-Westerners, localities in the Fako division like Buea, Limbe and Tiko, constitute small and relatively accessible pockets of stability where they can find refuge. This has contributed to an evolution of the economic fabric of both of these regions, with the waning of economic actors and entities in Ndian and the emergence of new business ecosystems in Fako.

The displacement of people from Ndian translates into a significantly reduced workforce in the division. 52% of businesses reported that they had to reduce their workforce, or in other words to lay off their employees, a phenomenon that is encountered in other divisions but to a lesser extent (Figure 14). This figure should however be interpreted with caution as businesses in the North-West were more likely to report that they are self-employed, in comparison to South-West, thus limiting the incidence of this indicator on survey respondents in the region. Nonetheless, employers shared that one of their greatest difficulties is “to pay our workers’ salaries in order to keep them” (FGD6, Ekondo-Titi, Ndian), suggesting that many are one small step away from letting their employees go if the business continues to be unprofitable.

Figure 19: Have you had to reduce your workforce as a result of the crisis?




### Positive perspectives ahead?

While most respondents tend to paint a bleak picture of the division’s economic landscape, a few participants noted some improvements, namely in specific economic sectors. One government official highlighted that education and schools have picked up again, notably thanks to the *back to school* campaign: *“Before, we saw a lot of mass exodus from Ndian as parents took their children for education to other towns and cities out of this division, taking their socioeconomic activities away with them too. But since 2019, we have seen great improvements in our activities, especially with the clamouring for peace and the back to school campaign.”* (KII9, Mundemba, Ndian) Likewise, a construction company owner claims that improvements can be observed in terms of infrastructure rehabilitation and entrepreneurship: *“Based on what I am seeing, the economic development of Ndian and Ekondo-Titi was stagnant and even became worse with the crisis. But lately, it has greatly improved. We can see the construction of some major farms to market roads and the introduction of good economic ideas.”* (KII11, Ekondo-Titi, Ndian)

### MOMO DIVISION (NW)

MOMO DIVISION DEMAND-SIDE ASSESSMENT	
Momo as a favourable place to do business pre-crisis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Participants in both Batibo and Guzang report that their localities were good places to do business <b>before the onset of the crisis</b></li> </ul>
Exodus of workers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Since the start of the crisis the division has experienced a <b>mass exodus of workers</b> leaving a shortage in supply of skilled labour</li> </ul>
Sectoral structure reshaped	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The pre-crisis sectoral structure of the division has been <b>decimated</b></li> <li>Many people have turned to agriculture, but more for <b>subsistence</b> than as a true economic enterprise</li> </ul>

Figure 20: Momo radar chart



## Momo as a favourable place to do business before the crisis

For both Batibo and Momo, one of the most common themes that emerges from the qualitative data is a perception that before the crisis they were a good place to do business. One KII participant in Batibo describes how *"This is not the Batibo we used to know. The level of economic development has really declined"* (KII27, Batibo, Momo). Others describe how before the crisis Batibo was an area in which one could easily find work by simply dropping applications into businesses, but since many businesses have now closed and movement is severely restricted, finding work is much more complex: *"Before the crisis, you could just move around and ask neighbours for a house-help and you will easily get one, they were many temporal jobs people could do and receive small money but now they shoot from 1st to 31st you don't even have the chance."* (FGD15, Batibo, Momo). This leads participants to apportion the blame for all of Batibo's problems on the crisis. Indeed, as this KII explains, all the other problems the area faces can be seen as consequences of the crisis itself *"If the crisis were over, you will not believe this is the place you came one week ago. The only problem is the crisis. Other challenges like bad roads, no school all stem from the crisis."* (KII27, Batibo, Momo). This is corroborated by the quantitative data, where 100% of respondents in Momo cited 'security and the ongoing conflict' as one of the main barriers to the expansion of their business, compared to 67% of respondents from other divisions.

In Guzang, participants also describe the area as being a good place to do business before the crisis. In particular, they cite the fact that it is a 'road/junction town', which is easily accessible from other places, meaning that before the crisis it was easy to buy and sell goods: *"it is a road junction. People leave from Ashong, Besi, and come here to buy or when they leave from other towns, they stop here before going to those places. It is a fine place to do business but is not safe right now."* (FGD13, Guzang, Momo). Another participant agrees and stresses the importance that the tarred road had for the success of the area *"It is a good place for business because God has helped and we have a tarred road which gives quick access for people from other places to here so they can easily buy our goods."* (FGD13, Guzang, Momo). The impact of NSAG imposed lockdowns has therefore been felt particularly acutely in Guzang as traders and customers can no longer freely travel to the area using this road. Participants in both localities see their area as an inherently hospitable place for business and that the main impediment to their business thriving is simply the crisis itself.

## Exodus of workers

One of the most important impacts that the crisis has had on both Batibo and Guzang is an exodus of skilled workers, which has left business owners with a shortage of skilled labour. As this participant describes, *"there is a big gap between employer and employee in this community (Batibo)"*, pointing in particular to the fact that those who have studied technical skills like building and construction have emigrated to the Francophone region in order to earn more money, which for Batibo means *"if you want to construct a small house here you won't see*

*an expert in this community and if you have to call someone from outside to come they will be very expensive given the fact that transportation is high.” (FGD15, Batbibo, Momo). Another participant makes a similar point, saying that the “majority of people have left this place” meaning that “you will hardly find qualified people here to do a job...for example if you have any electric problem in your house now in Batibo and you need a technician you won’t find one.” (FGD15, Batibo, Momo).*

In addition to a drop in the supply of skilled labour, one business owner in Guzang points to the impacts this mass exodus of the population has also had on demand for goods: *“the majority of the people in the village have escaped has caused our demand rate to fall far down that is when we bring in goods there are no people to fill in the demands so that has really slowed down our business.” (KII29, Guzang, Momo).*

This exodus has also had the consequence that many of the established businesses in the area have either moved or folded, and that now in Guzang most businesses can be characterised as young startups. *“There were very large established businesses here, for example, those huge cement and zinc suppliers, they had customers that came from town to buy from them and went back to town to resell...But during the ongoing crisis most of these enterprises have escaped...I can say that [now] all the businesses here are young and run by beginners, people who are still starting to grow and hoping for a brighter future” (KII29, Guzang, Momo).* This differentiates Momo from other divisions, such as Fako, because Momo is an area from which people are primarily escaping, whereas localities like Buea are the ones people are seeking refuge in, indeed, as this participant attests, there are no IDPs in Batibo: *“There are no displaced people here so I can’t talk about them. People leave this community to other towns.” (FGD15, Batibo, Momo).*

### The division’s sectoral structure has been reshaped

All of this has had a huge impact on the economy of the area, decimating entire sectors, leading one participant to claim that talk of ‘economic sectors’ does not have much meaning in a context where there is no economic activity to speak of: *“We cannot even boast of any particular sector per say because things are not really going.” (FGD15, Batibo, Momo).* With entire sectors not functioning, people have had to pivot from their usual line of work, with one participant explaining: *“My real profession is building...but due to the “struggle” (crisis) I can’t sell them because people don’t build houses again because the military will come and burn the house. So I decided to divert my attention to business (becoming a petrol vendor)” (FGD13, Guzang, Momo).* Another describes how there are so few opportunities available in most sectors that when an organisation announces a vacancy they will receive 100-150 applications, with some candidates applying even without any relevant experience: *“When an organisation launches a vacancy you receive about 100 to 150 or so applications. It shows that there are people out (applicants) wanting but the organisations to employ are few. Since we are a financial institution most of the applicants we get are bankers but there are some people with no knowledge or skill in the field of finance and they just apply here because they heard of a job advert.” (KII26, Guzang, Momo).*


The biggest remaining sector is farming, but as one participant explains, for most this is mainly a subsistence activity rather than a true economic enterprise: *“We are farming mainly for subsistence, for the family to feed on because we cannot sell the farm produce because of gunshots and lockdowns...There is nothing like commerce in Batibo again. All big shops had long closed and people moved to other towns.” (FGD15, Batibo, Momo).* However, as another participant describes, this was not always the case, the area used to hold a diverse range of industries: *“It is mainly farming they do here. If things were normal, we would have been boasting of many schools, insurance companies, network companies but now you can only see one network company which is barely surviving.” (KII27, Batibo, Momo).* All of this testament to the significant impact that the crisis has had on the economic structure of the division.

### MEZAM (NW)

MEZAM DIVISION DEMAND-SIDE ASSESSMENT	
Comparatively less impacted	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Participants in Bamenda and Mezam both perceive their area to be <b>comparatively less affected</b> than others in the NWSW</li> </ul>

Impact of increased cost and complexity of transport	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>One of the major impacts to the division has been the <b>increased cost and complexity of transport</b>, which has made trading more difficult</li> </ul>
Differing impacts between Bamenda and Santa	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Bamenda and Santa have experienced different types of impacts, due to their <b>differing geographic and social characteristics</b></li> </ul>

Figure 21: Mezam radar chart



### Mezam as an area which has fared comparatively well


The data reveals that in both Bamenda and Santa there is a perception that they are less affected by the conflict in comparison to other areas in the NWSW. This is found in the quantitative data where Mezam is significantly lower than other divisions in reporting conflict as a main barrier to business (Figure 22).

In Bamenda, participants believe that the city's urban nature means it is not as badly affected as more remote areas *"I know for us here in Bamenda we are better off than those in remote areas, why? Because we have everything in Bamenda, our problem now is purchasing power"* (FGD11, Bamenda, Mezam). A KII participant from Guzang shares a similar sentiment, describing how rural areas like Guzang are dependent on urban areas like Bamenda, but this relationship is asymmetrical, as Bamenda can rely on trade from other areas: *"We know that when the rural areas [cannot connect to] the urban area it is the rural area that suffers most, so Bamenda doesn't feel the impact of our absence compared to how we feel. So when we don't go to Bamenda it affects us a lot at the village level but Bamenda doesn't because there are other villagers who come from other parts of the region."* (KII29, Guzang, Momo).

Participants in Santa also share the same perception that their area is doing comparatively well, though for different reasons to Bamenda. One KII participant shares his belief that the area's proximity to the border with Western Cameroon and the trade opportunities this offers lends it an advantage over other areas, including Bamenda: *"the intensity of the Crisis here is not as bad as other areas because we have areas like Ndop ,Bali, they are far and we are closer to the western side of the boundary...we have access to western side rather than those living far in Bamenda"*. However, the same participant describes how Santa's geography is also not without its disadvantages, namely, that its distance from Nigeria means that any goods imported from there will be more expensive due to the increased cost of transportation since the beginning of the crisis: *"areas like Bali, those who are closer to Nigeria, they have products coming in from Nigeria and they are cheaper but before it*

reaches us here with the bad roads and to many check points on the way, it cost in transportation and hence their prices are getting high.” (KII22, Santa, Mezam).

Figure 22: Do you feel that the ongoing crisis is one of the main barriers to the expansion of your business?



### Impacts of increased cost and complexity of transport

However, despite these perceptions, the data still shows that Mezam has experienced the impacts of the crisis. One of the most commonly cited impacts is the increased complications and costs of transport. As one participant describes, increasingly difficult transportation is an issue which impacts nearly every sector, undermining the economy as a whole. They point to the particular example of the mining sector, where quarries which were previously used for road construction are now no longer accessible due to poor roads, which in turn hampers future road construction efforts: *“There are many quarries in NWSW that I cannot even start to list them. These quarries have been mined for road construction but then those quarries are in places where People cannot afford to get into the quarries and because this quarries cannot be mined any longer and road construction is a difficult problem.”* (FGD11, Bamenda, Mezam). Another participant, a farmer, describes how the blockages have had a devastating impact on his business as it means he is no longer able to export his goods and is instead forced to sell locally at low prices: *“We have blockages of roads [and] borders which [we use to export]. So with these blockages, it causes food products to be very cheap [meaning] we cannot meet our cost of production”* (KII20, Bamenda, Mezam).

