

Adkaysi!

Joint analysis of donor engagements related to
Resilience in Somalia

A report commissioned by the Informal Humanitarian Donor Group
October 2016

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This research was commissioned by the Informal Humanitarian Donor Group (IHDG) with contracting and funding by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC). Special thanks to our colleagues and field enumerators in Doolow, Bossasso, and Hargeisa, who worked tirelessly to gather qualitative information and provide insight and expertise that greatly assisted this research.

We thank the Informal Humanitarian Donor Group (IHDG), donors (DFID, DANIDA, USAID, SDC, BMZ, Australian and Swedish Embassies), as well as Frida Akerberg (IHDG), Kunow Abdi (SDC), Marc Bloch (SDC), Pernille Brix Jørgensen (Danish Embassy) and Issa Bitang (USAID) for their active and continuous support.

We would also like to express our gratitude to all the surveyed Somali governmental counterparts, international donors, implementing consortia, as well as international and Somali NGOs for generously sharing data, views, and information on resilience programming.

This publication was commissioned by IHDG with contracting and funding by SDC. It was prepared and conducted by *Samuel Hall*. The views and analysis contained in the publication therefore do not necessarily represent the views of other agencies. Any errors are our own and should not tarnish the reputations of others.

This report should be cited using the following referencing style:

Samuel Hall (2016). *Adkaysi! Joint analysis of donor engagements related to Resilience in Somalia*, commissioned by IHDG with contracting and funding by SDC.



Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft
Confédération suisse
Confederazione Svizzera
Confederaziun svizra

**Swiss Agency for Development
and Cooperation SDC**



Samuel Hall is an independent think tank with offices in Asia (Afghanistan) and East Africa (Kenya, Somalia). We specialise in socio-economic surveys, private and public sector studies, and impact assessments for a range of humanitarian and development actors. With a rigorous approach, and the inclusion of academic experts, field practitioners, and a vast network of national researchers, we access complex settings and gather accurate data. We bring innovative insights and practical solutions to addressing the most pressing social, economic and political issues of our time.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	2
TABLE OF CONTENTS	3
ACRONYMS	4
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	6
RATIONALE OF THE STUDY	9
CONTEXTUAL FRAMEWORK	11
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONTEXT	11
FOOD SECURITY CONTEXT	12
OVERALL RISK ASSESSMENT.....	13
THEORETICAL LEVEL: CONCEPT AND CONTEXT.....	14
DEFINITION(S)	14
CONCEPTUALIZATION.....	16
PRACTICE	18
CONSENSUS: MULTI-SECTORAL, LONGER-TERM, AND... LEARNING-ORIENTED	21
OPERATIONAL LEVEL 1: KEY TRADE-OFFS.....	24
MAPPING SOMALIA'S RESILIENCE PORTFOLIO.....	24
FRAGMENTED RESILIENCE AGENDAS	26
HETEROGENEOUS DURABLE SOLUTIONS AND RESILIENCE AGENDAS	26
LACK OF CROSS-BORDER APPROACH	27
CONFUSION WITH SHORT-TERM POLITICAL OBJECTIVES.....	28
QUESTIONABLE FEASIBILITY OF RESILIENCE PROGRAMMING	29
OPERATIONAL LEVEL 2: VALUE FOR MONEY OF THE CONSORTIUM APPROACH.....	31
STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL ADDED-VALUE	31
LIMITED CAPACITY TO MEASURE IMPACT AND INFORM LEARNING PROCESSES	33
COST-EFFECTIVENESS (AND VALUE-FOR-MONEY?)	36
POLICY LEVEL: COORDINATION AND OWNERSHIP.....	39
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	42
FOCUSING ON THE LONG-TERM	43
BUILDING A COMMON LEARNING AGENDA.....	46
FOSTERING LINKAGES AND PROMOTING NATIONAL OWNERSHIP	47
ANNEXES	48
1. LIST OF 26 PROJECTS ON RESILIENCE IN THE PSG PROJECT DATABASE.....	48
2. RESILIENCE PROJECTS AND THEIR SECTORS.....	52
3. ACTIVE CONSORTIA IN SOMALIA	55
4. RAPID CONTEXT ANALYSIS.....	57
5. METHODOLOGY	58
6. GLOSSARY	62
BIBLIOGRAPHY	63

ACRONYMS

ACTED	Agence d'Aide à la Coopération Technique et au Développement
ADESO	African Development Solutions
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
BMZ	German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
BRCiS	Building Resilient Communities in Somalia
BNSP	Basic Nutrition Services Package
CCA	Climate Change Adaptation
CLTS	Community-led Total Sanitation
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
CSI	Coping Strategy Index
CSO	Community Service Organisation
CT	Communication Technology
CVE	Countering Violent Extremism
DFID	Department for International Development
DMA	Disaster Management Agency
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
DRSLP	Drought Resilience and Sustainable Livelihoods Program
DSRSG	Deputy Special Representation of the Secretary General
EAC	East African Community
ECHO	European Commission's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection department
EU	European Union
EU-DEVCO	European Union Development Cooperation
EUTF	European Union (Emergency) Trust Fund
FCS	Household Food Consumption Score
FGS	Federal Government of Somalia
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FSIN	Food Security Information Network
FSL	Food Security and Livelihoods
FSNAU	Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit
HFIAS	Household Food Insecurity Access Scale
HLPF	High Level Partnership Forum
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IDS	Institute of Development Studies
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IHDG	International Humanitarian Donor Group
IOM	International Organization for Migration
ISF	Integrated Strategic Framework
IPRSP	Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
JRS	Jesuit Refugee Service
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MOPIC	Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NDP	National Development Plan
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
NRM	Natural Resource Management
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OFDA	Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance
OR	Operational Research
PLW	Pregnant and Lactating Women
PPP	Public-Private Partnership

PRRO	Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations
PSG	Peacebuilding and State building Goals
PR	Poverty Reduction
RC/HC	Resident Coordinator / Humanitarian Coordinator
ReDSS	Regional Durable Solutions Secretariat
RIMA	Resilience Index Measurement and Analysis
SDC	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
SLI	Sequencing, Layering, and Integrating
SomReP	Somalia Resilience Program
SNA	Somali National Army
SRC	Somalia Return Consortium
SSA	Somaliland Special Arrangement
SSNP	Social Safety Net Programme
STEPS	Social, Technological and Environmental Pathways to Sustainability
SWALIM	Somalia Water and Land Information Management
TANGO	Technical Assistance to NGOs
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Emergency Fund
UNSOM	United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VfM	Value for Money
VSF	Vétérinaires Sans Frontières
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WB	The World Bank Group
WFP	United Nations World Food Programme
WVI	World Vision International

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Aid in Somalia, as in much of the world, can be said to be undergoing a change of identity. In the context of an international shift from emergency humanitarian programming to longer-term strategies that support and build self-sustaining capacities of individuals, communities, and systems, Somalia faces unique challenges. With the protracted nature of insecurity and conflict, resilience programming must be contextualised and operationalised in a Somalia-specific capacity to account for these constraints. In this light, it is especially pertinent that donors, implementing actors and governmental partners are collectively on the same page in terms of theory, operations and policy to maximize resource-usage and results.

In a **theoretical** level, there is presently not as a high level of consensus as is possible, with some **disconnect in perceptions between donors, implementing partners, and local communities**. Each actor has its own definition of resilience, which is generally aligned with its specific mandate and/or ethos. While local communities and NNGOs tend to emphasise the absorptive capacity at the micro-level, international actors' understanding and approaches can vary a great deal – including within subgroups. These disconnects present potential conceptual and operational risks, inhibit successful collaboration and even potentially engender strife between stakeholders. While there is a level of consensus on certain key aspects, until the gap is fully bridged between concept and implementation of programmes in Somalia – and until programming fully integrates the communities' ideas of resilience – success is hampered.

In an **operational** level, while funding for resilience-labelled projects has increased, a concrete resilience agenda is undefined, and some projects with this label do not qualify as resilience. In fact, if one defines resilience as encompassing individual to systemic change from an absorptive to transformative level – then resilience may not be a realistic or legitimate agenda in some parts of the country on the medium- to long-term. Furthermore, **resilience's connections to key related programming, including the durable solutions**

agenda, cross-border concerns and stabilisation goals, are unclear or not strongly established. Durable solutions and cross-border programming should be taken into greater consideration, while clear delineation needs to be created between resilience and stabilisation agendas to ensure political motivations do not (only) dominate. Finally, **consortia have added value in information sharing and stronger relationships to the government, but must strategize well in order to avoid inertia, measure impact adequately and optimise differences in organisational approaches**.

At the **policy** level, a resilience pillar has been included in the Federal Government of Somalia's National Development Plan. This is one piece of evidence that national ownership is viewed as essential not only by international actors, but also by Somali actors themselves. **While capacity is not yet fully realised in the government, there is a desire for higher engagement**. This is threatened by a challenging negative cycle, as donors may be deterred from collaboration due to a lack of capacity and representativeness. So, while progress has been made in the involvement of the government, there are still clear areas for improvement.

Prevalent through all of this is the notable finding that some actors still conceptualise resilience-building as a successive process, moving from absorptive to adaptive or transformative elements in a linear fashion. However, this piecemeal approach does not fit the reality of the needs and the reality of resilience, which must simultaneously encompass humanitarian aid, rehabilitation, and development assistance. **Resilience also cannot be merely at one level of focus, but must span the breadth of targeting from individual Somalis to systemic change. This does, unfortunately, provide limitations on the feasibility of resilience programming in some areas of Somalia, where the government is not at a capacity to take ownership and undergo systemic change**. This does not mean that the current programmes should cease, but does question their categorisation as 'resilience' activities.

With these considerations in place, the key questions become:

- Can resilience be done under just one programme?
- Do programmes have to be defined as 'resilience' in order to do resilience activities?

As a whole, NGO and UN consortia operating in Somalia are in a unique position, benefitting from the expertise, experience, and geographic coverage of 12 INGOs, many local NGOs and implementing partners, while UN agencies (such as FAO, UNICEF, and WFP) cover most accessible regions. In theory, the question becomes that of efficiently pooling resources while making economies of scale, mitigating operational risks and optimising impact. **There is a consensus on consortia's strategic added value on the medium-to long-term, with a clear impact on information sharing, operational collaboration, and an improved dialogue with the Somali government.** Beyond the clear consensus on the potential and actual added value of the consortium model, the findings of this research also point to three key conclusions on consortia operating in Somalia: 1) there are **doubts over NGOs and consortia's actual capacity to measure outcomes and impact** on the short- to medium-term; 2) there is still **inconclusive evidence of NGOs and consortia's actual cost-effectiveness** on the short-term; and 3) considering both the objectives and timescales of resilience activities and the organisational inertia of the actors operating in Somalia, **it will take some time to fully optimise the outcomes of the model, which remains conceptually and contextually valid.** These findings are not alarming but require a discussion between donors and consortia to rethink the operational translation on the Somali ground of the conceptual frameworks discussed in Nairobi. In this light, Samuel Hall suggests key focal points for improvement of resilience engagement in Somalia:

- **Accept that resilience-building may not be a realistic agenda in some parts of the country on the medium to long-term.** If resilience requires change from the individual to the systemic level, and from the absorptive to transformative capacity, then it may not be realistic in some areas of Somalia. In these areas, resilience-building cannot be seen as a priority, as it may be detrimental to other (better) assistance modalities and approaches.

- **Distinguish stabilisation and resilience strategies and programmes for greater clarity and efficiency.** Not drawing clear strategic, funding and programmatic lines between those different – albeit necessary – approaches may be detrimental to the assistance community.
- **Shift from a continuum approach to a contiguous approach.** Currently, with the predominance of short-term humanitarian programming, the transformative dimension is poorly addressed, as it is considered as a long-term priority. In this regard, the feasibility of resilience programming (vs. emergency) in South-Central Somalia must be questioned in today's context, in light of the constraints of the socio-economic and security situations.
- **Systematise regional and cross-border approaches to resilience programming.** In a context of regional migration, internal displacement, and seasonal pastoralist movements, a cross-border approach to resilience has to be improved in order to address the root causes of chronic vulnerability.
- **Align the resilience and durable solutions agendas.** Donors have a key role to play in bridging the gap between humanitarian and development actors, as they can fund both – especially with the focus on resilience as a process that spans humanitarian and development objectives, durable solutions and resilience agendas.
- **Consider diversity (of concepts and indicators) as an asset.** As long as they are public, flexible, pragmatic, contextualized, multi-scale and include qualitative dimensions, diversity may be an asset for both concepts and indicators.
- **Put the learning agenda at the heart of the strategy.** Resilience-building programming needs to be evaluated for its medium- and long-term impacts *not only* on food and nutrition security in the face of recurrent shocks and chronic stressors *but also* on more transformative and longer-term dimensions. Donors should be more demanding with their partners on the Somali ground, so that their partners generate tangible evidence of what works most effectively and provides best value for money over a realistic timeframe.
- **Promote transformative and longer-term information systems (e.g. land and water information, environment, social and societal aspects).** While supporting early warning and nutrition systems leads to stronger adaptive or

absorptive capacities, it is also important from a resilience-building perspective to design and tailor information systems focusing on a more transformative capacity.

- **Create a proper coordinating body between stakeholders (e.g. broadened Steering Committee EU, SomRep).** While coordination is strong, covering the various dimensions of resilience building and reaching scale in a cohesive manner requires ever greater multi-sectorial and multi-stakeholder coordination. Beyond individual political agendas, donors would benefit from an actual consensus-building platform to promote coordination and encourage initiatives like the Resilience Systems Analysis. It is suggested that the Informal Humanitarian Donor Group take the lead in promoting this multi-stakeholder approach.
- **Work with the Somali government in a two-way dialogue.** Despite the relatively low capacities of most governmental agencies – at both national and subnational levels – local and national ownership and leadership are key to build resilient country, communities and

households in Somalia. Engagement has improved, but further progress can be made.

- **Develop direct accountability loops with local communities.** Community-based approaches are crucial to ensure ownership, sustainability, conflict prevention and resolution and, must be fully involved in all phases of the projects cycle. In addition, communities have inherent resilience mechanisms upon which programmes can be built. Donors should ensure that all the projects they fund apply strict participatory and accountability principles with local communities.

Resilience programming in Somalia is not ineffective, but its results are still merely accumulative, and it has the opportunity to increase its capacity to a great extent. This assessment makes clear that donors are the key agents of change, emphasizing the critical nature of coordination and long-term over short-term priorities.

October 2016

RATIONALE OF THE STUDY

Since the fall of Siad Barre's regime in 1991, Somalia has been in a state of civil war. The situation of recurring insecurity and emergency has been exacerbated by clan conflict, resource distribution, the rise of various militia groups and crime (including piracy) and the influence of radicalized and Islamist movements. The consequences of endemic insecurity and conflict are wide-ranging. They include destruction of communal infrastructure (e.g. health facilities), protection violations (e.g. children recruited by armed forces/groups, gender-based violence, forced displacement or evictions) and depletion or destruction of household assets, including monetary and physical assets.