In Santa, one participant makes a similar point, describing how poor transportation has also impacted on trade with Nigeria, meaning they have had to pivot to selling to Francophone Cameroon: *“First Nigeria used to come smoothly without a problem but now, Nigeria no longer comes to buy because of the crisis, because of the Mamfe road, you know how it is...Now we sell only to Douala or Yaoundé.”* (KII21, Santa, Mezam). Likewise, another participant in Santa describes how its rurality makes importing materials more complex and expensive, even from comparatively nearby areas like Bamenda *“There will be a difference with person's business in town than the same business here because of cost of transport from Bamenda to here.”* (KII22, Santa, Mezam).

### Differing impacts between Bamenda and Santa

The data also reveals that within the division of Mezam there is significant variation in the nature and extent of the impacts of the crisis. Bamenda and Santa’s differing geographical and social characteristics has meant the crisis has impacted the areas in different ways. As the capital of the division and a large urban centre, Bamenda acts as more of a hub where goods are sold, rather than an industrial or agricultural centre, as one participant explains: *“Bamenda does not harbour a lot of industries per say but Bamenda is a focal point for the sale of what most of the industries actually give out so it’s difficult to actually say it has crippled one particular sector totally but interlinked, it has killed so many.”* (KII23, Bamenda, Mezam). For Bamenda, one of the most important



sectors is education: “One of the other economic sectors that prevail in this community is that of education...the NW used to harbour at least 16000 foreign students. Foreign students that come from Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria, Chad.” (KII23, Bamenda, Mezam). However, participants explain how this sector was deeply and quickly impacted by the crisis: “When the crisis began, education was the first sector to be affected, schools were shut down.” (FGD11, Bamenda, Mezam).

Santa, being more rural, is more reliant on farming, with one participant estimating that 25% of the population is employed in agriculture: “At least 1/4 of Santa population works in farms and even some of those I employ to come and work have their own farms where they work e.g. when they work here, they can go buy manure or anything and put in their farms and it also yields and he/she sells and get profit” (KII21, Santa, Mezam). Another participant agrees, describing how Santa is an area particularly suited to agriculture because “our soil here is very good and weather conditions are very good for agriculture” (KII22, Santa, Mezam), however, the crisis has had some severe impacts on the farming sector. The same participant goes on to list some of the main impacts as being the “rise in the prices of manure and fertilisers...the bad roads and the economic breakdown”. While respondents suggest that the situation worsened with the crisis, they still claim that it is comparatively good in relation to the rest of the NWSW. For instance, one participant describes how the farmers are still doing “very well except for the [overall] effects of the crisis on the NWSW economy” (KII22, Santa, Mezam).


### DONGA-MANTUNG (NW)

DONGA-MANTUNG DIVISION DEMAND-SIDE ASSESSMENT	
Access and connectivity as the main issues enclaving Donga-Mantung	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The main road linking Donga-Mantung to Bamenda (major urban centre in the NW region) is blocked by NSAGs and forces business-owners and farmers to take riskier routes. <b>Entire value chains are disrupted</b>, with both suppliers and buyers being affected.</li> <li>This in turn <b>increases production costs</b> but also <b>disrupts business operations</b>, to a point where employers are forced to close - a figure as high as <b>74% of business-owners</b> in the division.</li> <li>Cross-border trade has significantly reduced, notably due to the absence of storage facilities to counteract the delivery delays resulting from the roadblocks.</li> </ul>
Farmers as the main victims of the crisis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Farmers, both those working on plantations (tea) and on their own account have become isolated and compelled to <b>halt their operations</b>.</li> <li>Some of the division’s agricultural production has <b>shifted to other divisions</b> that may not have the necessary resources and technical capacity to fulfil cultivation needs.</li> </ul>
Poor infrastructure and the limitations of local solutions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Access to electricity is the main grievance among communities who denounce the <b>poor state of local infrastructure</b>.</li> <li>Communities have been mobilising to use <b>solar power</b> instead but point to its limitations in driving business operations in a uniform manner.</li> </ul>

Figure 23: Donga-Mantung radar chart



## Donga Mantung



### Roadblocks enclave Donga-Mantung and erode economic ecosystems

Donga-Mantung is located in the Western High Plateau or the Bamenda Grassfields, a region characterised by savanna vegetation and favourable climatic conditions (cool temperatures, heavy rainfall). This has made the division particularly reliant on the agricultural sector. Contrary to the South-West region, and particularly the division of Fako, Donga-Mantung's economy is mainly populated by smallholder farmers, with the exception of some large tea plantations such as the Ndu Tea Estate.

One of the major impediments to business expansion in Donga-Mantung, since the onset of the crisis, is the issue of access and connectivity. According to research participants, the main road that allowed businesses and farmers to access major markets is the road linking Donga-Mantung to Bamenda and passing through Kumbo, in the division of Bui. Yet, roadblocks have drastically reduced goods movements along this route, thus turning Donga-Mantung into an economically landlocked division.

"This crisis has greatly affected agriculture in Donga Mantung which is the furthest division in the North West Region and being the furthest, we have been locked for close to five years now. Our access road used to be Bui road [main road leading to Bamenda, the capital of the North-West], giving us access to the main market but now we are forced to go round." (KII33, Nkambe, Donga-Mantung)


Participants also explain that, to avoid hot spots like Kumbo and circumvent roadblocks, businesses, including smallholder farmers, have to find alternative routes to get the supplies they need and sell their products in major marketplaces. *"Nkambe Central or let me say Donga Mantung Division as a whole, they are really suffering. How? They have only one road that leads to where they can get goods that will help other people in this locality. [...] If you cannot pass through Kumbo, you will go through Bafoussam."* (KII31, Nkambe, Donga-Mantung). However, the respondent goes on to add that *"if that road is blocked, there is no way you can get anything. That is why goods are very expensive. People now believe that if you take the risk and get to Bafoussam and get goods, because you will not be going there that often, you need to make that profit. You double the price and we will have no other choice than to buy it."*

Just like in the division of Manyu, which is equally highly dependent on goods coming from other regions, road closures have repercussions on the cost of transportation, which in turn is reflected in production costs and in consumer prices. 52% of demand-side respondents attributed the disruption in their business operations to the increased production costs they are experiencing, placing Donga-Mantung ahead of other divisions on this indicator. According to one a male employer in Nkambe, *"[employers] face a lot of difficulties in transportation as the roads linking Nkambe to Bamenda have been blocked, so transportation has increased since we now have to go round through Bafoussam to Bamenda (30000 to 35000 CFA)."* (FGD18, Nkambe, Donga-Mantung)

More than the increase in transportation costs, road closures and NSAG restrictions can have direct spillover effects on business operations, thus thwarting potential growth prospects. This affects the capacity of employers to retain their employees or hire new ones, as they see their production capacity shrink. In Dongga-Mantung, 74% of demand-side respondents reported that they were forced to close their business temporarily in response to the crisis, a figure that is just as high among supply-side respondents who were asked whether their employer had to shut down temporarily due to the crisis. Dongga-Mantung is closely followed by Ndian where a high proportion of business closure can equally be recorded. One respondent describes how orange suppliers are unable to keep their business afloat in a context where their market access is significantly restricted. *“There is a place like Ako, they used to supply oranges to Bamenda, you will see about 15 trucks taking oranges to Bamenda, they will sell them, take money and go to the farm and recruit people who are working in the farm. There is no way to transport those oranges now.”* (KII31, Nkambe, Dongga-Mantung). Such evidence is proof that people working in more remote areas that are not well-connected to urban centres suffer the consequences of the crisis in a more disproportionate manner.

Another male employee in Ndu highlights how economic actors along the supply chain are affected from one end to another and across various divisions. This suggests that businesses in Dongga-Mantung are dually hit by the crisis both as suppliers to main economic hubs and as economic units whose survival depends on supplies from beyond the division. *“It is a problem for goods to reach Ndu. You have a small capital and you have to go to Bamenda to buy goods and at the end you are unable to make profit out of it. You even decide to send the money to your supplier in Bamenda but by the time the goods reach Ndu, they are completely damaged.”* (FGD17, Ndu, Dongga-Mantung) Such accounts are aligned with the quantitative data where 61% of businesses in Dongga-Mantung reported that their equipment were damaged or vandalised due to the crisis, limiting their income-generation capacity.

Figure 24: Would you say that one of the way your business has been affected by the crisis is through damaged equipment?



The crisis also severely undercut the cross-border trade that Dongga-Mantung capitalised on with Nigeria, mirroring the effects felt in the division of Manyu. Since the onset of the crisis, business-owners and farmers are unable to import or export products across the Nigeria-Cameroon border. This is notably attributed to the lack of adequate storage facilities, such as warehouses, to preserve the foods products. *“There are some goods that Nigerians can only get from Cameroon and most of the Nigerians they come through Ako and Abuenshie to come and get them in Nkambe here. At first they used to come and buy from here and take it to Nigeria, [...] some of them used to have warehouses in Ndu which are not available anymore because of the crisis, so I think it is dropping.”* (KII31, Ndu, Dongga-Mantung). Another respondent adds that *“even just going to the border*

market that we used to run to, to buy things and come up to sell, now there is no way." (KII32, Ndu, Donga-Mantung)

### The agricultural sector as the primary target

With agriculture being a major economic sector in Donga-Mantung, the crisis has affected smallholder farmers in a disproportionate manner. The threats and challenges farmers are facing in the division echo those of farmers working in large plantations in Fako division. Fear has been cited as the main denominator that forces farmers into a situation of economic isolation, almost entirely paralysing their revenue-generating activity. A farmer who used to work on a tea plantation in the division shares his personal story: *"I worked in Ndu Tea Estate but was sacked because of the crisis. I remember my colleague's child who was seriously sick and could not be taken to the hospital on time and finally died because of lack of finance. Imagine we used to work for like four months without pay."* (FGD17, Ndu, Donga-Mantung)

Meanwhile, farmers who work on their own account are just as dispossessed of their capacity to sustain their livelihoods: *"Some farmers have even abandoned their farms after cultivating and planting for the fear of those boys. It's very risky farming in the suburbs except if you farm 100% from your home. This has caused a serious downfall in the agricultural sector in Ndu since those farmers in Bafoussam [West Region] have taken upon themselves to cultivate crops that used to be cultivated in Ndu."* (FGD17, Ndu, Donga-Mantung). Such accounts shed light on how the crisis is altering labour market dynamics even beyond the North-West and South-West regions by forcing local production to cease and be transferred to another region. While Bafoussam may benefit from this shift in production capacity, it is still important to question whether this city has the necessary infrastructure, human resources and network to sustain and harness these economic changes.

As one respondent explains, farmers and their activity are deliberately targeted by NSAGs who view the possession of resourceful and fertile lands as a key component of their strategy of territorial domination in the NWSW and reappropriation of natural resources which they believe should be under their control. *"It has affected farming in the sense that, the areas where crops were doing well, 'The Ambas' came and took them as their zone, so we have abandoned the area for them. Now we are working besides the houses where we cannot get good produce, so it has really affected farmers badly."* (KII32, Nkambe, Donga-Mantung).

### The state of local infrastructure and existing coping strategies

61% of businesses in Donga-Mantung reported that the main barrier to the expansion of their business is poor infrastructure, making Donga-Mantung stand out compared to all other sample divisions. Indeed, several research participants corroborate this finding pointing to access to electricity as the main impediment to business creation and growth. One baker describes how the absence of electricity affects his day-to-day operations: *"Talking about my own sector which is pastries, things are more difficult for me to produce, like bread, as there is no electricity in Nkambe. Because of the crisis, there is no electricity, because of no electricity, the electronics business is dying down and putting people into debt."* (FGD18, Nkambe, Donga-Mantung)

To address this issue, businesses in the division have been resorting to solar panels, an interesting coping strategy that nonetheless attests to the inventiveness of local communities. *"We have not had electricity for like four years now and people have been surviving through solar panels and generators. I remember when I travelled to a small village, I saw many stores selling solar panels. People have become so used to solar power that they're no longer interested in electricity supply."* (FGD17, Ndu, Donga-Mantung).

Yet, one fish farmer in particular explains that reliance on solar power can be limiting for businesses that operate with specific types of machinery that can only function properly with electrical power.

*"We have not had lights for almost three years and you cannot do any business without electricity, so it has been a big problem, so we are trying to manage with the solar panels and solar electrification but with solar electrification you cannot do all that you want to do because not all machines can work properly with solar panels. I don't have a refrigerator, so when we harvest fish, if we do not sell all of it, we are bound to get a loss unless we have to smoke it and that was not the original idea."* (KII36, Nkambe, Donga-Mantung)

## SUPPLY-SIDE ASSESSMENT



### Overview of the experience of employees and jobseekers in the NWSW

The Anglophone crisis has also been translating into practical implications for unemployed persons whose job search has become more challenging and for employees, who find it hard to retain their jobs or sustain their livelihoods. The threat posed by NSAGs and the restrictive impact of lockdowns and road closures has contributed to uncertainty and instability in the job market, as one respondent describes: *“Before the crisis, you could just move around and ask neighbours for a house-help and you will easily get one, people could engage in temporal jobs and receive small money but now with the constant insecurity you don’t even have the chance to move and ask people if they have a job for you or for your child, neighbour or friend.”* (FGD15, Batibo, Momo)

As well as restricting jobseekers’ ability to move in search of work, the impacts of the conflict, in particular NSAG-imposed lockdowns, have also made employers increasingly reluctant to hire, as there is a danger of employees becoming a financial burden: *“It has become very hard to find a job, business-owners tend to think that there is no need for them to hire you, especially when they don’t know when a lockdown could be imposed and how long it would last. Ultimately, lockdown or not, if they hire you they will need to pay you.”* (FGD11, Mezam, Bamenda).

Elsewhere, other respondents describe the implications for those who are employed, notably a loss of income and delays in the payment of salaries: *“companies like CDC [Cameroon Development Corporation] at times will go for 6 months without payment of salaries. How do you expect one to continue working in such a situation when we have families and children to take care of?”* (FGD2, Limbe, Fako). The CDC is the largest employer in Cameroon and one which was cited in our literature review as particularly important to the economy of the NWSW region. It is also an enterprise which was particularly affected by the onset of the conflict, with all of their banana plantations in the SW having been abandoned.<sup>40</sup>

40 World Bank Group, The Anglophone Crisis in Cameroon: Assessing the Economic and Social Impacts and Implications for the World Bank Group, p.44

One of the consequences of these impacts is that respondents describe how it inhibits long-term planning and forces them to focus on day-to-day survival. As this respondent describes: *“The ongoing crisis at a certain point killed my plans and hopes because there were times when you feel like the world will end in no time”*, despite this inability to make plans, the respondent also describes how she still has hope for future, but that this will involve leaving her community: *“as time goes on I feel I must not remain here for my dreams to be realised. I hope to go out of Ekok after saving enough...to start afresh and continue pursuing my dreams.”* (CS3, Eyumojock, Manyu).

The crisis and its impacts have also had consequences on mental and physiological health. The qualitative data provides many vivid accounts of how respondents have suffered: *“You will prepare to go out and do one or two things, gunshots will not allow you, so, you are forced to stay indoors. Someone like me I cannot bare the trauma of gunshots, when you go out you see things that can traumatise you so I don’t even want to go out.”* (FGD15, Batibo, Momo). One respondent describes how this mental strain has also had physiological consequences, especially for women: *“Many more women are getting mentally ill, getting sicknesses associated with the stressors of the crises. Many are getting high blood pressure, hypertension, and all of that even though they say they are fine, we realise that inside of them their lives are not moving...so at times they pretend to be resilient but inside it is killing them.”*. (FGD10, Bamenda, Mezam).


The following sections provide a breakdown of how different demographic groups interact with the labour market. The data has shown that these demographic factors have an important role in mediating experiences within the NWSW labour market. To grasp variations and nuances, the community profiling adopts a holistic approach by discussing challenges specific to “gender” rather than “women”, “age” rather than “young people” and “migration” rather than “migrants”.

## Community profiling

### Gender

The data shows that presently the employment status of men and women is very similar, with 37% of men reporting that they are unemployed, compared to 36% of women. Whilst men do tend to earn more than women (Figure 17), the impacts of the crisis on income levels also shows a close similarity between the two genders, with 71% of women saying their income has either ‘slightly’ or ‘significantly’ decreased since the conflict, compared to 68% of men.

Figure 25: How much are you paid for your main job every month? (CFA Franc), disaggregated by gender




Despite these similarities the data reveals several unique challenges faced by both men and women in the labour market. Gender is shown to play an important role in shaping perceptions of others, as well as the expectations people have of themselves and the role they should play in the labour market and society more broadly.

Women are confronted with several prejudices when seeking employment, one of the primary ones being a fear that they will become pregnant and a burden to employers. This is reflected in the survey data, where the most commonly cited challenge women face in securing employment is pregnancy and also in the qualitative data, where participants share similar sentiments regarding the potential pitfalls of employing women: *“About 45% of women are skilled but the greater number of them due to child bearing struggle between getting a career and taking care of the family.”* (KII14, Mamfe, Manyu).

In addition to this, women also face a common perception that they are not fit for certain types of work, particularly physical labour. This is not only a perception held by men. Some women, too, perceive that they are not suited to certain types of work: *“I hardly see women in fishing and factory [work] because something like factory work requires hard work and energy...tourism, education, these are things women can easily handle.”* (FGD11, Mezam, Bamenda). One of the most commonly cited professions in which women can be found is as “buyam sellem”, a local term which refers to small-scale retail, usually, though not exclusively, of food stuff. *“Yes, there are many businesses here in Nkambe, headed by women, a majority even. We have “buyam sellam”, selling of dresses and shoes, marking of dresses, even the supply of cooking gas.”* (KII32, Nkambe, Donga Mantung). The quantitative data corroborates these findings, showing that women are more than twice as likely to work in the trade sector than men (Figure 26).

Figure 26: Sector of activity by gender



Beyond preconceptions, women also face the challenge of sexual harassment and exploitation from potential employers. As one case study participant, a young female jobseeker, describes: *“The crisis made things very difficult, as some places where I applied were shut down temporarily and others permanently. As a young girl in search of a job I was very vulnerable, some employers would ask for sexual favours in exchange for employment.”* (CS3, Eyumojock, Manyu). This experience is corroborated by one business-owner who states *“Sexual harassment is a real challenge for young women who seek a job.”* (KII24, Santa, Mezam). Whilst this is not a new phenomenon, the sexual exploitation of women has gained ground in the region due to the precarious socioeconomic and political situation. On the one hand, employers are more tempted to profit from the vulnerability of women who are desperately looking for a job; on the other hand, women use it as a negative coping mechanism in a context where towns are emptied from their male population and women forced to become the main breadwinners (KII43).

Whilst men tend to face less discrimination from employers regarding their ability to be recruited, they still face a number of unique challenges based on their gender. One of the key challenges stems from a perception that men cannot be ‘vulnerable’ in the same way as women. As one of our key informants explains, this often leaves men excluded from economic support programmes, because women are *“systematically considered as more*


*vulnerable*", whereas men are often assumed to be more actively involved in the conflict opposing the central government and NSAGs. She describes men as being in a position of *"impossible neutrality"*, where they face the possibility of reprisals from both sides: *"If they don't want to take sides, the military will suspect them of being in cahoots with the militias, or the NSAGs will suspect them of being spies for the regular army."* (KII43, Yaounde) This dynamic of 'impossible neutrality' also has the impact of upending traditional gender dynamics. In a context where *"masculinity is defined by the fact of being a provider of resources or breadwinner"*, and where women are increasingly taking over these responsibilities, men are left at higher risk of radicalisation as they search for an identity and purpose. For women, it also has the added impact of leaving them at an increased risk of gender-based violence.

This link between a lack of economic opportunities and attraction into NSAGs is one which is also found elsewhere in the qualitative data. One participant explicitly draws a causal link between the two, saying: *"the lack of economic empowerment of the youth greatly pushed them into taking up arms against the government. If most of these youths were employed, this crisis would never have existed in the first place."* (FGD9, Eyumojock, Manyu). Motivations to join NSAGs are usually perceived to be economic rather than ideological and are understood as a 'push' rather than a 'pull' dynamic: *"Most of these boys are forced to join the others in the bush...to sustain their lives and family"* (FGD17, Ndu, Donga Mantung). Meanwhile, another participant specifically pinpoints a lack of vocational training opportunities and business support as being one of the primary push factors: *"There are very little or no avenues for vocational training and no assistance rendered to people who are willing to start up business. More or less they are instead being exploited so this has pushed them towards violence hence an impact on the ongoing crisis."* (FGD9, Eyumojock, Manyu).

## Age

The data also reveals age to be an important factor that shapes individual experiences of the labour market in the NWSW. The quantitative data shows that youth<sup>41</sup> unemployment was higher than older groups before the crisis and remains high today. Before the crisis, 53% of young people were unemployed/inactive, compared to 23% of older respondents. Today unemployment remains at a similar level for young people, at 51%, whilst unemployment for older people has increased to 33% (Figure 27).

Figure 27: Unemployment status for young and older participants, pre-crisis and now



Despite these statistics, the quantitative data also shows a high level of openness from employers towards recruiting young people, with 74% of respondents to the demand-side survey saying they would be 'very open' to the idea. Some employers in the qualitative data even show a preference for young people, usually due to

<sup>41</sup> 'Youth' is defined as anyone aged between 18-24. This is based on the ILO definition of 'Youth' as anyone aged 15-24 but is adapted for this study as it only contains participants aged over 18. See more: [https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---stat/documents/publication/wcms\\_422439.pdf](https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---stat/documents/publication/wcms_422439.pdf)




their generally stronger physical attributes and energy levels: *“I prioritise young men, as their energy is a great asset for my operation (agriculture)”*, conversely, older people are often viewed as too weak for certain jobs, particularly physical labour: *“The older population are very likely to face challenges in getting jobs in this sector (agriculture) [because] it requires young and energetic persons”* (FGD6, Ekondo Titi, Ndian).

In contrast to other demographics, the main challenge for young people stems less from prejudice, but from a lack of perceived skills and experience. This is revealed in the quantitative data where the most cited challenges for young people in gaining employment is that they lack work experience, with 38% (Figure 20). This is also a sentiment widely shared in the qualitative data, as one KII participant describes: *“their highest challenge is they have not completed their education. These crises have affected them in the way they cannot finish school...[which has been] a serious problem with them getting a job.”* (KII24, Santa, Mezam).

This perception of a lack of skills and experience is also held by young people themselves. In the supply-side survey 36% of young people said one of the main reasons they are unemployed is because they lack work experience, compared to 15% of older respondents. Likewise, 18% of young respondents said they ‘don’t have any skills’ compared to just 3% of older respondents. These perceptions are also found in the qualitative data, with one case study participant bemoaning how it is becoming even harder for young people to gain work experience because internship positions are increasingly harder to find: *“People want people with job experience...[but] there is no more room for internship, organisations that use to take interns are now scared and without internship where will 5yrs of experience come from.”* (CS6, Nkambe, Donga Mantung).

This issue of a lack of skills is compounded by the crisis because education and training institutions have been severely interrupted. Education is regularly cited as one of the most deeply impacted sectors and participants also often underline the importance of educational institutions for the country as a whole: *“And at the end, it all boils down to one thing which is education. If schools are not going, the country will not be going and it will be stagnant even from the government itself.”* (FGD12, Santa, Mezam).

Figure 28: What are the main challenges for young people seeking work in your sector?