Moreover, Somalia's climate is arid (north-eastern and central regions) to semi-arid (northwest) with a rainfall that varies between 50-150 mm up to 500 mm. There is little seasonal variation and unpredictable rainfall. Consequently, the country experiences droughts of varying severity every four to five years. Regional droughts in 2011 and flash floods in Puntland's coastal areas in 2013, in addition to the country's insecurity and limited access by humanitarian agencies, caused the deaths of 258,000 people, over half of whom were children under the age of five.¹ The Human Development Report for Somalia estimates that the annual renewable freshwater is below 1000m³ per person/per annum and is forecast to fall below 500m³ in 2025. Water scarcity is not only hampering human wellbeing, it has also become life threatening.

The famine crisis in 2011 shifted the aid priorities throughout the region, with many actors calling for a new paradigm. 'A consequence of 20 years of annual programmes is the growing number of chronically food insecure households and of people in need of short-term humanitarian assistance'.² Instead of short term humanitarian projects after disaster had already occurred, it was time to have another approach that was both efficient and cost efficient: resilience. Resilience

prioritises increasing the capacity to absorb, adapt and transform in the face of shocks. Thus, joint resilience activities and consortia became prominent in Somalia after the 2011 famine: 'Some of the new approaches crafted and later adopted were multi-year responses in place of short-term assistance, increasing coordination by breaking down institutional barriers, and blending humanitarian and development investments'.³

Communities in Somalia are remarkably adaptable, but after almost three decades of crisis, coping mechanisms at the household and traditional community levels are overstretched. Continual exposure to drought and floods has degraded natural resources, further eroding community resilience and fuelling conflict. Traditional humanitarian assistance, including targeting of the most vulnerable households, provides assistance through an individual crisis but does not contribute to longer-term resilience. An assessment conducted by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) revealed that destitute pastoralists and agro-pastoralists needed transformative assistance to move them away from emergency food assistance towards sustainable livelihoods.⁴

According to a 2012 DFID-funded study on the economics of early action in Kenya and Ethiopia, while resilience costs more than early response, resilience-led interventions offer the highest value for money in comparison with a timely humanitarian response. On average, '£1 spent on disaster resilience was found to result in benefits, in the form of reduced humanitarian spend, avoided losses and development gains, of £2.8 in Ethiopia and £2.9 in Kenya'.⁵ While figures and estimates often vary (other data suggest one Euro invested on DRR saves between four and seven Euros in humanitarian response or that one USD spent on El Niño mitigation saves up to 119 USD of actual costs/profits), study respondents unanimously

¹ Bariagaber, Assefaw. Crisis and crisis-induced migration in Somalia, Background study and field research conducted in 2013 (International Organization for Migration).

³ Issa Bitang, 'How to Achieve Strategic Integration of Humanitarian and Development Funding,' n.d.1.

⁴ NRC, (2012), Food Security and Livelihoods Report – Banadir, Lower Shabelle and Gedo

⁵ Cabot Venton et al (2012). *The Economics of Early Response and Disaster Resilience: Lessons from Kenya and Ethiopia*. DFID.

agree that building resilience can significantly cut humanitarian needs.⁶

In line with development-related efforts within the New Deal and the upcoming National Development Plan, programmes that focus on developing the coping capacity and resilience to future shocks of a vulnerable population are critical. As with other programmes in Somalia, the resilience portfolio is defined by its multiplicity: a combination of numerous approaches, actors, methodologies, definitions and exit strategies. As such, it is natural that donors take stock of what is going on to coordinate efforts, avoid duplication and move ahead with a collaborative and comprehensive agenda.

Samuel Hall has been commissioned by the Informal Humanitarian Donor Group (IHDG) and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) to undertake a joint analysis of donor engagements related to Resilience in Somalia. The specific objectives of this study are to **analyse the resilience portfolio in Somalia** to:

- 1) Contribute to **coordination** and collaboration as well as improved donor support towards promising food security and resilience initiatives,
- 2) Discuss the approaches and modalities of resilience programming in Somalia and their **relevance** to the context, appropriateness and timeliness.

This study is not an evaluation but an assessment at conceptual and operational levels of what resilience means and *can* mean in the Somali context, conducted through a stocktaking exercise of existing programmes and consortia on resilience. It integrates feedback from donors, organisations and communities with case studies from South Central Somalia, Somaliland and

Puntland to illustrate and contextualise entry points for improved coordination and relevance. It should be noted that this report is merely a snapshot from March to June 2016 of a rapidly changing context. The idea of the report is to look at the existing trade-offs and *possible* areas of recommendation. In this regard, it may underestimate the history of efforts made by stakeholders (since 2011 in particular). The data is indicative and not representative, but the report none-the-less aims at being objective in its reflection of the existing consensus, contradictions, debates and opinions of resilience actors operating in Somalia in 2016. In addition, the overarching conclusions and recommendations do not necessarily apply to all actors. Finally, with the variation in definitions of 'resilience', it is important to note that this report is presupposed on a definition of resilience that includes change from the individual to the systemic level, and from the absorptive through transformative time frame.

This study links the resilience conceptual framework with contextual vulnerability variables in Somalia (migration, displacement, gender, pastoralism, etc.) as well as existing and potential resilience strategies in Somalia. Using this framework, and after a three-week fieldwork in sites where resilience programming is being implemented, the research questions became: How to reach a consensus among donors with different interests? How to define a realistic resilience agenda in Somalia? How to optimise implementation and learning agendas among agencies with different culture/capacity?

This report brings answers to these questions, illustrating both the opportunities for and limitations of resilience in the Somali context.

Figure 1: A threefold approach to resilience strategy and programming in Somalia



⁶ DFID, 'Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 – 2017,' n.d.; BRCiS, 'Building Resilient Communities in Somalia,' n.d.

CONTEXTUAL FRAMEWORK

Before assessing the donor engagements in Somalia in relation to resilience, it is necessary to understand the political, economic and social context in which these engagements occur. Not only does this context both direct and constrain the engagements that are feasible in Somalia, but the situation in Somalia is constantly undergoing rapid shifts that must be taken into consideration.


Political and Economic Context

In South Central Somalia the internationally recognised Federal Government of Somalia was established in 2012, following years of political instability and ending the transitional period under the weak Somalia Transitional Federal Government.⁷ While this suggests improvements, and was lauded by the international community, there remain issues. The new constitution and parliament were not decided truly democratically, but rather by the Constituent Assembly and elders/intellectuals respectively. Furthermore, the Federal Government of Somalia lacks control over much of the region, and political infighting is seen to hamper the effectiveness of the government.⁸

Despite these risks, there are some positive results from this shift in South Central Somalia. New Federal Member States have emerged, despite continued insecurity. Furthermore, there are governmental efforts at structural, legislative and institutional reform. Finally, the government's mandate expired in September 2016, and new elections are in the works with the support of AMISOM. However, the elections have been delayed multiple times. Somaliland and Puntland have been relatively more stable politically than South Central Somalia.⁹

Somalia faces significant issues in its economy, with high levels of poverty and inequality, a youth bulge, high unemployment and large infrastructure gaps. After the economy collapsed in 1991, there has been no formal banking system, and growth since that time has mainly been limited to Mogadishu.¹⁰ However, despite this, *'Somalia's economy has shown remarkable resilience, despite over 24 years of weak and ineffective central government; mainly driven by the private sector'*.¹¹

Figure 2: Somalia GDP (in USD billions). No data for 2011. Source: World Bank and IMF.



⁷ Martina Lagatta and Manuel Manrique Gil, 'Somalia: Concluding the Transitional Period or Opening a New One?' (European Parliament, January 9, 2013).

⁸ Ibid.; ACAPS, 'Somalia,' accessed September 27, 2016, <https://www.acaps.org/country/somalia>.

⁹ ACAPS, 'Somalia.'


¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ 'Somalia Overview,' accessed September 27, 2016, <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/somalia/overview>.

Food Security Context

Because of diverse factors, but most strongly connected to the severe drought, Somalia's food security was very perilous in 2011. Approximately a quarter of a million people died as a result of this famine, totalling 4.6 percent of the South Central Somalia population as a whole and an astonishing 10 percent of children under five.¹² Thankfully, the situation has improved significantly since 2011. None-the-less, 4.7 million remain in need of food assistance, nearly a million are severely food insecure and the national median value for severe acute malnutrition is 2.2 percent, which is greater than the emergency SAM threshold of 2 percent. Overall, conditions are expected to worsen in the remainder of 2016.¹³

Figure 3: Somalia Food Security Situation 2011-2016. Sources: FSNAU



Besides this, there are many groups that face more significant vulnerability than the average Somali. These include single female heads of household, youth, children, sub-clans and pastoralist communities. However, it is the large number of IDPs that is of most significance, and it is estimated that there are 1.1 million IDPs in Somalia.¹⁴ However, based off of the IOM's recently-launched Displacement Tracking Matrix, which piloted in seven districts in Somalia, it is likely that the number of IDPs is higher than is estimated.¹⁵

¹² United Nations News Service Section, 'UN News - Somalia Famine Killed Nearly 260,000 People, Half of Them Children – Reports UN,' *UN News Service Section*, May 2, 2013, <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=44811#.V-pc7JN95E4>.

¹³ ACAPS, 'Somalia.'

¹⁴ IDMC, 'Somalia IDP Figures Analysis,' accessed September 27, 2016, <http://www.internal-displacement.org/sub-saharan-africa/somalia/figures-analysis>.

¹⁵ 'IOM Identifies Over 430,000 Internally Displaced in Somalia,' *International Organization for Migration*, July 12, 2016, <https://www.iom.int/news/iom-identifies-over-430000-internally-displaced-somalia>.

Overall Risk Assessment

All of these previous factors make Somali's INFORM risk assessment rating of no surprise to most stakeholders. At an overall rating of 8.7, Somalia has the highest risk assessment of any country in the world. Overall, it has high (and therefore poor) rankings on potential hazards, vulnerability to those hazards and lack of coping capacity.


Despite this, Somalia has shown improvements in the past three years, and is unique in this respect amongst the countries with the highest risk indexes. Nonetheless, the country faces significant risks of crises: *'In Somalia, exceptional hazards are the rule – most regions are exposed to floods, droughts, terrorist attacks, etc. on a regular basis, and people have to factor them in their decision making process'* (NGO). Furthermore, in terms of susceptibility to these hazards, Somalia shows a high vulnerability due to their socio-economic constraints, poor development, high inequality, and the presence of many vulnerable groups and uprooted people. Finally, in terms of coping capacity, the country shows a lack of capacity at the institutional, governance, infrastructure and healthcare levels, with clear regional differences.

Table 1: INFORM Risk Assessments from INFORM 2016 Risk Index (OCHA, IGAD)

INFORM 2016 RISK INDEX	Somalia	CAR	South Sudan	Afghanistan	Yemen	Iraq	Sudan
Risk of Crises and Disasters	8.7	8.3	7.9	7.9	7.5	7.2	7.2
➤ 3 Year trend							
➤ Hazard	8.8	7.8	6.8	8.6	8.1	8.5	7.1
➤ Vulnerability	8.3	8.3	8.2	7.2	6.6	6.1	7.1
➤ Lack of Coping Capacity	9.1	8.7	8.9	8	7.9	7.1	7.3

While the ranking is overall poor, there is notable variation between different regions in Somalia. However, the index for the lack of coping capacity was not disaggregated by regions – *'Which clearly undermines its legitimacy and usefulness'* (NGO). Finally, a caveat to this entire framework is the consensus that *'improving the resilience of local communities will take more than 4 or 5 years, and tangible impacts should not be measured with short-term output-oriented indicators'* (NGO).

Figure 4: INFORM Risk Assessments by region and category



THEORETICAL LEVEL: CONCEPT AND CONTEXT

Many people overthink resilience. The one thing that is important is that you come to leave behind the capacity. The added value of a resilience-based approach is that it does not focus only on fixing problems or identifying solutions, but also on leaving behind capacity. At all levels, all layers of any resilience initiative, capacity building will need to be at the forefront. Strengthening capacity of organizations, authorities and people to understand what the implications are for them to own initiatives.¹⁶


Definition(s)

Resilience in Somalia has seen a surge in conceptual definitions, theoretical frameworks, programming approaches and, as a result, indicators for measurement. ‘Sometimes, it is as if Somalia were a touchstone for conceptual frameworks and academic definitions...’ (NGO representative, Bossasso).

The Terms of Reference for this assignment define resilience in Somalia as a combination of initiatives that aim to enable pastoral, agro-pastoral and peri-urban poor to increase their ability to prepare for, adapt to and recover from shocks without eroding their productivity or assets. While this broad definition describes the aims of resilience-enhancing initiatives, it does not adequately take into account nuances in vulnerability and contexts in Somalia. There are many challenges to building the resilience of communities in a country that is still prone to famines, flooding and other conflict and natural disasters. South Central Somalia has faced ongoing crises for over 20 years, and in the face of this Somali communities have demonstrated remarkable internal resilience and proven abilities to withstand and adapt to shocks. While the ongoing turmoil gradually reduces the efficacy of these strategies, a resilience strategy ought to be founded on context-specific and local resilience traits.

Within this framework, it is crucial that stakeholders understand what resilience means to the variety of actors involved. An understanding of communities’ conceptualisation of resilience, for instance, is crucial to tapping into the inherent resilience that exists within these communities. As has been identified by Samuel Hall, however, actors diverge significantly in their conceptual understandings of resilience.

Figure 5: Different conceptual understanding of ‘resilience’ among stakeholders in Somalia



¹⁶ Interview with USAID


The chart above maps the *conceptual* views of key stakeholders active in Somalia in resilience-related programmes to better identify salient differences along two main axes: *capacities* (absorptive, adaptive, transformative) and *scope* (household, community, country, system). This assessment is: 1) based on publicly available official definitions and documentations; and 2) nuanced by key informant interviews and field observations. Moreover, three communities from Bossasso, Doolow and Hargeisa, as well as three local NGOs from Bossasso were assessed through field visits. This rapid mapping points to three conclusions:

1. Each actor has its own definition of resilience, which is generally aligned on its specific mandate and/or ethos;
2. Local communities and national NGOs tend to focus on the absorptive capacity at the micro-level;
3. International actors' understanding and approaches can vary a great deal (including within subgroups: donors, INGOs or UN).

In spite of these conclusions, there are some concepts that most stakeholders share a consensus on. International stakeholders generally agree on the following:

1. Key socioeconomic indicators of more resilient communities are significantly less volatile in both the short- and the long-run;
2. More resilient communities absorb and recover from shocks better than others;
3. On the long-run, more resilient communities/systems not only tend to better resist shocks but also gradually improve their key socio-economic indicators (*difference between the two exponentials in figure 6*).

Figure 6: Fictitious example of resilient (B) and non-resilient (A) communities: absorbing and recovering



Finally, as suggested in a recent contribution of Samuel Hall to the OCHA Monthly Bulletin in Afghanistan, resilience may also help 'reshape the debate with donors by overcoming artificial territorial sovereignties. Assuming that donors want to know if their money makes a difference, resilience can help adjust the funds, agenda, and type of coordination – regardless of the humanitarian or development nature of the problem'.²⁰ This broader objective will be developed in the next sections of this study.