There is also a strong appetite for skills development and employment support amongst young people, with 91% saying they would be interested in taking part in a job placement programme. The specific skills young people most said they would be interested in acquiring were livestock raising/farming (37%) and cooking and catering (31%). One KII participant adds texture to these findings by explaining that young people are increasingly interested in cooking and catering as it offers a method to make *“quick money”* (KII16, Divine Providence Training Centre, Manyu). However, despite this high level of interest only, 9% of young respondents have taken part in a vocational training programme, compared to 22% of older respondents. This suggests that the main problem lies in the supply-side, as the crisis curtailed the offer of skills development and training on the market.



By disrupting the functioning of training centres, the crisis seems to be affecting younger generations more severely, who do not have access to training opportunities that older generations may have benefited from.

The data also reveals that young people are seen to be particularly susceptible to 'Matricule Syndrome', a local term which describes the propensity of job seekers to prefer jobs in the public sector as they offer a greater degree of job security than those in the private sector. Job security is particularly valuable in a context where employers are repeatedly forced to close either temporarily or permanently. One KII respondent also explains that public sector jobs are perceived to be better paying and comparatively easier: *"In Cameroon there is the matricule syndrome where everyone wants to work for the government. People have grown with the mentality thinking that working with the government is relaxed as compared to the private sector."* They go on to describe how this can lead to more than 10,000 persons applying for 100 vacancies for public-sector positions (KII36, Nkambe, Donga Mantung).

Despite this generally high level of openness towards recruiting young people, the data did still reveal some shared negative perceptions or stereotypes concerning young people, in particular their attitude towards work. For instance, one FGD participant stated that *"young people prefer jobs which are less stressful and comfortable and you will hardly see them being into things like agriculture"* (FGD2, Limbe, Fako). Meanwhile, one employer contended that young people have the propensity to *"never pay attention to learn"* and *"to be absent without your permission"* (FGD16, Nkambe, Donga-Mantung). Therefore, while the majority of employers are open to the prospect of employing young people, young people still face unique challenges in gaining the necessary skills and training, as well as overcoming stigmatisation about their work ethic.

In some cases, young people, predominantly men, face issues of trust, due to a perception that they are the most likely to become involved with NSAG groups. This section has already examined the dynamics whereby young men are attracted into NSAGs through a lack of opportunity and identity, and these dynamics have left employers wary of employing them: *"You know most of our youths now are not trusted, because the fighter and the military are youths. So for somebody to trust a youth and employ him, the person will really screen him very well because they don't trust people now, you don't know who is who. That is the challenge that the youths are facing."* (KII31, Nkambe, Donga Mantung).

The data here produces some very actionable insights, namely that the main barrier that prevents young people from entering the job market is not a lack of motivation from young people or openness from recruiters, but a lack of access to skills development. Ensuring better quality and coverage of training programmes will be a key pathway to reducing youth unemployment.

### Other sources of exclusion

#### IDPs<sup>42</sup>

IDPs also face several unique challenges in finding and keeping secure employment. The most significant challenges they face stem from preconceptions and stereotypes around their ability, work ethic and trustworthiness. One KII participant lays out this issue of trust in explicit terms stating his belief that *"some IDPs are not honest"* and claims that they will often register for government assistance multiple times (KII14, Mamfe, Manyu). A similar sentiment is shared by another KII participant who states his belief that IDPs are often lazy and self pitying: *"Some of the IDPs are very rude and lazy and only want people to pity them and give them things for free"* (KII4, Buea, Fako).


Similarly, even the perceived benefits of hiring IDPs are less to do with their positive attributes and more that they offer a cheaper alternative to other workers. The most cited advantage of hiring IDPs given in the surveys was that they offer a source of cheap labour, and this is a sentiment also found in the qualitative data. For instance, one KII participant says of IDPs *"What skills do they have? They are facing a predicament. Some are*

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<sup>42</sup> IDP is defined as someone who responded to our survey question 'If this is not your place of origin, why did you decide to move here?' with the answer 'due to conflict'. The size of this sample was 45 respondents.

lucky to pick up jobs because of the low rate of payment, but others due to no professional background and no skills and lack of trust cannot get jobs.” (KII15, Mamfe, Manyu). Evidence for lower earnings are also reflected in the quantitative data, where IDPs were found to be more likely to be in the lowest earnings bracket (30k CAF p/m and below), with 29% of them reporting incomes at this level compared to 16% of non-IDPs.

Figure 29: How much are you paid for your main job every month? (CFA Franc), disaggregated by displacement status



IDPs also face additional practical hurdles in securing employment. They may have difficulties in finding information about job vacancies, especially in a context where information about employment opportunities is increasingly dispersed through informal channels and based on the kind of social connections which IDPs often lack. *“I think there are opportunities which come and they are only aware of after because information does not really circulate...I think the job market now is more based on personal connections so I think the displaced won’t really have the opportunities.”* (FGD10, Female employers, Bamenda, Mezam). This is corroborated in the quantitative data where IDPs were more likely to say that one of the main difficulties in finding jobs locally was a lack of information, with 56% of IDPs reporting this as an issue, compared to 40% of non-IDPs. In addition to this, another hurdle they face is that they often lack the correct documentation, which can make registering for jobs difficult: *“IDPs face a lot of difficulties...some of them leave all [their] documents, some of them don’t have documents because all of them were burnt so it is difficult for them to secure a job.”* (KII23, Global Visionaries Network, Bamenda, Mezam).

In addition to this, IDPs also face the issues of discrimination and “tribalism”, a term this case study participant uses several times:


*“It’s really difficult, sometimes employers don’t want to employ someone from a particular tribe. For instance, here in Nkambe, employers that are against the idea of secession will not want to employ people coming from tribes that embrace this idea. So it’s been a difficult task for me coming from a place like Belo that fully embraced secession. Most employers don’t want to hear you are coming from Belo because they fear you’ll bring the idea of secession to their company.”* (CS6, Youth jobseeker, Nkambe, Donga-Mantung)

Another participant outlines how this discrimination is not only based on ethnicity or tribe background, but also on the ability to speak local languages. They go so far as to claim that this discrimination can even result in exclusion from humanitarian aid: *“When they discover you can’t speak the local language you are excluded or they discover you are not from the communities for example I’m from Nkwen and when humanitarian aids come and discover I’m not from Meforbi, Boi, they wipe me out [exclude me].”* (KII22, Santa, Mezam).

A clear barrier that forcibly displaced people seem to face is that of employment discrimination based on their area of origin, and anchored into identity politics. While IDPs are not necessarily affiliated with a political group,

their area of origin may have negative connotations, linked to existing conflict sensitivities and dynamics, which reduce young people’s chances to be recruited. Ultimately, this may lead to an erosion of social cohesion in locations that host IDPs especially when the latter are stigmatised and cannot integrate themselves economically. There are indications of these dynamics at play in the quantitative data, where only 31% of IDPs said they ‘frequently’ or ‘very frequently’ participated in social activities in their community, compared to 60% of non-IDPs.

Figure 30: How frequently do you take part in social activities in your community?, disaggregated by displacement status



### Ethno-linguistic discrimination

Discrimination is not only experienced by IDPs, the data also reveals wider dynamics of ethno-linguistic exclusion within the NWSW. As outlined earlier, participants in the Anglophone region have reported feelings of exclusion and discrimination from Francophones, with one respondent describing how they are dismissed as ‘Anglofools’ (FGD12, Santa, Mezam). However, the data also shows that this discrimination is also present within communities in the NWSW itself. As one participant succinctly summarises: *“There is a lot of tribalism in this country. Even when you are qualified to get a stable job, you must be connected”* (FGD3, Tiko, Fako).

Participants bemoan that, as employers have increasingly turned to informal methods of recruitment based on connections or referrals, this has led to a more discriminatory recruitment process, where employers favour people of their own tribe: *“Referrals are not really working effectively now for everyone because of the tribalism. Where are the people that used to call to talk about opportunities? They no longer do so to everyone now and they only prefer calling either people of their tribe, neighbourhood or family.”* (CS4, Santa, Mezam).


### Persons with Disabilities (PWD)

Persons with Disabilities (PWD) also face a number of specific challenges in the job market. Many respondents share the perception that PWDs are not physically able to carry out many types of work, so they are limited to only a few professions, whilst others describe how employers will often view them as a burden: *“Some [employers] avoid people with disabilities because they think...they will be a nuisance to the organisation”* (KII23, Bamenda, Mezam). These challenges are also reflected in the quantitative data. As Figure (21), below shows, only 18% of respondents said they would be ‘somewhat’ or ‘very’ open to recruiting PWDs. The most commonly cited reason (65%) for why PWDs may face challenges was that ‘there are tasks they cannot perform because of their disability’.

However, some employers in the qualitative data also display an active desire to help disabled people through a sense of social responsibility: *“After receiving application letters I go through and see if I can assist any of the*

*disabled...I once employed one guy who had an accident and couldn't walk and was in serious need for a job...I have found myself helping so many displaced and disabled." (FGD18, Nkambe, Donga Mantung).*

Figure 31: How open would you be to recruiting PWD?



### Sectoral analysis

The data also reveals interesting trends in how workers in different sectors have experienced the impacts of the crisis differently.

#### Income

Workers in the professional sector can expect to earn significantly more than those working in other sectors. As the graph below shows, the professional sector has a markedly higher share of respondents in the 100-250k p/m bracket (42%) and is the only sector with respondents in the above 250k p/m bracket (3%). Conversely, the trade sector has the highest percentage of workers in the less than 30k p/m bracket (44%) and agriculture, construction, and manufacturing also fare badly, whilst the services sector shows a more even distribution across income brackets. Workers in the professional sector are also significantly less likely to report that they receive money from family or friends as an alternative source of income, suggesting that their salaries are often sufficient to support themselves – just 25% of professional sector workers said they receive support from this source, compared to 44% of agricultural workers.

The data regarding changes in income since the start of the crisis paints a similar picture, with workers in the professional sector reporting the lowest 'significant decreases' in income (13%), compared to trade and agriculture, which reported 44% and 41% in this category respectively. This is in accordance with our qualitative findings that the agricultural and trade sectors have been hit hard by the forced closure of businesses due to NSAG-enforced lockdowns and the severe disruption to supply chains.

Figure 32: Income (CFA) by sector





Figure 33: Income change by sector



### Loss of jobs

Beyond changes in income, the data also reveals differences in job losses across sectors. As the graph below shows, agriculture, construction, and manufacturing have seen a significantly higher percentage of workers lose their job due to closures. This is in accordance with our findings on the severe impact that the closure of major agricultural companies, such as PAMOL and CDC, has had on employment in the region.

Figure 34: Loss of job due to closure of employer, by sector




### Job formality and security

Workers in the professional sector can also expect to experience higher levels of job formality and security. As shown in the graph below, workers in the professional and services sector are found to be significantly more likely to have contracts for their employment than the other sectors. It is perhaps unsurprising that 78% of workers in the agricultural sector say they do not have any formal written contracts, whilst the 80% of workers in the trade sector who are without contracts can in part be explained by the fact that many of these will be informal 'buy 'em sell 'em' traders, who were highlighted earlier in our report.

Similarly, employees in the professional sector are also significantly more likely to have social security benefits arranged through their employer. As shown in the graph below, the professional sector reports such benefits at more than twice the rate of any other sector, meanwhile, no respondents working in construction or manufacturing reported these benefits.


Figure 35: Social security benefits through employer, by sector



# ASSESSING THE LABOUR MARKET ECOSYSTEM IN TIMES OF CRISIS: COPING MECHANISMS & SUPPORT SYSTEMS

This section offers a deep dive into the coping mechanisms and support systems people have been relying on across labour markets in the NWSW region to navigate the crisis. In times of crisis and political instability, our understanding and representation of labour market systems needs to evolve to account for the strategies businesses and people put in place to sustain their livelihoods as well as for the interactions they have with existing support structures. This shift in paradigm is represented in the revised Labour Market Systems diagram below.

Figure 36: Modified Labour Market Systems diagram



In more volatile settings where the relation between supply and demand cannot be predicted, looking at supporting functions or rules and regulations in a vacuum - without consideration for the dynamic environment - provides little information on how supply and demand interact with each other, or on the actual reasons why a mismatch can be observed. For instance, addressing the lack of infrastructure will not help bridge the gap between supply and demand alone. Poor infrastructure, or lack thereof, should be anchored in the broader context of the crisis and need to be examined through a conflict sensitive lens. Practically, this requires future programme designers to question the root-causes of inefficient support systems or of adopting specific coping mechanisms.

It is particularly important to rethink our understanding of labour market systems in conflict-affected contexts for the following reasons:

1. To gain a better understanding of the coping strategies/support systems that exist. The section notably distinguishes between the coping strategies deployed by businesses (demand-side) and people (supply-side) as the challenges they face require them to seek out different solutions.
2. To be able to build on these coping strategies/support systems and harness the existing potential
3. To grasp existing political sensitivities - determining what drives the attitudes and behaviours of businesses and people on the job market is key to produce employment support interventions that are conflict-sensitive.

## Demand-side coping mechanisms

Across the NWSW sample divisions, businesses have been forced to rethink their operations and consider selling new products/services. This has proven key to adapt to rapidly-evolving and volatile markets. Beyond diversification, the need to ensure the security of their operations and staff had led business-owners to shift towards informal methods of recruitment.

### Diversifying economic activities

For businesses, one of the key ways in which they have navigated the crisis is to diversify their activities. Pivoting to selling new products or services enables businesses to respond to rapidly changing local markets. This was the most common response given in the demand-side survey question regarding commercial coping mechanisms (42%) and was also a common theme found in the qualitative data, for instance, this business owner who explains: *“We cope by diversifying our operations not one activity, we are into farming, trading and mentorship. So when one fails the other helps.”* (FGD4, Mundemba, Ndian). These findings illustrate how, in the context of the crisis, diversification offers businesses a safety net and helps to insulate them from disappearing demand for certain products and services.

### Recruitment methods

On the demand side, the crisis has also provoked changes in the way in which businesses recruit. Prior to the crisis, businesses used a wide range of recruitment methods, and one of the most prominent methods was using their own personal networks. With the advent of the crisis, the data shows an increasing tendency to resort to informal methods of recruitment, as Table 10 illustrates. One research participant claims that “informal brokers have been and are still the safest means of job search” because, according to her, *“their effectiveness comes from the “man know man” approach they use, meaning that your friends or relations are those who source for the job and recommend you to their acquaintances.”* (CS2, Ndian, Ekondo Titi). Several research participants also reported that employers who used to resort to more formal mechanisms such as radio or newspaper have stopped doing so since the onset of the crisis. Instead, employers prefer hiring relatives and friends directly.

Table 10: Recruitment methods used by businesses

Recruitment method	% of respondents
Ask family/friends of employer for recommendations or connections	37
Ask family/friends of employees for recommendations	40
Post the advertisement publicly, either physically or online	47
Through government recruitment programmes	5
Somebody approaches the workplace in search of a job	31
I am the only person working in this workplace	14
Don't know / I don't recruit	9
other	6

Different motives have been put forward to justify this behaviour. Some research participants point to the lack of employment opportunities or the shortage of jobs that pushes employers to narrow the scope of their



recruitment to *“people of their tribe, neighbourhood or family.”* (CS4, Mezam, Santa). In their view, economic factors are at the origins of the “tribalism” that has become generalised across the NWSW regions.

Others link the increasing tendency to hire locally or among a pool of people known to the employer to ideological reasons, the same as those that are driving the conflict. As communities have become polarised and people are looking inward, employers favour *“local background and relationship to employer than expertise, professionalism and skills because, with the current political situation, you cannot have an opportunity and give it to a stranger.”* (CS3, Eyumojock, Manyu). Minority groups and, especially, internally displaced persons, are the primary victims of the community withdrawal. If in normal times they would be considered as anglophone Cameroonians, the crisis is leading them to be viewed as “strangers”, justifying discriminatory attitudes that prevent their labour market integration. In specific economic sectors, the idea of recruiting from within local communities is seen with a positive lens. This is the case in Mundemba, where the manager of a wildlife conservation organisation explains that keeping the business running resonates with the need to work with people who have been immersed in the local practises and traditions of the area: *“our coping mechanism has been to recruit people with an understanding of local dynamics and who are locally rooted so as to be able to operate despite the difficulties and security issues”* (FGD4, Mundemba, Ndian). This suggests that recruiting locally in certain fields of activity, such as the preservation of natural resources, can help appease the tensions that erode business operations, as it sends a positive message to local NSAGs.

Finally, mobilising informal recruitment methods to a larger extent during the crisis has also been a way for employers to keep a low profile and avoid drawing attention to their business from NSAGs. In fact, posting public advertisements for jobs may be seen as an indication that a business is doing well, making the business-owner and venture targets for NSAGs. An employer in Nkambe explained that *“as soon as an “Amba” [Ambazonian] spy sees you [going to a radio station to advertise your business], they will report you to their general and the general will start calling and threatening you, asking for a ransom.”* (FGD18, Nkambe, Donga-Mantung). Beyond the ransom, businesses that are seen as flourishing despite the crisis can even be subject to physical reprisals on their business space, such as the vandalization of equipment and the demanding of property or assets. The search for safety and the ability to keep their business running thus justifies their preference to hire using personal connections.

### Supply-side coping mechanisms

Meanwhile, individuals - both employees and jobseekers - have also been resorting to various coping strategies to make ends meet. One of them is to diversify their economic activities, by taking on new types of work to supplement their diminishing income. Some of the coping mechanisms individuals resort to are tied to negative externalities, such as prostitution for women, and petty crime, scamming or radicalisation for men. When no solutions are found locally and their economic situation is dire, individuals sometimes take the decision to migrate, a way for them to escape imminent danger as well as pursue longer-term economic goals.

#### Diversifying economic activities

For individuals, diversification means taking on new types of work and even learning entirely new professions. The diverse range of activities that people undertake in order to better insulate themselves against the impacts of the crisis is underlined by this participant who describes how his normal profession is construction, but he now has a business selling petrol, as well as a separate endeavour raising poultry: *“My real profession is building...but due to the crisis I can’t sell [property]...so I decided to divert my attention to business. I [am now a] petrol vendor because the business is profitable here. I was also into piggery but since the pig disease came and killed all my pigs I had to go into poultry.”*(FGD13, Guzang, Momo). The crisis has prevented many respondents from focussing solely on their normal line of work and they have had to adapt to rapidly changing local markets and take on several new activities simultaneously in order to generate income.

Another common diversification strategy for individuals is to turn towards self employment. As this participant explains, starting up one's own enterprise is seen as offering a sense of security because one is no longer beholden to an employer for an income and, in times of crisis, one can escape more easily *“It will help them first for their security, to be able to escape on their own in case of any risk or difficulties and to be able to run their business the way they want to. At times, because of the risk of the crisis, employers compel employees to do certain things against their wishes. [Employers don't care about] the effect or a risk on the employee...people*

*prefer to work on their own and protect themselves and be able to escape from risk"* (FGD11, Bamenda, Mezam) .

The tendency to turn toward self-employment can also be assessed in light of the (mis)perceptions that prevail on the labour market, especially among the youth. Cited by many respondents, commercial bike-riding is an emergent sector of activity that exemplifies young people's desire to work on their own-account and belief that they will be better off doing so in a time of crisis. When asked what challenges young people face in finding employment, 35% of respondents claimed that young people do not want to work for the salaries offered. This suggests that young people would rather refuse a job because of low salaries and embrace more appealing alternatives such as entrepreneurship (or working on one's own account), and migration as discussed below.

## Migration

Across the different divisions, the primary 'push' factor that leads people to migrate is the insecurity caused by the ongoing conflict. Some participants report migration to be a coping mechanism for the threat of direct violence, for instance, one participant describes how for them migration was a means to escape the threat of kidnapping: *"For a coping mechanism, the first thing I did was to relocate since...some of us were kidnapped, we relocated from that place to Bamenda."* (FGD10, Bamenda, Mezam). Whereas, other participants see migration as a coping mechanism for the secondary effects of the crisis, namely, lockdowns and ghost towns which prevent them from running their business or seeking work. For other participants, migration is seen as a necessity to pursue their hopes and dreams, with their own locality viewed as devoid of opportunity: *"The ongoing crisis at a certain point killed my plans and hopes because there were times when you feel like the world will end in no time...as time goes on I feel I must not remain here for my dreams to be realised. I hope to go out of Ekok after saving enough to another place to start afresh and continue pursuing my dreams."* (CS3, Eyumojock, Manyu).

Localities that experience this outward movement of people face various problems. One of the primary negative impacts is that outward migration leaves behind a significantly depleted labour force, for instance, this participant, based in Buea describes how people in the area have increasingly sought to move to areas like Yaoundé and Kribi and outlines the impacts this has had on the local area *"Labour is very scare because a lot of people have relocated to Douala and other parts of the country...We use to train more than 50 youths and women on snail farming each year but because of the crisis we can't even organise training sessions in Buea. We mostly go out of the Southwest region, into Yaoundé and Kribi."* (FGD1, Buea, Fako). Interestingly, elsewhere in the qualitative data, Buea is frequently cited as a relative safe haven within the NWSW, but residents within Buea clearly still perceive the Francophone region as comparatively more desirable.

For businesses in these communities the high number of departees has also drastically reduced demand for goods and services, as this business owner explains: *"I deal with importation of goods from china, and the crisis has affected my sales. Most of my customers have been displaced and those who are available are mostly IDP'S who always complain of lack of money."* (FGD1, Buea, Fako). All of this also contributes to capital flight from the worst-affected areas, with wealthy individuals and investors choosing to spend their money in their new host communities, as this participant in Mamfe outlines: *"Most of the wealthy people here have relocated to the most stable parts of the country and so they choose to invest in those parts of the country where they are. This has made a lot of business gurus to leave this community to set up their businesses in other regions. Hence a drastic drop in the income level in mamfe."* (KII14, Mamfe, Manyu). The data therefore reveals that outward migration leads to a number of cascading and mutual reinforcing impacts for origin communities.

Host communities face distinct challenges from migration across the NWSW. For instance, in Buea, the high number of IDPs has increased competition for housing, which has led to an increase in rent prices: *"Because of the increased population in Buea, most landlords have increased their house rent and so people who do petty business like us face a lot of difficulties because of the huge bills. So the crisis has really affected us."* (FGD1, Buea, Fako). However, an increasing population is not universally viewed in negative terms, as this participant describes, for Buea, the increase in the population can also be good for businesses as it increases demand for goods and services: *"Businesses can still go on and expand, there is a huge demand for building materials and other services. You know there are a lot of IDP'S that have come to limbe for safely, so there is a potential for this business expanding."* (KII5, Fako, Buea).

## Negative coping mechanisms


The data also reveals a number of negative coping mechanisms that people have resorted to in response to the crisis. For women, this can often mean prostitution, with many participants recounting stories of women being forced to sell sexual favours for either cash or employment. One participant describes the situation of female IDPs, who through a lack of financial security are pushed into “*survival sex*” because they have “*no shelter, health care services, and no food*” (FGD8, Mamfe, Manyu). This coping mechanism can lead to a number of further negative consequences, such as the transmission of sexually transmitted diseases and unwanted pregnancy, which, in turn, can also harm their chances of securing employment, as one participant describes “*they will ask you...do you have children? You say yes, a patron will feel that employing you, instead of taking care of the work that you have, you will spend more time taking care of the baby*” (KII31, Nkambe, Donga Mantung).