²⁰ Nicolle, H. (2015) Measuring Resilience – from Concept to Action, in OCHA Monthly Bulletin, January 2015, p.4. available at: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/MHB_Jan15_Final.pdf

Conceptualization

While many humanitarian and development strategies often suffer from a lack of conceptual backbone, it was unanimously acknowledged – by all the stakeholders interviewed – that the implementation of resilience activities in Somalia has been grounded in detailed and comprehensive conceptual work. It is naturally a very positive outcome and a great opportunity to bridge the gap between theory and practice. However, as highlighted by both academics (Béné, 2012) and many respondents interviewed in both Nairobi and across Somalia, the *concept* of resilience itself is often approached differently:

- Policy makers and donors generally value its *“relatively intuitive and loose meaning (...) that rallies an increasing number of people, institutions, and organisations under its banner, as it creates communication bridges and platforms between disciplines and communities of practices, and offers common grounds on which dialogue can then be initiated between organisations, departments or ministries which had so far very little, or no history of collaboration.”*²¹
- By contrast, practitioners are often more sceptical about conceptual approaches and workshops, seen as *“too far from the ground reality”* and *“idealistic”* (NGO, SomRep), while their work in a difficult and volatile Somali context still consists in *“preventing people from dying and overcoming life-threatening situations.”* (NGO, SomRep)

Here, it should be noted that stakeholders do not cast any doubt on the uniqueness of this conceptual effort; however, they call for more realistic expectations from donors and policy makers (= Nairobi) in terms of objectives, agendas, and means. The potential risks of such a disconnect are twofold:

- Potential conceptual risks: Dilution of the concept of resilience, due to a lack of operational and pragmatic translation into the Somali context;
- Potential operational risks: Growing antagonism between donors and implementing partners (NGOs and consortia), and between Nairobi-based offices and field teams.

Workshops in Nairobi with stakeholders (initiated by SomRep) and multilateral/bilateral donor meetings indicate that some of these risks are declining, but it remains an issue to be aware of. To better assess and mitigate this risk, this section looks into communities' knowledge, understanding and perception of resilience-related activities.²² The answers collected from 14 focus groups conducted in the three surveyed locations, provide insightful indications on communities' understanding and approaches to resilience.

- The words 'resilience' and 'shocks' ('Adkaysi' and 'Naxdin') are commonly used by local communities to indicate the reality of the concept of resilience. However, it does not mean that people understand the concept and reality that are behind these two words. In the discussions conducted with community members, it seems that 'Adkaysi' and 'Naxdin' are associated first and foremost with the assistance provided by NGOs and implementing partners. In other words, populations consider 'shock' and 'resilience' as key elements of the assistance jargon but do not necessarily understand the conceptual architecture that goes with them (*types of shocks, recovery, long-term, adaptation, absorption, transformation, etc.*).
- By contrast, when asked to give linguistic equivalents of 'coping', focus group discussion participants identified more options (five), as they genuinely associated the concept to more concrete activities.

²¹ Béné, C; Godfrey Wood, R; Newsham, A; and Davies, M. *Resilience: New Utopia or New Tyranny? Reflection about the Potentials and Limits of the Concept of Resilience in Relation to Vulnerability Reduction Programmes*, IDS Working Paper 405, 2012.

²² It is important to bear in mind that the resource and time limitations of this study did not allow for a fully representative picture of the situation; the figures presented below are only indicative and based on qualitative information and subjective assessments. In this regard, a few caveats should be borne in mind: 1) The sample (between 20 and 90 respondents, depending on the theme) is not representative of any sub-segment of the Somali population and none of the observations below should be generalised; 2) Likewise, data cannot be disaggregated by gender or geographic area, considering the reduced number of interviewees; and 3) Surveyed areas were those accessible to our team – and hence they are safer areas than others, where criminal or terrorist activities are still widespread.

Figure 7: Word for 'shock'




Figure 8: Word for 'resilience'






Figure 9: Word for 'coping'



When asked to specify the *meaning* of the concept 'resilience' (*Adkaysi*), participants insisted on four key aspects (open question, multiple answers possible):

- Providing humanitarian assistance (basic needs), while longer-term and transformative aspects seem secondary (30 mentions);
- Recovering from traumatic experiences (e.g. drought and conflict – 24 mentions);
- Anticipating and coordinating (mainly at the community level and with NGOs – 19 mentions); and
- Focus on livestock, as systematically pointed out in the group discussions (12 mentions).

Figure 10: What does 'resilience' mean in practice?




As shown in the two graphs below, when asked to provide concrete examples of 'shocks' (*Naxdin*) and 'resilience' (*Adkaysi*):

- A large majority of respondents (22 out of 30, with multiple answers possible) mention drought as the most emblematic example of *shock* that could affect them or their community;
- A significant number of respondents equally give: 1) access to food and water (15/30) and 2) protection of livestock (15/30) as the most useful examples of resilient activities – it should be noted that these two answers are not mutually exclusive, as many respondents consider that water should first be saved for their livestock.
- Lastly, it is worth mentioning that 'savings', 'anticipation', 'provision of stocks' and 'community coordination' all fall under the same *adaptive* umbrella – it shows that communities are now familiar with both the *absorptive* and *adaptive* dimensions of resilience.

Figure 11: Examples of shocks




Figure 12: Examples of resilient activities



Finally, when asked to specify the key actors of resilience at the community level, respondents generally agreed that the government (local and federal – 25 mentions in total) was at the forefront of assisting their community, followed by INGOs (16 mentions) and NNGOs (9 mentions). By contrast, the 'community' itself was only mentioned 13 times, even if some respondents said that *'it has to start from our community' (FGD with women, Bossaso)*.


Figure 13: Who is responsible for Adkaysi at the community level?



Practice


These initial findings echo the concerns of stakeholders and confirm observations. *First*, the understanding of what resilience is – and whose ownership it is – is still unclear. It is mainly a form of assistance, of funding, for now. *Second*, communities are aware of both absorptive and adaptive components, but what is politically and realistically the challenge is aiming at the transformative step – for which there is limited strategy in Somalia. This section presents additional key findings of the focus group discussions.

Figure 14: Household Socio-Economic Assessment (past 3 years)




Overall, a large majority of respondents (42/52) said that the socio-economic climate of their household and their community had worsened over the past three years, mainly due to severe droughts. Fewer respondents mentioned improvements, and out of the seven who reported some improvements, six pointed to the positive influence of resilience activities (no specific mention) on the ability of their household to cope with a deteriorating economic environment. 'NGOs often use the image of a safety nets, that's what it is about. Without the resilience net, you die, slowly and surely.' (Doolow, Male Beneficiary, 41)

Figure 15: Resilience as a Driver of Conflict




Considering the harsh economic context and sometimes volatile security environment surveyed communities have to deal with, it is not surprising to observe tensions and conflicts over the allocation and distribution of aid. 25 out of 26 respondents confirmed that resilience activities had directly or indirectly generated some conflicts within their community. 17 mentioned examples of physical or verbal conflicts, as well as strong resentment between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries; 5 added that the unfair selection and distribution process was responsible for that: 'Yes, it created many conflicts, because NGOs cannot meet the demand, and they raise people's expectations. It is not fair to give some tools to a family and not to their neighbours.' (Bossasso, Female Beneficiary, 28)

Figure 16: Main positive outcome of resilience activities (open question)



When asked to name the main positive outcomes of the resilience activities undertaken in their communities, respondents insist mainly on longer-term development dividends, such as job creation (6 answers), employment (6) or equipment (2). More surprisingly, some respondents also reported a change in their mindset (6), which is definitely one of the expected outcomes of any resilience programme: 'I am much more confident now, because previously I would have never thought it was possible for me, in my life, to withstand to such a negative context. I am optimistic and can make choices for my future' (Bossasso, Male Beneficiary, 32).

Figure 17: Perception of resilience projects' effectiveness



People are nearly unanimously positive about the outcomes and potential/actual dividends, etc. of resilience activities. The only four respondents who did not report any positive outcome from resilience projects are fishermen from Bossasso. When asked to further explain their opinion, they reported being upset at the FAO staff: 'Assistance organisations have no role in our community. They just do data collection but they never bring anything concrete to us. FAO just came and did some observations in the area. So they just give hope to people, raise expectations and create laziness among desperate communities' (Bossasso, Fisherman, 46). Confirmed by the FAO office in Bossasso, such miscommunications on the objective and outcomes of the project clearly antagonized fishermen communities. While people perceive the potential development dividends of resilience projects – beyond the usual assistance model – they also tend to resent the lack of tangible results.

Consensus: multi-sectoral, long-term, and... learning-oriented


As has been noted by donors, 'We are currently funding SomRep under humanitarian funds and FAO under development funds. There is actually minimal difference in the activities, and they both do cash for work activities. The difference between humanitarian and development in Somalia is very thin'. Enhancing resilience is not about implementing specific 'activities' but more about how you design, implement, and monitor them in a given context. The same project can often be labelled as humanitarian or resilience. Therefore, for a programme to be labelled as resilience, it ought to fit the following criteria:

- Be implemented in coordination with other existing local and/or national activities to optimise its outcomes;
- Exist as part of a broader agenda with adaptive and transformative components;
- Involve the community to make those outcomes sustainable; and
- Be based on a clear theory of change supporting a systematic learning agenda.

Multi-sectoral

SomRep and OECD undertook a Resilience Systems Analysis in February 2015, which determined assets in human, financial, natural, physical, political and social capital and how they react to shocks.²⁴ These assets are some of the key sectors where resilience programming would be essential in Somalia. While livelihoods, food production and access to basic services are perhaps the three most important sectors in which dedicated resilience programming is undertaken, the information in the PSG and Somalia's current stakeholder context indicates that resilience requires a multi-sector approach that includes both access to basic services and longer term stability and governance in order to insulate people from further shocks and crises. This research clearly shows that there are competing opinions about and understanding of this fundamental dimension of any resilience strategy and/or programme.

Figure 21: Mapping of resilience drivers in Somalia



²⁴ SomRep, Resilience Systems Analysis – Somalia, Results and Roadmap, 24 to 25 February 2015, Available at <http://www.somrep.org/reports/Somalia%20Resilience%20Systems%20Analysis%20Feb%202015%20OECD.pdf>

Longer-term

Most respondents agreed that donors have changed their approach in Somalia and the way they fund NGOs and implementing partners. While humanitarian funds are annual, many actors move away from one-year humanitarian funding programmes, as *'it does not make sense to deal with structural and chronic issues of poverty and vulnerability by reinventing the wheel every year. We need to transform the socio-economic structure, the overall framework.'* (Donor) Through multi-year funding, donors' approaches do allow for a real resilience agenda, with three caveats:

- Resilience programming must be in consideration of the community systems already in place: As was both acknowledged by many stakeholders and evident from interactions with the community, Somali communities and individuals have their own existing ideas of resilience. Despite this, stakeholders do not always work with these existing conceptualisations, and instead come in with something new – which is not always context-specific and may not be accepted by the community. Not everything has to be created from scratch – instead, often the most resilient models are those that have been built off of traditional coping mechanisms developed by communities and based off of their strong internal resilience. As one focus group discussion participant noted, *'Why would I spend three hours discussing with my neighbours and NGO representatives of crops? If they want to create associations and cooperatives, they should focus on what our live and survival depends on: our livestock. And if they want us to be more robust, they should also listen to us. We have had problems for decades and we are still here'*.
- Multi-year and multi-sector should go hand in hand: *'it is only the beginning and it is too early to draw any conclusion: donors also have to change their work habits and consider not only multi-year programming but also multi-sector strategies to bridge the gaps between emergency response and actual recovery.'* (NGO, BRCiS)
- Existing five-year plans are still far from the idealistic 10-year scenario: *'How is a long-term approach towards resilience defined? Can we give a concrete number of years/commitment to donors? Five years, 10 years? Realistically no one will commit to investing in a 10-year resilience programme but we need 10-year resilience strategies!'* (Donor)

For these reasons, some donors stated being still sceptical about NGOs' and consortia's capacity to: 1) shift from the humanitarian to the resilience lens (approach and timescale); 2) actually involve local communities and build on existing resilience strategies. In the Somali context, most NGOs, consortia and other implementing partners historically have implemented quick emergency programming or humanitarian programming, whereas resilience programming requires other operational designs. The NGO field teams interviewed in Doolow, Bossasso or Hargeisa generally acknowledge that they struggle with the new requirements of resilience-led activities. *Operationally*, some of them have been delivering in-kind humanitarian assistance for thirty years and are now asked to work on a different activity portfolio, involving other timeframes and assistance modalities; *technically*, field practitioners also mention that the quantification of their work in terms of benefits, impact and outcomes is also very different from the humanitarian-as-usual approach, as it requires a multi-scale and qualitative M&E approach.

Learning-oriented


In this last regard, the learning component is considered as essential to resilience strategies and programming in Somalia. Referring to the way information was managed during the 2011 famine, surveyed practitioners put a lot of hopes and expectations in the *learning model* promoted by the concept of resilience. In essence, this new knowledge paradigm is *also* an answer to the mismanagement that happened in 2011: as highlighted by NGO representatives and donors, *'the management of the available data in 2011 was disastrous (...) even if people often put the blame on the political context, Al Shabaab, insecurity, etc. The truth is that we all got*

stuck in competing political agendas and none of us was able to make a rational use of the data and information we had. It was obvious, triangulated, factual, but everyone missed it.' (NGO, Mogadishu)

As pointed out by the NGO Open Data Watch, in its analysis of the 2011 Somalia famine, 'though data-driven change is possible, we should never expect the data-to-impact link to be automatic'²⁵ Corroborating a very substantiated study from Checchi and Robinson (2013), the authors show that the humanitarian response to the famine in 2011 was late and insufficient, despite the two early warning systems created by the international community to anticipate exceptional climatic shocks: the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) and the Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU). These systems were meant to carry out periodic surveys and gather reliable and comprehensive data on agricultural and livestock activities, health and nutrition, prices, displacement, well-being, etc. of deprived communities and more vulnerable groups.

But while both systems were efficient at timely warning of the threat of famine, multiple security, political, and operational factors resulted in full-blown humanitarian disaster, as shown in the graph below, the situation in Somalia was only classified as 'famine' in July 2011, more than six months after the first orange and right flags raised jointly by FSNAU and FEWS NET. Five years later, there is a common agreement that resilience-led initiative should encompass a strong component of *learning*, as emphasized by most interviewed donors, practitioners, and technical experts. This is also one of the main reasons why the consortium model was praised, as a pragmatic way to manage information, coordinate action, and optimise impact. The third section of this report will provide a more specific analysis of the successes and gaps of this model.

Figure 22: Funding flows and mortality in the 2011 famine²⁶



²⁵ B. Vaitla, C. Van Horn, J. Van Horn, and C. Wells. 2016. *Data Impact, How the Data Revolution is Making a Difference*, Open Data Watch, available at: <http://dataimpacts.org/project/having-the-data-is-not-always-enough/>

²⁶ Sources: adapted from Checchi and Robinson (2013) and Hillbruner and Moloney (2012) by Open Data Watch.