Another prevalent negative coping mechanism is crime. This is particularly relevant to young men, who are viewed as more susceptible to turning to this coping strategy. One participant underlines the importance of providing opportunities for young men in helping to ensure they do not stray into criminal activity “*It helps to occupy most idle youths...who have nothing doing because [it helps to ensure that they won't] become involved in one crime or the other*” (FGD10, Bamenda, Mezam). As explored in an earlier section, young men are also more prone to joining NSAGs and this may serve as more of a coping mechanism than an ideological undertaking: “*I work with young men mostly who have lost most of their assets like motorcycles and are trying to get different ones. Some of them struggled with me but could not get enough to buy the motor bikes and have joined the ‘amba boys’*” (FGD13, Guzang, Momo).

## Support systems

The data provides insight into how different support institutions are operating in the context of the crisis. The primary types of support institutions operating in the area are mapped below (Figure 32).

Figure 37: Support systems stakeholder map



## Existing support structures

### TVET institutions

TVET institutions have been heavily impacted by the crisis. One KII participant, an expert in TVET institutions in Cameroon, describes how one of the primary issues has simply been that *"we don't have enough trainers to be able to train"*. Like many other institutions they have been affected by high levels of migration, which has depleted them of both teachers and students.

The main challenge however, according to the TVET expert, is that TVET institutions are not responsive to the changing sectoral landscape of the region, and focus more on traditional sectors. In the current context, this leads them to operate on an obsolete curriculum that does not match the recruitment needs of employers.

*"There are too many people in traditional sectors...it's become more supply driven rather than demand driven. Some people fill in the training and will not get something to do. We need to look at the demand side, what can support emergent technologies."* (KII42, Yaounde). This view is not shared across the board. A representative of the Divisional Delegation of Employment and Vocational Training, for instance, argues that the government has been doing well in promoting *"significant improvement in the modern economic sector...[through] promoting professional and technical education throughout the Region"* (KII12, Mundemba, N'dian), citing in particular an increasing focus on 'ICT'.

Nonetheless, there seems to be a consensus that the primary issue with TVET provision is that it is 'supply driven' and is not responsive to what businesses actually need, meaning that many TVET participants are not able to secure employment after their training: *"TVET delivery is more supply driven. The training that they are having is not linked to what enterprises need. Assuming they work with enterprises, and allocate time to work with enterprises, I am sure they would have had jobs, for now we should propose to broaden the training and work very closely with enterprises."* (KII42, Yaounde).

Consequently, TVET provision is currently more "about hitting targets" than a genuine commitment to get people into work. In Mamfe, young people acquire skills in areas where there is a lack of demand in the local community, in this case, teaching and nursing: *"Most young people want to work in things like teaching and nursing [but] these sectors do not match. Mamfe does not have many schools and hospitals to employ graduates from these sectors and local businesses are not well equipped to employ many workers."* (KII16, Mamfe, Manyu).

Whilst there is agreement over the need to better align students and employers, as another participant outlines, this is not an easy undertaking: *"The main challenge is that most employers who need labour [are not transparent] with regards to the salary which is an important aspect for jobseekers. So sometimes it is difficult to link both parties as often jobseekers will not want to pick up low paying jobs. Also some employers expect so many skills from job seekers which make finding a candidate difficult. However I always encourage jobseekers to at least pick up something to polish their skills while looking for better opportunities."* (KII8, Buea, Fako).

One KII participant argues that the answer to making TVET programmes more effective is to ensure that they offer a more complete package than what is currently on offer: *"What is missing from vocational training and skills development is that we cannot just train people and throw them out there; there should be support packages, technical training programmes who after 1 year they get a good business plan and receive support for the business plan to be established."* (KII47, Yaounde). This can be done by supporting trainees who want to start their own business through financial support and start-up capital. Another key component is to link trainees with employers for on the job training or promote apprenticeships that would serve as a pathway for future employment (Workshop observations).

### Microfinance institutions

The data reveals a number of interesting dynamics in the provision of microfinance in the NWSW. On the part of individuals and businesses, access to microfinance is often perceived as complex and expensive. As one participant describes, one of the main challenges in securing this kind of support is a lack of collateral on the part of young businesses: *"I know most microfinance institutes usually give loans to start up businesses to expand or increase their operations, I also understand that this is usually difficult because most of these start-ups do not*

*have collateral security to secure huge loans.*" (KII8, Buea, Fako). Another participant shares the same sentiment, explaining that this is a reason why people have increasingly turned towards more informal sources of support, which is a theme that will be explored in more detail in a following section: *"As for credit union, if you don't have a collateral like land, they won't give you a loan. So most of us without land cannot obtain a loan so we mostly depend on njangi."* (FGD13, Guzang, Momo).

In addition, another barrier that prevents people from using more traditional sources of finance is prohibitively high interest rates, as this participant outlines: *"We have banks like the credit union that are there to assist in our business by granting to us loans. For instance we have BAPCULL and NKATCUL Nkambe. They are very effective though with high interest rate."* (FGD18, Nkambe, Donga Mantung). There is therefore a need to ensure that finance is more accessible and inclusive across the region, which will help both individuals and businesses save and invest.

However, finance providers themselves face their own challenges. One of the primary impediments they face is that their customers are no longer able to repay their loans and that a high number of account holders have also sought to withdraw their savings, leaving providers with a liquidity crisis: *"Those who took loans are not doing the repayments or are paying insufficiently because of the crisis. [Also because of the lockdowns] some have been displaced and they cannot meet the repayment of their loans...[also] because of fear, there has been an increase in savings withdrawal."* (KII28, Batibo, Momo). Individuals are not the only ones who are financially unable to seek loans, the disruptive impacts of the crisis on businesses has also left financial institutions with few corporate customers: *"There used to be cooperatives and big businesses here like big bars, building and construction material shops and many others that we used to grant them loans without hesitation but all those businesses no longer operate here, only small provision shops are operating and does not require our support even though some come and we deny because of the potential risk in the business."* (KII28, Batibo, Momo).

## Employment agencies

The data does not reveal a strong perception amongst participants that employment agencies are a particularly useful way of finding employment: *"The national employment fund and visiting offices are less reliable to me. I don't depend on them for information about jobs."* (CS3, Manyu, Eyumojock). This is corroborated by the quantitative data, where only 14% of respondents said that public/private offices were methods they used to find employment, compared to 71% who said they use the assistance of friends and relatives. Nonetheless, 89% of respondents did say they would be interested in taking part in a job placement programme, suggesting that perhaps the issue lies in the effectiveness, reach, and awareness of existing programmes, rather than a lack of desire on the part of jobseekers.

The most influential employment agency in the region is the National Employment Fund (NEF), which connects jobseekers and employers, as well as providing a range of vocational training services. However, as one KII participant, a representative of the NEF, describes, the organisation's activities have been severely impacted by the crisis: *"Our activities have been disturbed by the political situation of the region as we have limited our activities only to Fako making us not to have a true representation of the region...[also] the crisis situation has really reduced our funding ability as there is no finance presently available for us to support initiatives."* (KII6, Limbe, Fako). Despite this disruption to its activities it still appears the NEF has work to do in convincing the local population that they are an effective tool to use when seeking employment.

## Turning to more informal support systems

The data also reveals that people have increasingly turned to informal support systems in response to the crisis. The most cited form of informal support was Njangi, a type of rotating savings and credit association (ROSCA) where a group of individuals agree to meet for a defined period in order to save and borrow together. Njangi has been defined as "more than a system of banking", but something that is rather "social, community,

belonging, self-discipline and trust all mixed together.”<sup>43</sup> Though it was not an option on survey, 2% of supply-side respondents mentioned Njangi, as a source of support they received from their community (this statistic was obtained by compiling answers in the “other” option of the relevant survey question). Corroborating this, one female jobseeker explained how her Njangi has stepped in where the government has failed: *“Now, as things are not moving and I can’t keep waiting for the government, I have joined “Njangi” and the money I will retrieve will help my family to purchase some basic needs.”* (FGD15, Batibo, Momo).

This turn towards informal systems can be explained by a number of factors. One strong advantage of Njangi is that it does not require the same level of compliance with rules and regulations that more formal systems normally entail, as one participant explains *“As for credit unions, if you don’t have a collateral like land, they won’t give you a loan. So most of us without land cannot obtain a loan so we mostly depend on njangi.”* (FGD13, Guzang, Momo). Another advantage, which was uncovered during our post-fieldwork discussions with our research team, was that the informal nature of Njangi means that it offers lower visibility than more formal methods, which decreases the risk of reprisals

### Remittances and the politicisation around them

The data provides contradictory findings on the importance of remittances in the NWSW crisis. In times of political instability, and when formal labour markets are weakened, evidence shows that people are more likely to rely on remittances to sustain their livelihoods. In the quantitative data collected for this study, remittances were not a commonly cited way in which participants supported themselves. Only 5% of respondents to the supply survey indicated that they receive remittances from outside of the NWSW region, including both national and international remittances. Meanwhile, research participants, especially key informants in Yaoundé and participants to the civil society workshop, attempted to offer some elements to elucidate this.

First, the topic of remittances seems to be highly politicised in the context of the Anglophone crisis. Specialists of the ongoing crisis in the NWSW region have explained that the leaders and prominent figures of the separatist groups are part of the diaspora and located in countries like Norway and the United States. Despite the gaps in the literature, scholars tend to agree that diaspora leaders are significantly involved in the crisis and play a decisive role in financing the armed conflict. This reinforces the government’s stance that the diaspora is responsible for fuelling the conflict and may lead people to retract from talking about remittances altogether in this atmosphere of fear.

Another reason for the low level of remittances recorded in the quantitative data can be a matter of interpretation or definition. According to one key informant, respondents may quantify remittances in a different manner, failing to account for the direct payment of school tuition fees or hospital bills for instance. Finally, other participants have argued that NSAGs in the NWSW regions may impose restrictions on formal remittances that inhibit people from resorting to them. In the context of fear and uncertainty, people may prefer avoiding such support mechanisms to guard against reprisals.


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<sup>43</sup> See more in Bounds, Jana, Njangi: Banking among friends, November 2016.

## RECOMMENDATIONS: FUTURE PROGRAMMING AND FOSTERING SOCIAL COHESION

Based on the evidence gathered and presented in previous sections, this section of the report focuses on recommendations for future programming. Before delving into specific recommendations, the section presents some preliminary reflections, which stem from the research findings and aim to guide the reader through the recommendations. The aim is to reflect upon the approach international organisations, such as IOM, should adopt even before beginning to conceive labour market interventions. Subsequently, the recommendations are clustered into different thematic areas and seek to offer concrete actions that IOM, alongside other partners, can carry out to strengthen the labour market ecosystem and foster social cohesion in the NWSW regions. Finally, the section provides some recommendations for areas that could be further explored in future assessments in the region.

Figure 38: Contributing to peace through the labour market



### PRELIMINARY REFLECTIONS

#### Contributing to peace vs achieving peace

Labour market interventions should not consider peace as a direct output, especially in a context where achieving peace is contingent upon multiple factors, besides economic development and job creation. Instead, when designing labour market interventions, it is important for development organisations to regard themselves as contributing to peace more broadly and in a dynamic environment. An important distinction to make is therefore the one between “negative” peace, which is understood as the absence of violence and fear of violence, and “positive” peace defined as the attitudes, structures and institutions that contribute to fostering more lasting peace.<sup>44</sup> While employment support interventions cannot act upon negative peace, they have the potential to appease tensions in the NWSW regions by granting people an alternative to the crisis and redirecting them towards more productive activities. To effectively contribute to peace, it is recommended that

44 Galtung, Johan. (1969). Violence, Peace, and Peace Research. *Journal of Peace Research*, 6(3), 167–191.



labour market interventions be 1) conflict sensitive, 2) designed and implemented in a collaborative fashion in humanitarian development peace nexus, 3) developed inclusively. The following subsections will provide more details into each of these *requirements*.