OPERATIONAL LEVEL 1: KEY TRADE-OFFS

Mapping Somalia's resilience portfolio²⁷


As pointed out in the *DFID Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013-2017*, 'a consequence of 20 years of annual programmes is the growing number of chronically food insecure households and of people in need of short-term humanitarian assistance.'²⁸ In this regard, achievement of resilience among chronically vulnerable groups in Somalia largely depends on the proper sequencing and combination of interventions and enabling conditions that include effective formal and informal governance, engagement of the private sector, and provision of social safety nets.²⁹

A look at the PSG project database maintained by the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC) in Somalia indicates that in a fragmented manner, each of the above – formal and informal governance, engagement of the private sector, provision of social safety nets and myriad initiatives to support 'a healthy ecosystem' – are being designed, developed, implemented and tested in Somalia. There is, however, an absence of a link that ties these together and translates it in a composite manner into building the resilience of communities. Their constraints and challenges arise from organizational mandates, donor agendas, geography, varied theories of change, and uneven capacities of implementing staff and communities' receptiveness.

According to the PSG project database for PSG 4 and 5, as of June 2015 there were

- 63 projects labelled as Natural Resource Management / Resilience / Productive Sectors, focusing mainly on food security, water and land management systems, energy, WASH (water/sanitation/hygiene), livestock, fisheries, technical support to agriculture, and capacity building for governmental counterparts. Out of those 63 projects,
- 26 were specifically labelled as 'resilience' with a clearer emphasis on both absorptive and adaptive capacities. The graph below shows a positive trend in spending between 2013 (USD 30.7 Millions actual) and 2016 (USD 86.2 Millions planned), which confirms the assumption that 'donors have understood the new imperative of developing longer-term and more comprehensive approaches in a context of recurring crises and chronic vulnerability' (Donor).

Figure 23: Spendings on NRM/Resilience/Productive Sectors in Somalia (in MUSD, based on WB data)



²⁷ This mapping section uses the data shared with Samuel Hall by the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation of the projects under the PSGs, OCHA's Somalia Resilience Mapping June 2015, KIIs conducted by the team and secondary desk review. The variables in the figure were identified through preliminary interviews with the IHDG as well as emerging issues during the research process.

²⁸ DFID, *Somalia Humanitarian Business Case 2013 – 2017*, Draft 04/02/13; p.43.

²⁹ Terms of reference, *Joint analysis of donor engagements related to Livelihoods and Resilience in Somalia*

While this graph shows a strongly positive trend since 2013:

- 1) Some projects labelled as resilience *should not* fall under this umbrella;
- 2) The buzz around 'resilience approaches' in Somalia led many donors and implementing NGOs to label their programmes and/or projects as resilience-led initiatives;
- 3) By contrast, other interventions do contribute to significantly increase the resilience of a given community, without having the label.


A more detailed look at MOPIC's data show that between 2013 and 2020 the total value of the 63 projects under PSG 4 or 5 amount to USD 346 Million. The graph and table below also shed more light on the mean and median durations of each project:³⁰

- Resilience projects are, on average, comparable to the health and education sectors – with respective means of 2.55, 2.81, and 2.73 years per project – which confirms that donors and implementing partners have integrated longer-term project cycles (even for food security activities);
- The significant difference between the mean (2.6) and median (2.9) indicates that the distribution of the 63 projects labelled as 'Resilience/NRM/Productive Sectors' is skewed with a significant number of projects of less than a year (half of them being implemented by Turkey and labelled as 'agricultural support' or 'technical support to agricultural schools').

Table 2: Spendings and duration of NRM/Resilience/Productive Sectors related projects in Somalia (MOPIC data)

Primary Sector	Primary sub-sector	Average Project Duration		# Projects (planned and actual)	Total value (planned and actual spending)	Total value (%)
		Mean	Median			
PSG 4: Economic foundations	NRM / Resilience / Productive Sectors	2.6	2.9	63	\$345 737 280	22%
	Private Sector Development and Employment	2.1	1.4	34	\$215 919 180	14%
	Infrastructure	1.9	1.2	40	\$175 586 458	11%
	Community-driven development	1.8	1.7	7	\$17 608 624	1%
PSG 5: Revenue and services	Health	2.8	3.2	114	\$482 423 148	31%
	Education	2.7	2.9	30	\$145 955 373	9%
	PFM & Revenue	1.9	1.5	24	\$80 086 207	5%
	Other Social Services	2.1	0.9	20	\$43 893 365	3%
	Solutions for the Displaced	1.1	0.9	35	\$38 969 270	3%
	Social Protection	0.5	0.5	3	\$3 153 179	1%

Figure 24: Mean and median duration of NRM/Resilience/Productive Sectors related projects in Somalia (MOPIC data)



³⁰ The mean is not the best 'average' to use in this case, as the distribution is skewed. So when the data is not symmetrical, which is the case with the duration of resilience-related projects, the median is the form of 'average' that gives a better idea of any general tendency in the data: 50% of values are above it, and 50% below it.

Fragmented resilience agendas

While there exist humanitarian and/or development projects in a variety of sectors above, whether they have a resilience agenda is unclear. Of over 200 projects mapped by the Somali government for the PSG Working Groups, only 26 identified the word resilience in their narrative, as often mentioned during the interviews conducted with donors, NGOs, UN agencies, and governmental counterparts: *'We are currently funding SomRep under humanitarian funds and FAO under development funds. But if you look at it there is minimal difference in the activities, and they both do cash for work activities. The difference between humanitarian and development in Somalia is very thin'. (Donor)*

Optimising the value for money and positive impact of resilience programmes requires a strong coordination between stakeholders and programmes. Large programmes or ambitions are generally fragmented, with as many definitions and strategies as donors – which sometimes makes sense from a political or national point of view, but may also be detrimental to broader and longer-term collective resilience agendas.

As a follow-up to a large coordination and information meeting between donors, UN agencies, consortia and NGOs held at the UNSOM (on February 6, 2015), OCHA carried out a non-public mapping of resilience activities and actors in Somalia.³¹ While acknowledging the comprehensiveness of the exercise, stakeholders who accessed the document generally agree that *'it shows clearly that it's all over the place'* (UN) and that there is *'still no common framework, of any kind, among resilience programmes'* (Donor). Such statements clearly question the potential added value of resilience programs in Somalia, as those activities are generally optimised by a *network approach*: network of activities, network of stakeholders, network of communities, to generate a *multiplier effect*.

By contrast, and according to the surveyed NGOs and donors interviewed by the research team, resilience is still a new area for donors in Somalia, who do not always perceive the necessity of going beyond individual objectives, portfolios, and calendars, and embracing more collective and multi-dimensional perspectives. As stated by members of SomRep and BRCiS:

'The reason why donors are not coordinating very well is because the lines of resilience are not very clear. For instance, until a year ago we were receiving funds from UNICEF to do 'social protection', but it was actually short term, seasonal cash transfer. We would have 8 months – 1 year funding, but interestingly it was part of FAO-UNICEF-WFP resilience portfolio (even if) for us it was very different from what we call resilience'. (NGO, SomRep)

'When implementers get UNOCHA funds for one year and they call it resilience – is that specifically resilience? When there is no continuation? (...) In the office we have several arguments: you can't have development/long term program with humanitarian funding. Where is the line between humanitarian/development funding?' (NGO, BRCiS)

Heterogeneous durable solutions and resilience agendas

According to interviewed donors, as well as UNHCR, the durable solutions and resilience agenda still need to be better aligned, as their respective goals overlap and seek to find solutions to allow returnees and displaced to rebuild their lives in Somalia. As stated by UNHCR, *'when discussing return and reintegration processes, livelihoods and absorption capacity are key components of any sustainable solution'* (UNHCR, Country Representative).

However, while the EU, among others, has clearly integrated and included IDPs in all its resilience projects, proper coordination mechanisms need to be adjusted, as displacement has still not made it on the agenda of the Somali Compact and its PSGs as a crosscutting issue. According to many field practitioners, there is clearly a missed opportunity here: *'there is this tendency to focus exclusively on the vulnerability of Somali*

³¹ Readout of meeting on resilience with donors, UN Agencies and NGO Resilience initiatives, 6 February, 2015 – UNON, Nairobi.

IDPs and returnees and disregard their exceptional resilient behaviour, entrepreneurial and survival skills. Why don't we build on that, in parallel, to optimise the efforts made on durable solutions and resilience?' (NGO, Luuq).

As synthesized in a recent Samuel Hall publication for UNHCR: 'It is clear that IDPs and returnees are part of the Somali population and need to benefit like others. It is also clear that they have specific displacement-related needs and vulnerabilities. They may be marginalized unless special attention is given to them. (...) Yet, resilience without durable solutions is unachievable in Somalia; and durable solutions cannot be achieved without resilience. Both are intrinsically linked.'³²

Lack of cross-border approach

A recurring issue raised by most interviewees when asked to identify the main weaknesses of resilience programming in Somalia is the lack of any regional dimension: 'Donors, consortia, NGOs, and governments have to think regionally and cross-border. It is not only 'beyond funding cycle', it is also 'beyond borders', otherwise the impact will always be limited' (NGO, SomRep). Considering the (increasingly) pivotal **role played by displacement and migration phenomena** in the region, cross-border resilience programming may soon become a priority.

Unfortunately, many donors either ignore regional strategies or systematically favour national approaches over more global ones: 'It is not in our culture, at least in East-Africa and the Horn. It did exist in the past but led to many internal conflicts – hence our decision to stick to national humanitarian business cases.' (Donor, Kenyan office)

By contrast, on the 'supply side', significant regional actors, including IGAD, the Islamic Development Bank, African Development Bank, the World Bank, etc., are already playing a key role in the Somali development and resilience landscape. In today's context, benefitting from the unique regional legitimacy and knowledge of these actors to build a common regional resilience agenda does appear as a necessity to move Somalia's resilience efforts into a comprehensive direction.

In particular, such a cross-border approach is needed to build the resilience of the residents of the Mandera triangle – mainly ethnic Somalis pastoralists and agro-pastoralists routinely moving across the various borders of Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia. In this regard, NRC's future programme in Mandera offers a good example of integrated approach:

- Conceptually, by bridging the social and economic, household and community, and relief and recovery gaps,³³
- Thematically, by incorporating aspects of Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR), Climate Change Adaptation (CCA), and Poverty Reduction (PR) into its programming;
- Regionally, by developing a cross-border approach between Kenya, Ethiopia, and Somalia.

By contrast, some donors nuance this point by questioning the **capacity and legitimacy of consortia to operate beyond a national perimeter**. Individual NGOs having both a national and regional expertise may be better fitted to this type of – necessary – approaches. 'I think the BRCIS, STREAM and SomRep are efficient tools at the national level. Would a cross-border approach be relevant for them? I doubt that. Not only because it is too early or because their members are not ready, but also because they would lose their key added value: flexibility, knowledge of local context and realities, etc.' (Donor)

However, in a context of regional migration, internal displacement, and seasonal movements, this cross border type of approach seems more likely to assess and address the root causes of chronic vulnerability.

³² Samuel Hall (2015), 'Beyond Copenhagen: A Toolbox for Durable Solutions', commissioned by UNHCR Somalia.

³³ NRC's conceptual lens is derived from UNDP's 3x6 approach use for its YEEP (Youth Economic Empowerment Project) and Heijmans Annelies, 2013, *Reaching Resilience - Handbook Resilience 2.0 for aid practitioners and policymakers in Disaster Risk Reduction, Climate Change Adaptation, and Poverty Reduction*, CARE Nederland, Groupe URD, and Wageningen University.

Confusion with short-term political objectives


In the Somali context, it is impossible to fully dissociate humanitarian assistance from the political and security environment in which it is delivered. Without **stability**, assets, social and institutional resources that are required to develop adaptive capacity cannot be built up. *'This dilemma is rather new to Somali actors. Things were actually **more simple before**, as the government was much weaker than it is today; NGOs were not perceived as a potential auxiliary to the central or federal government. With the progressive rise of governmental authorities, humanitarian actors may be more frequently be used as pawns in the local or national political game. That is why they have to clarify their position vis-à-vis governmental, non-governmental, and civ-military actors' (Donor).*

Many donors tend to consider ways in which the humanitarian agenda can connect with stabilisation initiatives, as highlighted by both EU-DEVCO and ECHO: *'EU is the only donor tackling resilience from a development perspective. There is no competition between EU-DEVCO and ECHO, but our agendas and mandates do not always match up. For instance, EU does not want to have ECHO associated with its stabilization agenda. In practice, ECHO and its partners should work in accessible and even unsafe areas (including areas where al-Shabaab is present), without being associated to our own activities' (Donor).*

The US DoD (2005) defines Stabilization Operations as *'military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in States and regions'.*

The chart below synthesises the main existing strategic approaches towards socio-economic robustness: while there is no doubt that political stability is an absolute *prerequisite* to resilience and socio-economic development, its politicized nature also raises some questions to NGOs and consortia. As emphasised during the workshop with donors held at the SDC office on May 18, 2016, the question is not to play resilience *against* stability, but to draw a clear line between political and security agendas (STABILISATION) and necessarily neutral priorities (RESILIENCE). In other words, if the latter cannot exist without the former, and their respective legitimacy can only be strengthened if they are clearly distinct.

Figure 25: Possible power dynamics in Somalia (Adapted from STEPS Centre's Pathway Approach)



Based on the interviews with consortium members and donors, however, there seems to be a double-threat here:


- Some donors wrongly assume that development and humanitarian actors *de facto* have the capacity to successfully implement stabilization projects, whereas this type of approach requires very specific capacities: *'Stabilization programmes are not lasting and humanitarian [programmes] are not*

ready – or should not be ready – to play this game. It is the same thing for humanitarian donors. Beyond the ethical line, I also think that doing stabilization programmes requires some specific capacities that most humanitarian or development NGOs operating in Somalia do not have. There are structural issues with the NGOs'. (NGO, SomRep)

- Ethically, some humanitarian NGOs may not agree to associate their name to a consortium that implements stabilization programmes. The question may soon be raised by SomRep members, should the orientation of the consortium be confirmed in the years to come. 'The continuum (between stability and resilience) can only happen if they keep long-term goals in mind and not short-term political priorities. Example: the new priority is on youth (CVE) and migration – the 3rd pillar of the EUTF – is resilience-oriented. But as actors of the humanitarian community, we cannot accept an agenda that would promote a zero migration objective – that is not our goal and mandate as non-politicized players'. (NGO, BRCiS)

The chart below shows the risk of using resilience as an umbrella for stabilization projects and programmes. The recent examples of Afghanistan and Iraq show that, it is often proven counterproductive and potentially harmful to blur the lines between politicized and neutral types of assistance.