### Conflict-sensitivity

The research has shown that it is crucial to adopt a **conflict-sensitive approach** to programming the Anglophone crisis, including any type of employment support interventions in the region. CDA defines conflict sensitivity as *“the practice of understanding how aid interacts with conflict in a particular context, to mitigate unintended negative effects, and to influence conflict positively wherever possible, through humanitarian, development and/or peacebuilding interventions.”*<sup>45</sup>

The goal of a labour market assessment is to ultimately offer pathways to improving the state of the local economy and the labour market. Understanding how aid, or development programming, interact with conflict is the first step to designing mindful and context-appropriate employment support interventions. This first step is driven by the “Do No Harm” policy and therefore seeks to understand how employment support interventions could amplify or mitigate existing conflict dynamics, including by further marginalising certain groups (e.g., people running successful businesses, men refusing to take sides in the conflict), if not designed carefully.

This labour market assessment inscribes itself in the context of an ongoing, polarised crisis, that pits separatist groups in the Anglophone regions against the central government on a multitude of issues that go beyond poverty or lack of employment opportunities, and are embedded in the country’s history, colonial legacy, and sociopolitical culture. The research notably found that NSAGs will often target businesses that create more jobs or are active in the labour market. Flourishing businesses can therefore be subjected to physical reprisals, including abductions, vandalism and sometimes killings. Promoting job creation and business development without considering local conflict dynamics can therefore be potentially dangerous and counterproductive.

Before any labour market intervention, there is a need for development actors to acknowledge the importance of conflict-sensitivity. A conflict-sensitive approach is about ensuring that the project design mitigates the worst potential impact of the conflict (at worst) or strengthens peace opportunities (at best).

### Collaboration in the HDP nexus

Besides conflict-sensitivity, labour market interventions that seek to foster and sustain peace in the NWSW regions should also be **designed and implemented in a collaborative fashion**. Collaboration can take place among actors involved in the HDP nexus. It is notably recommended that development actors must work hand-in-hand with humanitarian and peacebuilding actors if they want their interventions to produce the intended outcomes, as well as to mitigate any negative externalities.

The Risk Mitigation Working Group the Resident Coordinator’s Office has set up in relation to the Presidential Plan for Reconstruction and Development (PPRD) is an important first step to strengthening the collaboration between early recovery programming and humanitarian interventions. Beyond making sure that development programming does not duplicate or counteract efforts made in other fields of assistance, such platforms are also crucial to foster a dialogue and broaden the understanding of the root-causes of the Anglophone crisis.

Besides HDP coordination, labour market interventions are more likely to contribute to peace if they involve local actors including local authorities, market actors (e.g., training providers), and grassroots organisations including NGOs and CSOs from the early stages. This will help increase buy-in for the interventions and ensure the needs of the local populations are appropriately diagnosed and addressed. Without such collaboration and coordination pathways, actions in the regions may only produce limited outcomes.

### An inclusive and holistic approach

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<sup>45</sup> CDA is known as the founder of ‘Do No Harm’ and as a recognized leader in conflict-sensitivity. Through collaborative learning projects and other forms of support, CDA helps organisations to systematically apply conflict sensitivity in their work. CDA defines conflict sensitivity on its website at: <https://www.cdacollaborative.org/what-we-do/conflict-sensitivity/>



Finally, labour market interventions that seek to foster and sustain peace should aim to be **as inclusive as possible**. As will be discussed in the next section, any intervention that seeks to support employment creation, or business development, or to facilitate labour market integration should adopt a comprehensive targeting strategy and avoid marginalising population groups at the expense of others. Unemployed and underemployed men should be just as supported as their female counterparts. Similarly, interventions that target IDPs, returnees or former associates should also adopt a whole-of-society approach to include host community members that suffer the same socio-economic hardships.

## PROGRAMMATIC RECOMMENDATIONS

### Revitalising the agricultural sector

The economies of the NWSW regions are predominantly based on agriculture. Yet, the agrarian sector, and farmers more specifically, are shown to be disproportionately affected by the crisis. This can be attributed to the following factors: 1) farmers are usually at the beginning of local or regional value chains, a vulnerable position that makes them dependent on other economic actors to transport and sell their crops; 2) farmers are located in remote areas and thus affected to a greater extent by roadblocks and NSAG restrictions; 3) farmers are prime targets in the strategy of NSAGs to reappropriate fertile lands and natural resources; pursuing their activity endangers them more relative to other occupations.

1. First and foremost, interventions aimed to revitalise the agricultural sector should invest in the construction and rehabilitation of agricultural infrastructures. This includes irrigation schemes, micro-dams, farm-to-market roads, storage and drying systems, flood protection and river control systems, soil and water conservation systems, among others. To this effect, IOM could collaborate with the ILO to implement employment-intensive investment programmes (EIIPs).<sup>46</sup>
2. The research has shown that border proximity, namely in the case of Manyu and Donga-Mantung which are located at the borders with Nigeria, provides cross-border trade opportunities to the local population. However, damaged roads such as the Trans-African Highway in Manyu and the absence of cold storage facilities in Donga-Mantung prevent business-owners from harnessing the potential of cross-border trade. It is therefore recommended to assess the feasibility of building infrastructures for the storage and preservation of basic food products intended for marketing. This can help foster cross-border value chains and support local production.
3. There is also a need to improve smallholder farmers' access to markets by capitalising on roads that are less affected by NSAG restrictions. Smallholder farmers in Donga-Mantung sometimes travel to Bafoussam in the neighbouring West region to buy supplies or sell their products. The risk they take naturally leads them to increase their prices and sell products that will not be affordable to many. There is therefore a need to provide farmers with the right incentives and adequate facilities to use the alternative routes. Compensating the cost of travelling longer distances can for instance be a first step to reviving the local ecosystems.
4. In the South-West, it would be important to work with local authorities and relevant ministries to offer financial support to big plantations such as the CDC and PAMOL. Long-term loans with preferential interest rates can, for instance, be envisioned to help these large-scale public enterprises, which provide salaried jobs to many people in the region, get back on their feet and resume their operations. However, it should be noted that limited financial capacity is not the only explanation to the downfall of these large companies. More structural problems such as ongoing security challenges and the threat field work poses to salaried farmers are also responsible for the closure of these companies.
5. Transformation or processing industries could go a long way in dis-enclaving communities in remote or border areas. The absence of such industries was deplored in Manyu specifically, a division considered to be on the "receiving end". Investing in such industries could not only reinforce agricultural value chains but also help

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<sup>46</sup> For more information on employment-intensive investment programmes (EIIPs), please visit this page <https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/employment-intensive-investment/lang--en/index.htm>

divisions affected by road closures become more self-sufficient. At the same time, these industries have great potential for job creation.

### Rehabilitating infrastructure

Included as one of the priority areas of the PPRD, infrastructure rehabilitation is a widely stressed need across divisions. Existing issues with infrastructure have been worsened by the crisis leaving many areas with damaged roads, an unreliable or non-existent power supply, and poor internet connectivity, all of which have severe implications for both businesses and individuals.

1. One of the most cited issues across all localities was the poor condition of roads, which has been exacerbated by the crisis. The destruction of major roads, including the Ekok-Bamenda road (part of the Trans-African Highway), has seriously reduced the ability of businesses to supply themselves and sell their products. The rehabilitation of roads across the NWSW will offer several economic and social benefits, including, repairing disrupted supply chains, bringing down transportation costs, opening up new markets for businesses, and allowing commuters to travel for work. Rehabilitation of the road network will need to be undertaken with a conflict sensitive approach which acknowledges the crucial role that engaging with NSAGs will play in any attempt to reopen or reconstruct road networks.

2. Another key infrastructure challenge is in the provision of electricity. This is particularly true in the division of Donga-Mantung, where one respondent describes *"We have not had electricity for like four years now and people have been surviving through solar panels and generators"* (FGD18, Ndu, Donga Mantung). The benefits of stable electricity provision are numerous, for example, it could allow businesses to open entire new revenue streams, such as by allowing food traders to install refrigerators and store a greater variety of goods.

3. In addition to power issues, participants also report issues with internet connectivity. This hinders businesses and individuals in several ways, for example, businesses are restricted from connecting with their customers or selling their goods online, whilst job seekers are prohibited from finding work online or undertaking remote work. Ensuring fast and stable internet access can also provide several specific advantages to certain industries, for instance, those working in the agricultural sector can gain access to weather data.

An effective way in which these infrastructure improvements could be achieved is through Employment-Intensive Investment Programmes (EIIPs), as one respondent from the ILO explains, *"Here, at the ILO, we recommend employment-intensive investment Programmes (EIIPs). These techniques enable using the local labour force as well as local material and small equipment to build roads, schools and other infrastructure."* (KII44, Yaounde). By harnessing local labour in rehabilitation efforts, these programmes can help to support poor and vulnerable groups by providing them with employment opportunities. This can also have the impact of counteracting the workers' exodus witnessed in places like Ndian and Momo as it incentivises people to search for employment locally. In addition, such programmes can also contribute to the integration of IDPs and refugees by providing them with a means to transition into the local labour market.

### Fostering an enabling environment

1. It is important to devise a continuity plan for business development service (BDS) providers in the NWSW regions and ensure they can offer the financial, technical and skills training support to existing businesses. BDS providers should be given the means and incentives to continue operating in the NWSW as they constitute an essential part of businesses' support system during the crisis. Alongside MINEPAT and UNDP (the PPRD implementing partner), IOM can work on ensuring BDS providers understand the specific challenges businesses face at the division and subdivision level and provide them with the right kind of support. For instance, urban businesses may need support in identifying new markets to compensate for the insufficient demand, whereas rural businesses may need support in moving up the value chain towards more productive activities.

2. The research found that people are more likely to resort to informal money lending mechanisms to compensate for their loss of income. This notably translates into borrowing from Njangi, a type of rotating savings and credit association (ROSCA). This can be explained by the fact that access to Njangi is easier and less expensive: it does not require a collateral, the interest rates are negotiated at the community level, and the repayment modalities are less stringent. In addition, Njangi offers lower visibility which decreases the risk of reprisals from NSAGs. At the same time, financial service providers have also become unable to provide loans

given the liquidity crisis they face. In this context, it is important to tap into the potential of informal finance options by notably generalising the use of instruments like Njangi. Meanwhile, microfinance institutions and formal banks should be encouraged to ease their loan requirements for the duration of the crisis, and temporary bail out measures can be enacted to relieve them from their liquidity shortage. Finally, measures should be taken to ensure that those who have moved outside of the NWSW regions and have managed to secure employment can resume reimbursing their loan without incurring additional penalties.

3. Our analysis also reveals the untapped potential of vocational training providers. The most important area of focus for TVET institutions should be ensuring a better alignment between supply and demand. Participants describe how TVET institutions are more often concerned with 'hitting targets' than a genuine commitment to ensuring students go on to secure employment, with the primary issue being that students are often trained in areas in which there is little demand from employers. By working in partnership with the NEF, TVET institutions can work to profile skills in demand from local employers to help ensure that more young people are able to secure employment after graduating.

4. A key way in which TVET institutions can help to mitigate the disruption caused by the crisis is to move more of their activities online. Equipping TVET institutions with the tools and capacity to provide remote teaching services will help to ensure that students can complete courses even if physical access to instruction centres is limited. The success of this initiative will also be contingent on the students themselves having access to digital devices and a stable internet connection, which underlines the necessity of the points made earlier regarding improvements to local infrastructure. In addition, the Ministry of Employment and Vocational Training (MINEFOP) can play an important role in developing a framework and set of guidelines for the development of remote learning courses.

5. There is also an increased role to be played by employment agencies, in particular the NEF. The data shows that many participants do not view employment agencies as a useful method of securing employment, suggesting that there is scope for employment agencies to communicate their purpose and usefulness to job seekers more effectively, which can be achieved through developing a more effective and targeted communications campaign and by working through organisations like youth associations to reach young jobseekers more directly. Employment agencies could also work in partnership with employers to develop a greater range of job opportunities, such as apprenticeships, which could help to improve their attractiveness to low-skilled job seekers.