Figure 26: Blurred lines between stabilisation and resilience
(Adapted from STEPS Centre's Pathway Approach)



Questionable feasibility of resilience programming

By nature, resilience approaches encompass contradictions between: 1) the local and national levels; 2) the short-term (absorptive capacity) and longer-run (transformative capacity). With this definition in place, then in practice, the sequencing exercise between those distinct phases is still not always realistic in the Somali context, as most organisations focus on *absorptive and adaptive capacities at the local (community) level*. It illustrates the following assessment of the Somali landscape: 'Absorptive capacity is the ability to deal with a shock, to absorb a shock, to mitigate the impact. This is what we do through our humanitarian intervention [s] at large. You have a sudden acute malnutrition – you have a 30% threshold – [so] you try to mitigate the impact and reduce the level of mortality. This is working well. Adaptive capacity – this is what Somalia should focus on, through a climate adaptation framework because most of the shocks and stresses that affect populations in Somalia are natural, [with] the biggest one being drought. The adaptive capacity is really the ability to withstand stresses and be better prepared for them. Transformative [capacity encompasses] those systems and structures in the community that are looking at the entire subset of the shocks and stresses and putting into place the elements that come together. So far, it is largely idealistic, very top-down, and totally disconnected from real communities' (Donor)


As shown in the chart below, donors' on-going priorities are still fragmented and follow an 'either...or' approach, regardless of the intrinsic logic of resilience programming, which added value comes from the coordinated efforts between the absorptive, adaptive, and transformative dimensions and from the individual to the systemic level. This is the only way to increase synergetic benefits where the impact is greater than the sum of the inputs. At the moment, the latter two (transformative and systemic) are still secondary for most donors, as pointed out by the country Director of a local NGO: *'For Somalia, the transformative aspect can make a difference. It is the one we should all focus on, while dealing with emergencies in parallel. If we do not follow this causal pathway, we miss the point and cannot say that we have resilience strategy and programmes in South Central or Puntland. What do we call 'transformative'? Capacity building in Mogadishu or Nairobi and stabilization goals in volatile areas... These are key aspects but not the only ones'.* (Local NGO)

By contrast, some donors and NGOs argue that more humanitarian priorities (= absorptive) should remain the main – if not the only realistic – focus of resilience programming. However:

- The dividends of resilience can only be tangible if the three capacities (absorptive, adaptive, and transformative) and multiple points of focus (from individuals to governmental systems) are coordinated; this is the only way to increase synergetic benefits where the impact is greater than the sum of the inputs.
- Some tools, like the crisis modifier, may be tested and generalised to avoid likely stresses and shocks and keep the overall resilience architecture flexible and tailored enough to the Somali context: *'USAID is trying to put in place short term funding to enable long term funding to come in and do the rest. The crisis modifier goes in the right direction, as it considers humanitarian funding as a bridge to long term funding'.* (Donor)

This does not mean that the activities should not take place, but merely questions the label of the activities as 'resilience' – as well as the way they are designed, implemented, and measured – in extremely deprived and volatile areas where other forms of emergency assistance should be prioritized.

Figure 27: Risks associated with a partial understanding of the transformative/long-term dimension



OPERATIONAL LEVEL 2: VALUE FOR MONEY OF THE CONSORTIUM APPROACH

'Each Euro invested in resilience saves €7 in emergency aid (...) investing in resilience is more effective than crisis response'

Christostos Stylianides, Cypriot Commissioner-designate for Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Management

'Resilience' is a concept that can bring various actors involved in disaster risk reduction, climate change adaptation and poverty reduction together and offers opportunities to 'work across silos' by sharing different analytical approaches.³⁴ The consortium approach – very common in Somalia with JRS, SomRep, BRCiS, and SSNP – is an operational answer to a volatile and complex environment: *'the potential added value of the consortium is clear to everyone: 1) we can work at scale; 2) better for procurement; 3) cost reduction (mutualisation); 4) tighter management; 5) better outreach'. (Consortium). Thus, the consortium is seen as scalable and with opportunities for outreach, and it also is legitimate and necessary: 'Resilience is about coordination and synergies between humanitarian and development actors. The expectation that collaboration and coordination between them can occur without a dedicated supporting infrastructure (BRCiS, SomRep, STREAM, etc.) is one of the most frequent reasons why resilience programs fail.'* (USAID). However, the advantages are not always immediately tangible and will require a continuous and long-term effort (beyond the 3-5 year usual cycle).

In most interviews conducted with implementing partners and donors for this study, however, a shared concern was the need for consortia to add some actual value to the existing model: *'UN agencies or NGOs were already working in those areas and are now coming together. So you have a joint strategy but not necessary a joint programme. That's where the resilience tools can be used to fill in the joint programming gap – harmonization of logframes, indicators, measurement tools?' (Donor).*

This section highlights the differences between high level approaches that form the basis of planning and programming on resilience and their translation on the ground. By breaking down approaches outlined in programme documents and asking field officers and beneficiaries to define their resilience approach from a conceptual and operational point of view, the conclusion is that too much energy is being spent at the high level, centralized discussions. There is scepticism over what has been achieved on the ground despite organisations coming together to form large consortia.

Considering the time required to assess the actual added value of consortia – especially on resilience and in a very volatile context – such findings are neither alarming nor surprising; however, they should lead to the collective realisation that some serious improvements are needed to better operationalize concepts, coordinate operations, measure outcome, and learn from both failures and success.

Strategic and operational added-value

There is a consensus on consortia's strategic added value on the medium- to long-term, with a clear impact on information sharing, operational collaboration, and the dialogue with the Somali government

As a whole, NGO and UN consortia operating in Somalia are in a unique position, benefitting from the expertise, experience, and geographic coverage of 12 NGOs and 3 UN agencies: 5 for BRCiS, 7 for SomRep, and 2 for SSNP, while FAO, UNICEF, and WFP cover most accessible regions. In theory, the question becomes that of efficiently pooling resources while making economies of scale, mitigating operational risks and optimising impact. According to all the stakeholders interviewed over the course of this research, there is a

³⁴ Reaching Resilience, Handbook Resilience 2.0 for aid practitioners and policymakers in Disaster Risk Reduction, Climate Change Adaptation and Poverty Reduction

clear consensus on the potential and actual added value of the consortium model in all those regards, with one caveat: considering both the objectives and timescales of resilience activities and the organisational inertia of the actors operating in Somalia, it will take some time to fully optimise the outcomes of the model. In the same vein, SomRep members argue that consortia can make a stronger difference, assuming that they are given enough time and opportunities to do so: *'It is a better value (for donors and beneficiaries) and ensures closer planning and linkages to state-building and humanitarian assistance alignment. It puts everyone in a better position to end chronic vulnerability and is flexible enough for partners to adapt to the local context/needs. Some people would argue that the higher costs are not justified and that it takes longer. It requires more than five years'* (Consortium).

This last point is crucial to fairly assess the potential/actual value for money of consortia in Somalia. Consortia are working on a 'humanitarian to development' transition, but most of their members still lack: 1) the organisational structure; 2) the capacity (beyond strict humanitarian assistance); 3) and the mindset, to develop and manage multi-year programmes. In this regard, there are still many improvements to make among implementing actors and consortia... and the consortium approach is probably the best way to do it. As synthesised by a member of BRCiS, *'the mindset/culture of BRICS' or SomRep's members must change, as it is often in contradiction with resilience strategies and programmes, which comes from and require a new paradigm'*. (NGO, Consortium). There are three points to look out for:

- Operational coordination: *'NGOs tend to have different styles. Some of them are on-board and react quickly. Generally, though, their 'business as usual' approach is challenged by the availability of data/info. It does require some prompt action and they are not always ready to do/capable of doing it'* (NGO, Consortium).
- Organisational inertia: *'There is not only a problem of overheads with [a] large consortium, but an administrative issue related to managing several NGOs with different identities and cultures, based on the history of each organization. Changing it requires some time, as it has been 'cultivated' for many years: procurement procedures and management differences. It takes time to trickle down to the local staff and for them to catch on the pace of agreements made at the head'* (Donor).
- Learning curve and contextualised approaches: *'Building a thorough resilience network, through BRCiS or SomRep or ADESO/ACTED, is the ultimate goal.. but: 1) it depends on the context and it requires a strong buy-in, a long inception phase; 2) while it should focus on the broadest set of sectors (network approach) it cannot be the case in practice, considering past/existing activities, expertise, and the technical focus of certain NGOs; 3) donors dictate what we are supposed to do, in practice (WASH, shelter, food security or livelihoods); and 4) stabilization objectives are very present (explicitly or not) in today's context and for donors, NGOs and consortia'* (NGO, Consortium).

Overall, the consortium approach in Somalia can be described as a way to rationalise organisational processes while contextualising resilience operations better, as pointed out by BRCiS: *'We have 5 big organisations with different cultures, but their respective managements have supported us from the beginning. They all understand the added value and facilitate our work. BRCiS has changed the mindset of those organisations. Before, at NRC, there were 5 competencies/components doing relevant activities that could have legitimately be labelled as 'resilience', but they were siloed. Resilience is a way to bring together all these layers and components to maximize their outcomes/impact. More broadly, it also applies to the organisations themselves. We identify bridges, opportunities, streamline processes, etc.'* (Consortium, BRCiS)

Finally, another three strong potential benefits from the consortium approach were often emphasised by SomRep, BRCiS, and SSNP respondents during the interview process:

- Information sharing is a strength of the consortium approach, even if most consortium members (including the UN) are still at the early stage of the learning curve: *'All the stakeholders know who, when [and] how others are working. [It is] good for information and coordination. However, 1) sharing information with others consortia is a challenge; 2) we have plenty of data but we do not metabolise them, analyse them or optimise them; 3) to what extent can the management embrace these data and analyses is still uncertain; and 4) we still need to improve the use of new technologies (digital data gathering system)'* (Consortium).

- So far, collaboration has generally been favoured over competition between the different consortia: *'We have different indicators, agenda and approaches (BRCiS = more humanitarian; SomRep = more development/institutional) but our emphasis is on communities and it is in our interest to collaborate. Also we both favour a learning agenda approach. Two examples: at the field level we are both operating in Baidoa; BRCiS and SomRep won the EU/DEVCO-funded bid and start[ed] their activities. It is 1/3 of BRCiS portfolio' (Consortium).*
- Discussions with governmental counterparts seem to be significantly strengthened: *'With regard to the government, we have had a lot of discussions on our relationship with the government. SomRep and BRCiS NGOs have been under great pressure by the government. We discussed 'is that really our place?' With SomRep, we said, we don't think we have a place and resources to support capacities at the very top level. But it is our responsibility to provide resources to intervene at the district level. There are donors with that kind of resources that can go into supporting the government. For SomRep the agreement was to help strengthen structures at the district level and at the very grass-root level where all of this is happening. So far, things are working well with both national and subnational actors, which is a direct outcome of the consortium approach, much more flexible, homogenous and stronger' (Consortium).*

Limited capacity to measure impact and inform learning processes

There are doubts over NGOs and consortia's actual capacity to measure outcomes and impact on the short- to medium-term

As highlighted by BRCiS, SomRep, and FAO representatives, since 2011, unprecedented coordinated efforts have been made to shape the new learning framework: *'We came a long way since the 2011/12 famine. Resilience – and especially resilience measurement – require a brand new approach that the international had to create on the basis of past mistakes and limitations' (NGO, BRCiS).* In this regard, it is important to note that due to their novelty and complexity, resilience programming and measurement will require some time to present more concrete evidence of its impact: *'It makes sense considering the nature of resilience programming in Somalia. This approach can potentially reshape the entire humanitarian and development debate. It has already done it, actually. So we need to be patient, rigorous and understanding' (Donor).*

Stakeholders have strived to develop the right indicators that reflect Somalia's context to measure changes in levels of 'absorption', 'adaptiveness' and 'transformation' of the Somali people to shocks and crises. For example, SomRep's indicators have changed significantly over the last two years. They've learned that their old approach was not informed by evidence – it had 138 indicators and 28 outputs. According to an interview with SomRep staff, it was a menu of options and didn't use a programming lens. The M&E framework, when developed, used a number of existing frameworks including the FAO Global Framework, the 2015 OECD Systems Analysis Approach (used also by BRCiS), TANGO, FAO RIMA, and the Crisis Modifier (to bridge the gap between humanitarian and development activities in a pragmatic manner). Additionally, Tufts, Tulane, Cornell, ODI, and donors like DfID and USAID all played a role in M&E development by insisting on two key dimensions: the theory of change and learning agenda.

To optimise reporting on resilience across all key players operating in Somalia, a minimal consensus on how and what to measure is needed. So far, there is not even a common denominator and most stakeholders (Donors, Government, NGOs, and even consortia) have not taken a full ownership of the learning process that should be the cornerstone of any resilience programming: *'Theoretically, the conceptual backing is brilliant: the greatest minds on resilience are involved for a real focus on the learning agenda. Practically, the M&E approach is superficial. ODI's or BRCiS' annual approach is not what is needed (2014, 2015, 2016...): not adapted. Whatever they say, it is still a baseline, midline, endline approach as usual. There is nothing innovative and dynamic in it' (Donor).*

The FAO M&E framework is a good example from this point of view, as it is an attempt to help the organisation transition from the Emergency to the Resilience Programme. On the basis of an innovative quantitative approach (Resilience Index Measurement and Analysis – RIMA), the FAO aimed ‘to measure the resilience capacity of people to food insecurity and the effectiveness of resilience strengthening interventions, explaining why and how some households cope with shocks and stressors better than others do’.³⁵ Initial baseline studies were conducted in collaboration with WFP and UNICEF in Doolow in 2013, using quantitative and qualitative research methods, and followed by additional baseline studies in May and June 2014 in Puntland and Somaliland. While extremely comprehensive and promising in theory, the frequency of the data collection (baseline, mid- line and end-line) does not allow to measuring results accruing from systems in a nuanced way.

Finally, based on the interviews conducted for this study, most implementing NGOs (consortium members and individual NGOs) and UN agencies are not yet able to measure where each area is in terms of levels of resilience and still focus on short-term output indicators, rather than systemic indicators. More critically, it seems that resilience indicators still do not inform programming efforts: ‘We know that those indicators are available but we see them as another cook in a crowded kitchen. They are very abstract and often questionable. Further, should NGOs actually decide to act on the basis of BRCiS or SomRep, they should also accept to delegate their authority to those consortia. In practice, it means that your objectives depend on the information managed by your consortium. Maybe in theory, but de facto. Do consortia have the capacity to do so? Do (NGOs) have the willingness to do so? I doubt both’ (Consortium member). Similar comments were made on for the Joint Resilience Strategy by FAO or UNICEF respondents, suggesting that ‘indicators and M&E procedures are still output oriented – despite the architecture we have developed with RIMA – not allowing for learning benefits or operational adjustments’ (FAO).

BRCiS and SomRep undertook a mapping exercise to understand the ways in which consortia are undertaking resilience measurements within their programmes. They developed a matrix as a first step to share lessons learned and best practices within the Resilience Working Group.³⁶ Though not comprehensive yet, the mapping highlighted some interesting results. The unit of analysis of almost all the actors mapped (five, of which BRCiS and SomRep were two) was either the household, the community or both. Biannual is the frequency of measurement used by SomRep, while BRCiS uses an annual frequency.

Table 3: Examples of indicators used by SomRep and BRCiS in Somalia

Agency or Consortium	Resilience objectives	Used indicators
SomRep	Reduced mean depth of poverty Reduced external humanitarian support	<u>Depth of Poverty decreased</u>
		% of community accessing community contingency resources
BRCiS	Increase resilience strategy through WASH, FSL shelter	<u>Depth of poverty</u>
		<u>Coping Strategy Index (CSI)</u>
		<u>Household Food Consumption Score (FCS)</u>
Tearfund	Increased resilience to drought, Improved food security throughout year	<u>Household Food Insecurity Access Scale (HFIAS)</u>

³⁵ FAO, *RIMA-II: Moving forward the Development of the Resilience Index Measurement and Analysis Model*, 2016.

³⁶ In particular, the matrix aimed at measuring the following: 1) Type of intervention; 2) Timeframe; 3) Place of operation; 4) Resilience purpose you want to reach; 5) Indicators used; 6) Indicator measurement; 7) Frequency of measurement; 8) Unit of analysis; 9) Focus of measurement (impact or output); and 10) Level of indicators of resilience.

Currently, M&E procedures have more to do with window-dressing than actual learning agendas. There are at least three main reasons for that:

1. **Technically:** Measuring resilience of a system or measuring the contribution of a specific sector to the resilience of a given group is proven difficult. As acknowledged by the interviewed M&E specialists working on Somalia, as it often impossible to: 1) identify indicators to be measured; and 2) attribute an impact/changes (in a given system) to resilience activities. As highlighted by a consortium member, *'the fact that reporting has remained at the output level is a concern to us. We understand that at this point they may not be able to report at the outcome or impact level but we have constantly put this as part of our response to the reporting'*. (NGO, Consortium)
2. **Conceptually:** Beforehand, donors, implementing organisations, and academics agreed that there is still no clarity on the concept and reality of *shock* in the Somali context: *'[M&E of resilience] also needs to identify shocks. You can't just look at people's food consumption scores, you have to look at the contexts'* (NGO, Consortium). Afterwards, with the predominance of short-term emergency programming within resilience portfolios, which can be quantified easily in terms of outputs (e.g. food security indicators), longer-term and more adaptive/transformational dimensions are generally not addressed properly – unless they specifically deal with crisis management or DRR.
3. **Practically:** the shift from the traditional output-oriented M&E approach (baseline, midline, endline) in areas where humanitarian activities have been predominant over the past 25 years to a more coordinated Learning Agenda approach has proven difficult.

To give a more tangible form to the constructive criticisms made by study respondents, the figure below is based on the field observations conducted in Bossasso, Doolow, and Hargeisa. While fictitious, this example is representative of the problems identified by most stakeholders and listed in the 'Comments'.

Figure 28: Gaps in the M&E and learning agenda approach (example based on observations in Somalia)

Example (Fictitious case, synthesis based on the situation in 3 different districts)		Baseline	Year <i>n</i>	Index	Comments
NGO (BRCiS)	• Cash Transfer • Return Packages	Given situation	Actual outputs vs Planned	Specific Indicator of resilience (if any)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. No common indicator to capture the multiplier effect of the 5 different programmes (in this example). 2. Mainly output-driven (actual vs. planned) 3. Generally based on a normative (mean) understanding of socio-economic well-being 4. No assessment of the impact on the absorptive, adaptive, and transformative capacity of the targeted communities 5. Doubts on the reality of the learning process at the field level.
NGO (SomRep)	• Institutional Capacity Building	Given situation	Actual outputs vs Planned	Specific Indicator of resilience (if any)	
NNGO	• Health and Hygiene	Given situation	Actual outputs vs Planned	Specific Indicator of resilience (if any)	
INGO	• Livestock vaccination	Given situation	Actual outputs vs Planned	Specific Indicator of resilience (if any)	
JRS (UN)	• Food distribution • Cash for Work	Given situation	Actual outputs vs Planned	Specific Indicator of resilience (if any)	
		No coordinated impact assessment			

Cost-effectiveness (and Value-for-Money?)

There is still unclear evidence of NGOs and consortia's actual cost-effectiveness on the short-term

(Cost Analysis for Resilience Projects in Somalia – adapted from work by Hasim Abdirahman Shuria of Research Care Africa, with funding from SDC)

A 2015 Cost Analysis for Resilience Projects in Somalia assessed a two-year summary of expenditures from three types of resilience responses: UN resilience programmes, a consortium and an INGO.³⁷ The objective was to take the examples of a UN-led consortium, of a multi-NGO consortium and of an individual resilience programme to better identify the benefit and costs of each model.

Limitations of the 2015 cost analysis. At first glance, this study can be used to inform donors of the financial implications and Value for Money (VfM) regarding the support of different models. Unfortunately:

- The study was unable to directly compare each organisation due to significant variances in total expenditures (see figure 1), indicators and impact measurements and locations of operation; and
- Organisations provided a summary of expenditures without taking into account whether their initial plans were accurate, as it is likely that each programme allocated resources according to their initial plans rather than releasing expenditures based on their ability to achieve results (and/or save costs). The report does not account for an organisation's changes/variations in planning or whether finances have been allocated wisely in the first place.

General findings from the 2015 cost analysis. That said, the study looks into several valuable management topics that can be used to help guide future decisions around the structure of programming, whether that be UN-led, a multi-organisational consortia approach or directly supporting individual programs.

- The cost analysis disaggregates several topics worthy of discussion. In particular, it depicts the percentage of expenditures according to three categories: programme, admin and indirect costs (see figure 2), which can be a useful measurement to verify if individual organizations are following acceptable standards (i.e. commonly used levels of indirect/programme costs).
- Results of the cost analysis indicate that organization structures influence the cost incurred on programmes. For example, the UN agency structure spends more on security while a consortium spends more on salaries, as different organizations staffs draw salaries from the same programme. In addition, single international NGO spent less on coordination compared to the consortium and UN agency. It also found that security related costs for UN agency were high as it spent 16% of the total costs incurred on security related activities. The cost of delivering a dollar to the beneficiaries is crucial and was found to be less than 41% of the total costs for the three structures.³⁸
- Substantial improvement was noted on the reduction of non-programmatic costs, such as administrative costs, salaries, etc., from the year of inception to the subsequent year for the consortium.
- The report recommends that donors provide guidelines to limit certain expenditures such as the types of salaries (technical vs. administrative staff) related to overall costs. The question exists: does increased coordination require significantly higher costs? Despite the relatively robust M&E systems (see figure 4), this answer still remains unclear.


³⁷ Researchcare Africa (2015) 'Cost Assessment of Resilience Projects in Somalia – June-July 2015', Final mini report for the IHDG Somalia, assessment conducted by Hashim Shuria and made available to the research team as background documentation by SDC.

³⁸ Ibid

Table 4: Total Cost of Resilience Programmes

Organisational Structure	Total Cost: Resilience Programmes
NGO	\$929,616.75
UN	\$44,033,476
Consortium	\$7,575,188.57

Figure 29: Cost Assessment of Somalia Resilience Projects: Summary



Salary costs. This last point was raised by many stakeholders (both based in Nairobi and in Somalia) who stated that resilience programmes, particularly that of consortia, have higher start-up costs in terms of time and money spent to engage local beneficiaries and authorities within the programme. Some of these resources have been invested to implement a more community-based approach that involves several days of research and analysis in order to design village-specific interventions. One may argue that these costs contribute directly to the beneficiary, but these costs also include salaries (see figure 3), logistics and other administrative fees. The cost analysis further indicated that the consortium allocated more to salaries because multiple partners often utilize technical expertise from within the programme. An important question remains: does that extra layer of expertise and coordination directly impact the programmes' beneficiaries?

Table 5: Costs of Salaries for Consortium (Year 1-2)

Costs	Year 1	Percentage	Year 2	Percentage
Staffs Salaries	\$996,954	55%	\$1,808,607	31%
Total Programme Cost	\$1,825,098	-	\$5,750,091	-

Coordination costs. The study also points out that the international NGO required fewer resources for coordination than the consortium or UN. However, as competition for limited resources becomes more intense, it raises yet another question: does that place extra pressure on smaller organisations to increase coordination spending (likely at the cost of working directly with beneficiaries)? Though implementation appears to be more cost effective in the second year, the analysis raises more questions than answers, and perhaps that is why the report also recommends that a more coordinated, donor driven approach will help all parties streamline their efforts. Unfortunately, this comes with a trade off because a top-down approach can be overly prescriptive and cause further delays to the planning and implementation phases.

Table 6: Spending on Coordination and M&E

Org Structure	Coordination	M&E	Total Percentage of Budget
NGO	N/A	1.1%	1.1%
UN	4.8%	5.5%	10.3%
Consortium	5.2%	5.7%	10.9%

Capacity development costs. A key finding (figure 5) is the low levels of investment in capacity development in the UN-led consortium (0.8%) as compared to the multi-NGO consortium (4.2%). The individual resilience programme falls in the middle (2.2%).

Within the 4.2% of the multi-NGO consortium investment in capacity development, 4.1% was spent on the development of community capacity vs. 0.1% on the staff development capacity. This needs to be taken with a grain of salt. This analysis is based on the BRCiS model, which counts 3 full-time staff as the field staff are NGO staff. As such it does not integrate the investments made in NGOs' capacity development. That should be part of the analysis and should be part of the value added of the consortium approach: how much is invested in developing the skills of NGO staff on the ground, of those who are implementing and reporting on projects? That is a key question that this cost analysis does not address. Knowing the disconnect – highlighted in this report – between the centralized leadership on the resilience consortia and the capacity on the ground for implementation and reporting, this type of information is a necessary financial consideration for strategic planning and donor funding.

Table 7: Spending on Capacity

Org. Structure	Capacity Development	Total Cost	Percentage
NGO	\$20,076	929,617	2.2%
UN	\$370,330	44,033,476	0.8%
Consortium	\$320,874	7,575,189	4.2%

Reducing costs of direct goods and services. One thing is certain, the cost analysis clearly conveys that all three programmes should aim to decrease the cost of direct goods and services to the beneficiaries: the UN and NGO spent 1.4 dollars to deliver 1 dollar to the beneficiaries, compared to the consortium's 1.6 dollar ratio. What is the best way to accomplish these savings? It may be too early to tell, but all forms of implementation can benefit from an increased focus on building local capacity, both for the beneficiaries and for local staff that is based in the field. The cost analysis indicates that the consortium has invested the highest at approximately 4.2% on capacity building (see figure 5), but is that enough to make the transformational change that is needed?

Caveat. It is difficult to conclude, on the basis of direct beneficiary costs and individual component costs, a Value for Money of the resilience approaches analysed. It is not in reality possible to tell value for money until the system is tested with shocks.

POLICY LEVEL: COORDINATION AND OWNERSHIP

The Federal Government of Somalia has committed itself to develop a new comprehensive medium-term National Development Plan (NDP), aligned with the newly adopted Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). The NDP will cover the period from January 2017 to December 2019 and set the vision, goals, desired strategic outcomes, and specific annual *targets* for these outcomes. The table below shows that discussions on resilience are now fully brought under the new NDP framework: between the November 2015 and March 2016 drafts, resilience has become a specific pillar – encompassing environmental and social issues, from climate change to displacement. Interestingly, it also includes potential ‘solutions’ with the mention of a ‘diaspora strategy’: *‘Tapping into the resources and energy of the Somali diaspora should be one of our priorities, as there is a common interest in the future of the country and well-being of its people’* (Local NGO, Bossasso).

Table 8: NDP drafts 2015 vs. 2016


	PILLARS	COMPONENTS
MOPIC Vision for National Development Plan (November 2015)	Pillar 1: Consolidation of Security, Peace and Promotion of Good Governance	Demobilization and disarmament, conflict resolution, community participation
	Pillar 2: Consolidating the Macroeconomic Framework and Restoring Key Sectors	Public finance, Monetary policy and institutions
	Pillar 3: Accesses to Basic Social Services and Social Welfare	Education, Health, Teacher and vocational training
	Pillar 4: Infrastructures Development	Energy; Roads, ports, airports, and vital state infrastructure; Water; Transportation
	Pillars 5: Public Administration	Reform of the public service, Partnership with private sector
	Pillar 6: Cross-cutting issues	Gender empowerment, Youth, Environment
MOPIC Vision for National Development Plan (March 2016)	Pillar 1: Governance and Rule of Law	Politics, Justice, Security
	Pillar 2: Economic Development and Financial Governance	Livestock, Fisheries, Agriculture, Reforming fiscal & monetary policy, Reforming fiscal transfer, Empowering private sector, Managing aid
	Pillar 3: Infrastructure	Energy; Roads, ports, airports, and vital state infrastructure; Water; Transportation
	Pillar 4: Social Services	Health, Education, Training, capacity enhancement, and HR management
	Pillar 5: Resilience	Environment, Climate change, Solutions for displaced, Disaster mitigation and preparedness, Diaspora strategy

Interviews with international and Somali stakeholders draw a contrasted view of the situation, with actors understanding the crucial importance of national ownership, while regretting the absence of representative interlocutors, the lack of capacity among Somali counterparts and the existence of multiple layers of responsibility.

National ownership is seen as legitimate and necessary by both Somali and international actors: *‘We feel that for Somalia to progress and the Somali government to take control of the needs of the population, particularly environmental needs, it’s essential that they start taking the lead for some of these aspects. We will continue arguing for a needs-based approach but we also see that the government needs to recognise those needs’* (NGO, Consortium.) Similarly, governmental counterparts consider that *‘You cannot make any changes if you do not have the government leadership behind you. Second, resilience must also be aimed at helping the government to fulfil its duty. Donors and others must play a lead role in this change’* (Government). The need for a contract between parties – contract based on a renewed understanding of what collaboration could/should be – was sometimes mentioned by governmental counterparts and international stakeholders. It validates the assumption that there is a political window of collaborative

opportunity between Somali and international actors today, probably wider than four or five years ago. In this regard, some NGOs bemoan the fact that they are used as pawns in a political game of chess: *'Donors have to fund the government directly – about building the capacity or developing resilience activities. The risk now is that they know we received large funding and want to know what their share will be. It creates massive tensions at all levels and clearly adds pressure, resentment, delays, costs, etc.'* (NGO, Consortium).

Figure 30: Perception of governmental efforts to promote resilience (indicative only)



When asked if the government (local or federal) is effective in promoting resilience in their communities, more than three-fourth (27/35) of focus group respondents answered negatively. However, in the discussion, one third of this group expressed the idea that official actors should be more involved and have their capacity developed by the international community: *'It has to come from the Somali government as well. Otherwise, we will always be in a dependency situation'*. (Elder, 56, Hargeisa)

... and Somali counterparts wish the partnership and collaboration with donors were more active: The Office of the Prime Minister, in charge of resilience activities, clearly lacks the capacity to undertake its task, with one full-time Director and only 28 correspondents embedded in different ministries and administrations working on a voluntary basis. This lack of capacity is a major impediment to developing and implementing national plans. While acknowledging this reality, Somali officials also complain about the ambivalent attitude of the international community, calling for more coordination and dialogue: *'We have the police, prosecutor, judge and jury all in one with the international community. They fund, evaluate and implement. It is time to break that cycle. We have ideas that we need to contribute and our participation is useful. We are partners; we need people to see us as partners. Stop avoiding us and stop disregarding us. This is what we need to start our 'coordination journey'. We have clearly shared this need but have had little response to it'* (Government). In today's context, there is clearly a vicious circle, as the lack of capacity and poor representativeness of Somali counterparts deter donors from collaborating actively with them.