### Addressing vulnerability

Employment support interventions should strive to adopt a more holistic and inclusive approach. While it is important to grasp the specific challenges different population subgroups face in terms of employability, access to training and skills development opportunities and labour market integration, it is also essential to design interventions that avoid exclusive targeting.

1. Instead, interventions should be oriented towards vulnerable communities as a whole, and can then be adapted or complemented to address specific needs. It is therefore important for local organisations and international NGOs operating in the NWSW regions to broaden their beneficiary selection process. Ensuring greater inclusivity and that no population subgroup is left behind is critical to reduce existing vulnerabilities and thwart future radicalisation partners.

2. Awareness-raising and sensitisation can also be carried out among development and humanitarian organisations, as well as local actors (NGOs, CSOs). This should help ensure that these actors, especially those who work closely with affected populations, have an accurate understanding of existing vulnerabilities. These organisations should go beyond a women and children centric approach when delivering aid to local populations affected by the crisis. This research found that targeting women and children while leaving men behind can increase men's vulnerability to the crisis. To prove their "masculinity", they are constantly asked to take sides in the conflict and find themselves in a situation of "impossible neutrality". Men who do not want to be part of the conflict have to flee or hide. Informing organisations operating in the NWSW of these dynamics can trigger a shift in paradigm and enable men to also benefit from existing support.

3. Local actors themselves such as youth and women's associations have a crucial role to play in shifting mentalities around masculinity. In the NWSW, men associate their masculinity with being the main breadwinner.

As the crisis has reduced income-generating activities in the region and forces men who do not want to get involved in the crisis to abandon their jobs, men lose their sense of purpose. In addition, they have a hard time accepting the exclusion from support programmes. The idleness men are forced into *“can [therefore] have bad consequences for men, who turn to addiction or radicalisation, as well as for women who suffer men’s mounting resentment.”* (KII43, Yaoundé)

4. The Anglophone crisis has created a situation where men cannot pursue their income-generating activities out of fear of reprisals. In this context, the research found that household members tend to resort to negative coping mechanisms. For instance, young boys are likely to resort to scamming techniques while women or the wives of unemployed men tend to offer sexual favours in exchange for an income. To prevent negative coping strategies like scamming and sexual exploitation, it would be important to conduct a complementary assessment to assess these behaviours and their importance in the context of the ongoing crisis.

5. Exclusive reintegration programming - targeting groups such as IDPs, returnees and former associates - can have negative repercussions on host communities. It is therefore important to adopt a whole-of-society approach that can minimise frustrations, particularly in communities that have witnessed the erosion of their social fabric. This was framed by one key informant as such: *“My argument is that when you pay little attention to host communities, it raises two principal problems. It raises the problem of non-acceptance of the people you are trying to reintegrate among local communities. Then, when these groups receive training and support, and become socially and economically better off, it can lead to the radicalisation of other community-members.”* (KII48, Yaoundé)

6. An important initiative that can be undertaken to promote the reintegration of all groups into the labour market could be a programme to help provide civil documentation to those who do not currently possess it. Our analysis revealed that this is an issue that can often affect IDPs who move to new areas without their documentation, often as it has been lost or destroyed, and, as a consequence, face additional challenges in securing employment. However, this is not only an issue affecting IDPs, our analysis also found that ID documents of host communities are often confiscated or destroyed by NSAGs. An initiative to provide a simple and accessible way in which people can apply for these documents can help to remove barriers for jobseekers seeking employment.

7. Our analysis also revealed that the impacts of the crisis have taken a significant toll on the physical and mental well-being of the population, with some participants explaining that their trauma was so severe they feared leaving the house. To provide those affected with the confidence and ability to once again engage in the labour market it will be necessary to offer a range of rehabilitation and therapy services, which can be coordinated through local healthcare providers.

### Harnessing civil society

Partnerships with civil society organisations, including youth-based organisations and women’s associations, rather than large international NGOs should be prioritised in implementing inclusive labour market interventions in a collaborative fashion. The research showed that people are increasingly reluctant to turn to formal means of support, as they prefer remaining invisible to the warring parties. CSOs therefore have a stronger potential to contribute to peace in the NWSW regions and foster social cohesion.

1. To effectively support CSOs, it is recommended that donors adopt an inclusive financing strategy by providing CSOs *“flexible and responsive funding”*.<sup>47</sup> Research participants deplored the lack of financial support these local organisations receive: *“they could go a long way into mitigating the negative effects of the crisis but they are hindered by the lack of funding; the 2020 humanitarian response strategy only allocated a couple of percentages of its budget to local, Cameroonian organisations.”* (KII43, Yaounde) This was also one of the major

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<sup>47</sup> For more information on innovative ways for donors to support civil society partners, see for example Sida’s Guiding Principles for Engagement with and Support to Civil Society (2019)

pleas of civil society workshop participants who explained that the bottom-up approach is ineffective in the context of the Anglophone crisis, and that funding tends to be earmarked for large-scale interventions that replicate models that have worked in the past, without being mindful of contextual specificities. Donors should therefore engage with CSOs on a more regular and proactive basis to understand their modus operandi, objectives and the challenges they have been facing due to the crisis. Through dialogue with donors, the support CSOs receive can become more targeted and personalised, going beyond a mere transactional relationship. Funding can be complemented with capacity-building.

2. A mapping of local CSOs/NGOs could be carried out to better understand their role and operational challenges during the crisis. This should provide a broader picture of the coping strategies people resort to and the support systems that exist on the ground, as well as help determine how CSOs and local NGOs can best be supported in their activities. Besides a needs assessment, this mapping can highlight some best practices these CSOs have put in place and propose ways to generalise them to other locations while being mindful of the different contexts and labour market specificities.

3. The civil society workshop organised as part of this research proved to be a successful platform where CSOs from Buea, Bamenda but also Yaounde came together to discuss the impacts of the crisis on local labour markets and reflect on how the economic situation can be improved. To foster communication and problem-solving among CSOs from the NWSW regions, such avenues can be envisioned on a more regular basis.

## AREAS TO FURTHER EXPLORE

1. The research examined the challenges and opportunities for growth on the demand-side at the division level. This was aimed to provide a more granular assessment of local labour markets in their plurality. It is recommended that labour market interventions use the same approach and map out the strengths, weaknesses, dysfunctions, and comparative advantages of the local labour markets where activities will be implemented. This can and should be done not only at the division level but also at the level of subdivisions to draw context-specific conclusions. This can help detect specific dynamics such as cross-border trade dynamics as witnessed in the divisions of Donga-Mantung and Manyu, demographic dynamics and shortage of labour as witnessed in Ndian and Momo, and urban-rural dynamics as witnessed in Fako where focusing on urban centres may offer a skewed impression of security levels and business expansion challenges in the division.

2. To inform future programming, rapid assessments can be carried out on specific economic sectors and value chains per division. This can help get a clearer idea of growth challenges and opportunities in different economic sectors, and their needs in terms of human capital, skills, access to finance, access to business development services etc. Such rapid assessments can facilitate the design of measures and interventions to effectively match supply and demand in these economic sectors.

3. To inform future programming, in-depth assessments of the skills and occupation profiles of different population subgroups can be carried out. This can help establish the different skills profiles that exist at the community level to develop more targeted employment support programmes.

4. The partnership with religious authorities can also be further explored. Such partnerships can be useful in designing and implementing assistance programmes as religious authorities can serve as implementation intermediaries and help ensure the protection of vulnerable groups. In addition, religious authorities can help foster dialogue at the community level and their participation in future programming can therefore be useful in the operationalisation of holistic and inclusive programmes.

## ANNEX 1: KII & FGD LISTS

KII LIST			
Code	Type	Sub-division	Division
KII1	NGO/Association	Buea	Fako
KII2	Private sector	Buea	Fako
KII3	Private sector	Buea	Fako
KII4	Private sector	Buea	Fako
KII5	Private sector	Buea	Fako
KII6	TVET/Employment agency	Limbe	Fako
KII7	Private sector	Tiko	Fako
KII8	TVET/Employment agency	Buea	Fako
KII9	Government	Mundemba	Ndian
KII10	Private sector	Ekondo-Titi	Ndian
KII11	Private sector	Ekondo-Titi	Ndian
KII12	Government	Mundemba	Ndian
KII13	Private sector	Mundemba	Ndian
KII14	Government	Mamfe	Manyu
KII15	Private sector	Mamfe	Manyu
KII16	TVET/Employment agency	Mamfe	Manyu
KII17	TVET/Employment agency	Eyumojock	Manyu
KII18	Private sector	Eyumojock	Manyu
KII19	TVET/Employment agency	Bamenda	Mezam
KII20	Private sector	Bamenda	Mezam
KII21	Private sector	Santa	Mezam
KII22	TVET/Employment agency	Santa	Mezam
KII23	NGO/Association	Bamenda	Mezam
KII24	Private sector	Santa	Mezam
KII25	NGO/Association	Bamenda	Mezam
KII26	Microfinance institution	Guzang	Momo
KII27	Microfinance institution	Batibo	Momo
KII28	Microfinance institution	Batibo	Momo
KII29	Private sector	Guzang	Momo
KII30	Private sector	Batibo	Momo
KII31	NGO/Association	Nkambe	Donga-Mantung

KII32	Private sector	Nkambe	Donga-Mantung
KII33	Government	Nkambe	Donga-Mantung
KII34	Microfinance institution	Ndu	Donga-Mantung
KII35	Private sector	Ndu	Donga-Mantung
KII36	Private sector	Nkambe	Donga-Mantung
KII37	Government	Buea	Fako
KII38	Government	Buea	Fako
KII39	Government	Bamenda	Mezam
KII40	Government	Bamenda	Mezam
KII41	Government	Yaounde	Mfoundi
KII42	IO/UN	Yaounde	Mfoundi
KII43	Senior expert	Yaounde	Mfoundi
KII44	IO/UN	Yaounde	Mfoundi
KII45	IO/UN	Yaounde	Mfoundi
KII46	Senior expert	Yaounde	Mfoundi
KII47	IO/UN	Yaounde	Mfoundi
KII48	Senior expert	Yaounde	Mfoundi
KII49	Government	Yaounde	Mfoundi

FGD LIST			
Code	Type	Sub-division	Division
FGD1	Male employers	Buea	Fako
FGD2	Female jobseekers	Limbe	Fako
FGD3	Young male jobseekers	Tiko	Fako
FGD4	Male employers	Mundemba	Ndian
FGD5	Young female jobseekers	Mundemba	Ndian
FGD6	Female employers	Ekondo-Titi	Ndian
FGD7	Male employers	Mamfe	Manyu
FGD8	Female employers	Mamfe	Manyu
FGD9	Male employees	Eyumojock	Manyu
FGD10	Female employers	Bamenda	Mezam
FGD11	Female IDP employees and jobseekers	Bamenda	Mezam
FGD12	Female employees	Santa	Mezam
FGD13	Male employers	Guzang	Momo

FGD14	Female employers	Guzang	Momo
FGD15	Female employees and jobseekers	Batibo	Momo
FGD16	Female employers	Nkambe	Donga-Mantung
FGD17	Male employees	Ndu	Donga-Mantung
FGD18	Female employers	Ndu	Donga-Mantung



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## ABOUT SAMUEL HALL

Samuel Hall is a social enterprise that conducts research in countries affected by issues of migration and displacement. Our mandate is to produce research that delivers a contribution to knowledge with an impact on policies, programmes, and people. With a rigorous approach and the inclusion of academic experts, field practitioners, and a vast network of national researchers, we access complex settings and gather accurate data.

Our research connects the voices of communities to change-makers for more inclusive societies. Samuel Hall has offices in Afghanistan, Kenya, Germany and Tunisia and a presence in Somalia, Ethiopia and the United Arab Emirates. For more information, please visit [www.samuelhall.org](http://www.samuelhall.org)



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