However, there are still too many conflicting agendas and Somali counterparts: As systematically mentioned by international and national stakeholders throughout the research process, the relationship between the federal and regional government is complex, with a lot of local political, ethnical/clannish, cultural and economic determinants that are generally beyond control for donors or implementing NGOs. It does negatively impact sectoral dialogues on resilience, as it adds more administrative hurdles, delays and costs. At the regional, federal, and district, the NGOs also report having a hard time identifying the right interlocutor. As stated by a donor, *'with the government, you need to take the problem from different angles – including at the federal, regional [and] local levels. How can we raise them into serious sectoral discussions?'* (Donor). In practice, multiple direct lines are open with different 'representative' layers of the Somali government, in a scattered way: *'On NDP and resilience, there are varying views among donors. What would be the collaboration with the government look like? Which ministries would be involved? At which level – national, regional, federal, district? And what sort of capacity needs to be built? This is a really important point. But, in today's context, it is not even idealistic'* (Donor).

... and capacity remains the main obstacle to national ownership and strategic planning: *'How donors will coordinate on their support to the government on resilience? This is a key issue with the NDP and in view of developing a resilience strategy. However, corruption and lack of capacity clearly undermine the feasibility of the initiative. We are looking for new ways to fund government support on resilience (per diems, monitoring joint activities) with the World Bank to see if payments can be made through the National system and not using the parallel system of resilience funding'* (Donor). However, if working with the Somali government seems challenging to many donors and NGOs, more recent initiatives led by consortia show that common

initiatives and capacity-building activities can be developed in an efficient manner. In November 2015, SomReP and BRCiS initiated an official partnership with local authorities, particularly with the Office of the Prime Minister. According to donors and local actors, *'consortia have the national level government listening' (Donor)* and have agreed on a shared agenda with the Somali counterparts. Consortia have, for instance, been able to adjust per diem rates for government staff and a standardized Cash-for-Work rate.

A rapid qualitative needs assessment shows that the main gaps are strategic planning, M&E and mediation/coordination (with subnational entities). On the government side, at both national and subnational levels, the need to further enhance the existing capacities is seen as a priority as well: *'We all agree that we do not have all the proper capacities in place. Moreover, what we have needs to be enhanced. We are not at zero, we need to build institutions and help resourceful people in the county contribute to the development of their own country. This can only happen with a change of mindset' (Government)*. Despite this, clear areas of collaboration have been strengthened (especially through consortia): training, capacity building, etc. – *'which also raises awareness of local authorities on resilience and long-term priorities' (Federal Government)*.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This report recommends a more structured approach to resilience by building linkages both at the planning level (strategic, between various donors and implementing partners) and at the local level (operational). This multi-layered coordination needs to be supported by a strong information exchange and learning agenda within and across organisations. This leads to two questions:

- 1) Can resilience be done under just one programme?
- 2) Do programmes have to be defined as 'resilience' in order to do resilience activities?

There is a threat in this line of thinking that 'resilience' gets defined ever more broadly to incorporate more disciplines and sectors, such that it is in danger of being a catch-all concept. That, however, also belies the complex reality in Somalia of deeply interconnected networks, causal-consequence dynamics and, in normal parlance, the fact that 'one thing leads to another'. What sort of an approach would then work in Somalia, in line with the Handbook on Resilience's adage that 'resilience' can and should be operationalised differently depending on the context to which it applies? As FAO noted in a resilience meeting held in Feb 2015, *'most projects contribute to building resilience in a way or another. There is therefore a need for a mechanism to ensure activities are complimentary. How you sequence and combine different activities is also of importance'*.

A key finding of this report is that humanitarian (and development) donors are the key agents of change in Somalia, which holds critical implications for coordination and long-term choices beyond national short-term priorities. For international donors there is a clear momentum today, whatever their differences or individual agendas, for taking full responsibility by:

- 1) Developing a coordinated resilience strategy between donors, consortia and implementing NGOs *(with clearer theories of change, transparent and flexible learning agendas, and VfM principles)*;
- 2) Associating the government *(through capacity building, information sharing, endorsement and support to the NRP, transformative agenda, long-term calendar, with clear political lines between the different governmental layers and implementing NGOs or consortia)*; and
- 3) Reintegrating the Somali population and communities *(through systematic accountability and feedback loops, voicing needs, concerns and aspirations – to avoid any disconnect between donors and populations)*.

Resilience-building strategies and programmes need to take a longer-term vision into account, going beyond traditional three-to-five year planning cycles, in order to ensure that the different regions of Somali can progressively better deal with environmental and socio-economic shocks and stressors. In this regard, a strong emphasis on flexible and forward-looking approaches from IHDG and its partners is crucial to ensuring that decision-making processes can respond to changing risks, capacities and priorities. Humanitarian donors must be more demanding with their partners and counterparts, which means that they also have to take their part and rethink the conditions of a two-way dialogue with the Government, consortia, UN agencies, individual NGOs and the people of Somalia.

Focusing on the long-term

- 1. Accept that *resilience-building* may not be a realistic agenda in some parts of the country on the medium to long-term.** Resilience is naturally an objective that is particularly appropriate and necessary to the Somali situation. However, as strongly emphasised in this research, the multiplier effect of resilience programming can only occur when the three 'capacities' (absorptive, adaptive, and transformative) and comprehensive levels of targeting (from the individual to the system) are co-developed, in a *contiguum*. In this regard, there are some situations – especially certain areas in South Central Somalia – where the absence of formal government and the presence of violence threaten the legitimacy and feasibility of resilience programmes, as suggested by many field practitioners during the interview process, and synthesised by Frankenberger et al. (2012): '*resilience building may be impossible unless and until basic minimum conditions are present*'. It does not mean that emergency assistance should not be implemented in those areas, or that these activities should cease, but rather questions their label as 'resilience' activities. In these contexts, resilience-building cannot be seen as a priority, as it may be detrimental to other (better) assistance modalities and approaches.
- 2. Distinguish stabilisation and resilience strategies and programmes for greater clarity and efficiency.** In a workshop held in Nairobi and hosted by SDC at the Swiss Embassy in May 2016, it was highlighted that the approach of this report is not to question donors' stabilization agenda in Somalia, but rather to insist on the necessity for donors and implementing partners to clearly delineate what falls under:
 - The humanitarian/emergency *and* the resilience umbrellas, as they require distinct funding types, capacity, programme duration and learning agendas; and
 - The stabilization *and* the resilience umbrellas, as they have different objectives politically and socio-economically.

Not drawing clear strategic, funding and programmatic lines between those different – albeit necessary – approaches may be detrimental to the assistance community while:

- For local communities, blurring the lines between implementing partners' actual objectives;
- For consortia, generating unsolvable internal contradictions between the proponents of a strictly 'humanitarian' approach and organisations more inclined to tap into 'stabilization' funds; and
- For donors, undermining the rationale of any actual resilience approach – longer-term socio-economic objectives, collaborative approach with communities and governments, multi-year learning agenda and politically neutral geographic or thematic assistance focus.


While both agendas can take place, donors need to better delineate their respective perimeters:

- 1) *It is essential for humanitarian/resilience actors, at a time when their operations may increasingly become a point of contention between governmental and anti-governmental actors.*
- 2) *It is particularly true of today's political priorities (migration and youth), which should not be politicized.*

- 3. Shift from a *continuum* approach to a *contiguum* approach.** Currently, with the predominance of short-term humanitarian programming, the transformative dimension is poorly addressed, as it is considered as a long-term and developmental focus. Most actors consider longer-term or transformative initiatives in a linear continuum: from short-run humanitarian and emergency assistance to longer-term priorities. However, the most effective way to build resilience towards shocks is through integrated, community-led programming as part of a *contiguum* of simultaneous humanitarian aid,

rehabilitation and development assistance.³⁹ This should be the backbone of any resilience strategy or programme in Somalia, as suggested in the graph below, by combining immediate relief requirements with long-term development objectives in a simultaneous way. For the Humanitarian Donor Group, it is therefore crucial to coordinate with development actors to address acute or recurring cases of vulnerability (absorptive / adaptive capacities) while developing the capacity of communities and governmental actors to better cope with shocks and stressors in the future (adaptive / transformative capacities). While this approach is becoming more and more shared and adopted, many actors have not fully implemented it. Donors should clearly make it an individual and collective objective to promote an actual resilience agenda in Somalia.

Figure 31: Continuum vs Contiguuum approaches



As previously suggested above, this thus implies that resilience programming in South-Central Somalia is not feasible in today's context, in light of the constraints of the socio-economic and security situations. Until the capacity of the government reaches an extent to allow for the possibility of ownership and engagement in systemic resilience building, the comprehensive resilience desired is not achievable. Successful resilience must span from an individual to a systemic level, with internal ownership and scalability.

- 4. Systematise regional and cross-border approaches to resilience programming.** In a context of regional migration, internal displacement, and seasonal pastoralist movements, a cross-border approach to resilience has to be considered to assess and address the root causes of chronic vulnerability. The notion of 'border' should naturally be defined here: 1) international (Ethiopia/Somalia or Kenya/Somalia); 2) national and internal (between federal zones or regions); 3) programmatic (as defined by a specific NGO, inasmuch as it specifically and exclusively focuses on one geographic areas). However, it is crucial to adopt resilience-building approaches that go beyond international, national, or programmatic borders – when it is needed. In this regard, the informal HDG and its partners would benefit from the experience and knowledge of regional actors like IGAD, the Islamic Development Bank, African Development Bank, the World Bank, etc. to build a cohesive regional resilience agenda and move Somalia's resilience efforts into a cohesive direction. Cross-border programming seems relevant to nomadic, pastoralist and migrant communities. NGOs seem

³⁹ DFID's resilience position paper: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/193166/prom-innov-evi-bas-appr-build-res-resp-hum-cris.pdf

better fitted and more legitimate than consortia to promote this approach – at least on the short- to medium-run.

5. Align the resilience and durable solutions agendas. The international community is – financially, politically and operationally – more engaged on resilience than on durable solutions in Somalia. In 2014, discussions around a collective roadmap to operationalise durable solutions in Somalia started. In 2016, durable solutions for the displaced was set under Chapter 11: Resilience of the National Development Plan for Somalia. This does not, however, solve the challenges of operationalization. This needs to be addressed. First, UNHCR has invested time and energy creating strong relations with the Government, but it still needs to integrate the UN system, development actors and more strategic New Deal actors in the framework. The Solutions Alliance for Somalia may be a strong platform to pave the way for an operational framework – beyond the theoretical framework. Second, many of the resilience consortium members are part of the durable solutions sector. The members of BRCiS, SomReP, ACTED and ADESO are fully prepared to align their resilience and social safety net programming with durable solutions on the ground.

A formal policy now exists. The next step is an operational rapprochement and alignment. Assuming that donors keep funding activities in South-Central Somalia, this coordination should happen on a case-by-case operational basis following the lead members of the three resilience consortia mentioned above – BRCiS, SomReP, ACTED and ADESO. Looking at the needs of specific communities, districts, and villages to strengthen the food security, coping mechanisms, livelihoods and market access of IDPs and returnees through key resilience milestones is a key requirement of durable solutions. There are three angles to consider to operationalise durable solutions through the resilience agenda:

- First, integrating returns effectively into communities where resilience programming has already started.
- Second, planning resilience activities in areas of high return.
- Third, developing a joint monitoring framework. The baselines exist to measure the impact of displacement and return on resilience activities and on durable solutions.

Durable solutions require a multi-sectoral and multi-stakeholder approach, so do resilience activities – which often target the same deprived areas and populations. Donors should work closely with governments and key partners to operationalize the policy commitments under the National Development Plan, and support the needs and guarantee the rights of internally displaced and returnees through a community-based resilience response.

Building a Common Learning Agenda

M&E systems are improving, but there are clear opportunities to optimise on the use of information gathered.

6. **Consider diversity (concepts and indicators) as a strength.** As long as they are public, flexible, pragmatic, contextualized, multi-scale and include qualitative dimensions, diversity is an asset to both concepts and indicators. In Somalia, however, Ungar's definition of resilience seems particularly appropriate, as it insists on communities' role and responsibilities in the whole process: '[Resilience is] *both the capacity of individuals to navigate their way to the psychological, social, cultural, and physical resources that sustain their wellbeing, and their capacity, individually and collectively, to negotiate for these resources to be provided and experienced in culturally meaningful ways*'.⁴⁰ Such a strong emphasis on *navigation* and *negotiation* is also a key conclusion of the fieldwork undertaken in Bossasso, Hargeisa, and Doolow by the research team.

7. **Put the learning agenda at the heart of the strategy.** For the moment we have 'Strategy, Implementation, and Reporting (M&E)' whereas it should be 'Strategy, Learning Agenda, Implementation'. Resilience-building programming needs to be evaluated for its medium- and long-term impacts *not only* on food and nutrition security in the face of recurrent shocks and chronic stressors *but also* on more transformative and longer-term dimensions. Donors should be more demanding with their partners on the Somali ground, so that they generate tangible evidence of what works most effectively and provides best value for money over a realistic timeframe. Evaluating programmes at scale requires much more accurate and specific survey instruments, (Elbers and Gunning 2013), as well as iterative surveys to establish sustainability. To do so and accurately monitor long-term changes in the resilience of communities and households, it is recommended to promote actual *learning agendas* by:
 - Agreeing on monitoring, evaluation and learning procedures *before* operations start;
 - Identifying realistic theories of change – including absorptive, adaptive and transformative capacities;
 - Developing real context analyses before implementing programmes or finalising strategies;
 - Favouring *high-frequency*, cross-country, sustained, and long-term surveying of a designed number of *sentinel sites* (panels) to establish a quantitative evidence base on the disaster-poverty links;⁴¹
 - Developing metrics for projected drought and famine risks given the existing correlations between rainfall, production, food access and the environment;
 - Using the vast technological improvements in mobile communication, data collection, and data processing to aggregate and disseminate data in near-real time;
 - Mixing quantitative and qualitative methods and laying a particular emphasis on failures and how to learn from them;
 - Strengthening the already existing information sharing initiatives launched by SomRep between donors and implementing partners.

8. **Promote transformative and longer-term information systems (e.g. land and water information, environment, social and societal aspects).** While supporting early warning and nutrition systems leads to stronger adaptive or absorptive capacities, it is also important from a resilience-building perspective to design and tailor information systems focusing on a more transformative capacity. In particular, the key issue of *environmental degradation* is systematically seen as 'important but secondary' (donor) which is wrong from a resilience angle. Information systems on land and water, environmental and ecological indicators on deforestation and its consequences, etc. may for instance be developed and used as a warning system to better adjust longer-term transformative approaches.

⁴⁰ Ungar. M. (2008) *Resilience across Cultures*, British Journal of Social Work, 38.

⁴¹ See in particular: Barrett, C. (2014) *Measuring Resilience in a Volatile World, A Proposal For A Multicountry System Of Sentinel Sites*, 2020 Conference Paper 1, IFPRI and 2020 Vision Initiative. 'Resilience data must be collected at high frequency in order to capture the impacts of stressors and shocks (and responses to shocks) using risk-sensitive indicators. The data must be collected over the long term, because vulnerability to shocks is the product of slower-moving stressors as well as of long-term, multisectoral interventions for building resilience. The data should be collected in sentinel sites that are strategically selected for the purposes of minimizing costs while maintaining representativeness of key structural characteristics, such as specific agroecologies or livelihood zones.'

Fostering Linkages and Promoting National Ownership

- 9. Create a proper coordinating body between stakeholders (e.g. broadened Steering Committee EU, SomRep). Collaboration is strong, but there are ways to improve it more.** Covering the various dimensions of resilience building and reaching scale in a cohesive manner requires multi-sectorial and multi-stakeholder coordination. Beyond individual political agendas, donors would benefit from an actual consensus-building platform to promote coordination, polycentric governance/management/decision-making processes, and encourage initiatives like the Resilience Systems Analysis. Last but not least, it may also facilitate discussions with the Somali government. In this regard, it is suggested that the Informal Humanitarian Donor Group take the lead in promoting such a multi-stakeholder approach.
- 10. Work with the Somali government in a two-way dialogue.** Despite the relatively low capacities of most governmental agencies – at both national and subnational levels – local and national ownership and leadership are key to build resilient country, communities and households in Somalia. There has been progress on this front, but there is much more room for improvement.
- Firstly, government leadership is crucial since it encourages cross-sectorial and intra-governmental cohesion. From a transformative point of view, its participation and ownership is therefore key and should be promoted by the IHDG and its partners through capacity-building and information sharing in a two-way dialogue with clear conditionality and milestones to progressively strengthen the participation of the Government in the decision-making process;
 - Secondly, the necessary regional approach to resilience should be promoted in the discussions with the Government of Somalia by encouraging discussions with member nation states of IGAD or EAC to assess challenges, define strategies and adjust collective programmes at the regional level;
 - Lastly, working with the Government also means setting some conditions to the dialogue. In particular, the situation of NGOs, often caught between national internal political conflicts or considered as fund managers by local governmental counterparts, should be discussed – as consortia and NGOs, *de facto*, play a political role that puts their mandate and projects at risk.
- 11. Develop direct accountability loops with local communities, whose inherent resilience can be a foundation for programming.** Likewise, community-based approaches are crucial to ensure ownership, sustainability, conflict prevention and resolution and, must be fully involved in all phases of the projects cycle. Donors should ensure that all the projects they fund apply strict participatory and accountability principles with local communities.

ANNEXES

1. List of 26 projects on Resilience in the PSG Project Database

Reporting agency	Category	A. Sector	B1. Sub-sector - 1
Building Resilience to Water Stress in Somaliland- 'Preparation of Water Resources Management and Investment Plan'			
AfDB	Multilateral	Economic_foundations_PSG 4	NRM: Environment management (water, land, soil and biodiversity)
The overall objective/purpose of the project is to improve water resources management and catalyse water sector investments. Specifically the project will (i) prepare an Integrated Water Resources Management Plan; (ii) prepare bankable investment projects and programmes for funding; and (iii) provide some relief from drought impacts and build capacity through implementation of priority rehabilitation works.			
Drought Resilience and Sustainable Livelihoods Program in the Horn of Africa			
AfDB	Multilateral	Economic_foundations_PSG 4	NRM: Environment management (water, land, soil and biodiversity)
The DRSLP component for Somalia is aimed at building resilience and sustainable livelihoods for pastoral and agro-pastoral communities in drought-prone areas and to contribute to poverty reduction. The specific objectives of the project are: (1) to improve water and rangeland management to enhance water and forage availability and accessibility, and tackle environment /land degradation and desertification; (2) to improve infrastructure for market access, animal health, and livestock management; and (3) to build human and institutional capacity targeting improvement in agro-pastoral production, improved policy and institutional framework. In all three zones of Somalia (Somaliland, Puntland, and South Central), the project activities identified will be implemented in the drought prone pastoral and agro-pastoral and food insecure areas of country.			
Somalia Resilience Program - Enhancing resilience in Somalia 2013-2016			
Australia	Bilateral	Economic_foundations_PSG 4	Productive sectors: Pastoralism, farming and fisheries
To increase the resilience of chronically vulnerable people Households, communities and systems in targeted pastoral, agro-pastoral and peri-urban livelihood zones			
Supporting productive capacities for food security and resilience in the Horn of Africa			
Denmark	Bilateral	Economic_foundations_PSG 4	NRM: Environment management (water, land, soil and biodiversity)
Improved capacity for food production, associated income generation and governance of natural resources in the drylands of the Horn of Africa, benefitting local poverty reduction, food security and resilience			
Economic Development Programme for Growth and resilience Phase III			
EU	Multilateral	Economic_foundations_PSG 4	Productive sectors: Pastoralism, farming and fisheries
Livelihoods and nutrition of agropastoralists and pastoralists, farmers, fishermen and other vulnerable households improved and resilience strengthened			
FAO Resilience Programme			

FAO	UN Agency	Economic_foundations_PSG 4	Productive sectors: Pastoralism, farming and fisheries
At risk households anticipate, resist, absorb and recover in a timely and efficient manner from external pressures and shocks in ways that preserve integrity and do not deepen vulnerability .			
Food Security and Nutrition analysis Unit (FSNAU)			
FAO	UN Agency	Economic_foundations_PSG 4	NRM: Environment management (water, land, soil and biodiversity)
A broad range of stakeholders have access to appropriate food, nutrition and livelihood security information for improved emergency response and development planning thereby ensuring that communities, agencies and authorities in Somalia as well as the international aid community are empowered to respond.			
Somali Water and Land Information Management (SWALIM) Phase V			
FAO	UN Agency	Economic_foundations_PSG 4	NRM: Environment management (water, land, soil and biodiversity)
Increased availability and use of FAO-SWALIM information in water and land resources management, early warning, preparedness, response and resilience building, allowing informed decision making in sustainable natural resources management, planning and interventions.			
Fisheries Sector Support Programme			
FAO	UN Agency	Economic_foundations_PSG 4	Productive sectors: Pastoralism, farming and fisheries
To strengthen and protect sustainable livelihoods within the fisheries sector in Somalia through improved food security and resilience to shocks and crises.			
Haraad Rheeb - Quenching the Thirst III			
Germany	Bilateral	Economic_foundations_PSG 4	NRM: Environment management (water, land, soil and biodiversity)
Contribute to the resilience and drought recovery of Sool, Sanaag and Togdheer and reduce vulnerability to future droughts			
Rebuilding rural resilience in Southern Somalia			
Germany	Bilateral	Economic_foundations_PSG 4	Productive sectors: Pastoralism, farming and fisheries
The objective of the project is to increase and diversify incomes and rebuild productive assets of targeted households in order to enhance the resilience of the population in the project area. Focus is on enhanced productivity of smallholders in the agriculture and livestock sector, development of value addition opportunities in these sectors (pilot component) and improved access to markets for producers.			
Strengthening resilience of Somali population against natural disasters and conflicts.			
Italy	Bilateral	Revenues_and_services_PS G5	Human Development: Gender, social protection and safety nets
Support local population affected by natural disasters and / or on-going conflict across Somalia.			
Women Economic Empowerment			
UN WOMEN	UN Agency	Economic_foundations_PSG 4	Employment creation, labour and vocational training
Increased economic empowerment of women			
Alternative Livelihoods to Piracy in Puntland and Central Regions - Phase II			
UNDP	UN Agency	Economic_foundations_PSG	Employment creation, labour and vocational training

		4	
To strengthen community resilience against piracy through stimulating local economic growth, creating jobs, supporting entrepreneurs, particularly youth and other vulnerable groups in the hot spots of piracy in Puntland and Central Somalia (6 districts in Puntland and 3 districts in Central Somalia)			
Improving sustainable access to Water, Sanitation & Hygiene Promotion			
UNICEF	UN Agency	Economic_foundations_PSG 4	NRM: Environment management (water, land, soil and biodiversity)
To improve sustainable access to water, sanitation, & hygiene promotion. It will also support activities, which contribute to community resilience (including PPPs for strategic boreholes and CLTS) and extension of water supplies to health and Nutrition centres as well as hygiene promotion.			
Improved access to basic services and protection for vulnerable communities in Somalia			
UNICEF	UN Agency	Economic_foundations_PSG 4	NRM: Environment management (water, land, soil and biodiversity)
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Expand sustained access to safe water supply, improved sanitation and hygiene practices for vulnerable women and children in Somalia 2. Enhance community skills and household knowledge to enable household members to adopt a series of basic healthy behaviours leading to greater resilience. 			
Improved Access to Basic Social Services and Protection for Vulnerable Communities in Somalia			
UNICEF	UN Agency	Economic_foundations_PSG 4	NRM: Environment management (water, land, soil and biodiversity)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sustained and expanded access to safe water supply, improved sanitation and hygiene practices for vulnerable women and children in Somalia. • Community skills and household knowledge is enhanced to enable household members to adopt a series of basic healthy behaviours leading to greater resilience. • Strengthened capacity and improved knowledge of local WASH service providers on delivering quality services, building resilience of the communities and addressing gender gaps. 			
Resilience Programme– Community Based Basic Services in Bay and Gedo Regions			
UNICEF	UN Agency	Economic_foundations_PSG 4	NRM: Environment management (water, land, soil and biodiversity)
To increase resilience in vulnerable communities in Bay and Gedo Regions through improved access to basic services to protect human capital			
Boys and girls including Youth are protected from abuse, violence , exploitation and neglect through community based mechanisms and processes			
UNICEF	UN Agency	Revenues_and_services_PS G5	Human Development: Gender, social protection and safety nets
The program seeks to use participatory approach in the prevention and response of child rights violations at the community through establishment and strengthening of child protection systems and mechanisms at community level through empowering and engaging the existing community structures such as CPC, CPAs, CRCs, community safety nets, village communities and ensuring linkages with the local authority particularly district council members, and regional representatives of protection line ministries			
Improve and maintain optimum child and maternal nutrition status for U5 boys and girls and PLWs by ensuring access to and utilization of a quality integrated Basic Nutrition Services Package in all regions of Somalia			
UNICEF	UN Agency	Revenues_and_services_PS G5	Service delivery: Health and nutrition

1. To contribute to the reduction of malnutrition related ailments and mortality among vulnerable boys, girls (6-59 months), pregnant and lactating women (PLW) through systematic equal access to quality integrated curative and preventive food-based nutrition interventions
2. To improve women, boys and girl's access to evidence-based and feasible nutrition and nutrition related resilience activities, available through the Basic Nutrition Services Package (BNSP) interventions linking nutrition to Health, WASH, Food Security, Education and child protection programmes
3. To contribute to the availability of timely and quality community and health centre-based nutrition information, programme coverage and operational research (OR) into responses to the causes of malnutrition and related problems
4. To strengthen the coordination and capacity of all nutrition partners including communities and line ministries to deliver quality and sustainable emergency nutrition services through a variety of approaches

PROTRACTED RELIEF AND RECOVERY OPERATIONS – SOMALIA 200443.

WFP	UN Agency	Economic_foundations_PSG 4	NRM: Environment management (water, land, soil and biodiversity)
-----	-----------	-------------------------------	--

WFP will contribute to the overall resilience enhancing agenda with targeted interventions that rebuild, restore, and create new livelihood assets, and by seasonally aligning its programmes with those of partners for maximum complementary impacts. In line with the outcome of the Istanbul II conference, WFP will geographically expand its concerted resiliency enhancing efforts in tandem with capacity building of, and with, Government and its partners. Livelihood infrastructure rehabilitation will focus at the household and community level. Community consultations will be an integral part of the focus to build capacities at the grassroots level. These consultations will enable identification of vulnerabilities (including gender and youth), seasonal needs, and opportunities to strengthen resilience and for greater complementarity with other stakeholders. They will also facilitate greater community ownership for longer-term sustainability. It is anticipated such interventions will focus at the homestead level with activities designed to increase water retention and pasture development while addressing land degradation. WFP's operations are throughout Somalia except in areas where access is limited due to Al Shabaab and the indicated 2014 budget is reflective of this.

PROTRACTED RELIEF AND RECOVERY OPERATIONS – SOMALIA 200443.

WFP	UN Agency	Economic_foundations_PSG 4	Productive sectors: Pastoralism, farming and fisheries
-----	-----------	-------------------------------	--

The primary objectives of the PRRO are to enhance resilience of vulnerable households and individuals to shocks while at the same time rebuilding food and nutritional security for households by providing protective safety nets and saving lives through targeted relief interventions as seasonally and geographically appropriate. The PRRO also seeks to build operational capacities of Counterpart ministries in planning, oversight and implementation of health, nutrition and education activities.

2. Resilience Projects and their Sectors

As mentioned earlier, with the data from the Ministry of Planning and Cooperation on PSG projects shared with Samuel Hall, 63 projects fall under the 'Natural Resource Management / Resilience / Productive Sectors' umbrella and 26 were identified as working specifically on resilience. These are listed in Annex 1.

OCHA's mapping of resilience projects from June 2015 indicates a concentration of resilience projects in Togdheer in Somaliland, Iskushuban in Puntland and Doolow in South Central Somalia.⁴² While most other regions in the country are covered by at least one resilience programme, the areas shown as having no programmes related to resilience include Middle Shabelle, Middle Juba, Bay, Sool and Galdaguduud. However, donors emphasised the need for resilience programming in South and Central Somalia. There are two important considerations to note:

- 1) In the mapping undertaken for the PSGs, resilience projects were also shown to exist in the above mentioned regions; and
- 2) There exist projects (as the section on sector mapping will show) in all of the above areas that target sectors that fall within the purview of resilience-related activities but do not necessarily categorise/define themselves as resilience related projects.

Table 10. Projects implemented in South Central, Puntland and Somaliland.

Project Name	South-Central	Puntland	Somaliland
Building Resilience to Water Stress in Somaliland- 'Preparation of Water Resources Management and Investment Plan'			Yes
Drought Resilience and Sustainable Livelihoods Program in the Horn of Africa	Yes	Yes	Yes
Somalia Resilience Program-Enhancing resilience in Somalia 2013-16	Yes		Yes
Supporting productive capacities for food security and resilience in the Horn of Africa	Yes	Yes	Yes
Economic Development Programme for Growth & Resilience Phase III	Data not available		
FAO Resilience Programme	Yes	Yes	Yes
Food Security and Nutrition analysis Unit (FSNAU)	Yes	Yes	Yes
Somali Water and Land Information Management (SWALIM) Phase V	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fisheries Sector Support Programme	Yes	Yes	Yes
Haraad Rheeb - Quenching the Thirst III			Yes
Rebuilding rural resilience in Southern Somalia	Yes		
Strengthening resilience of Somali population against natural disasters and conflicts.	Yes	Yes	
Integrated Health Care Programme		Yes	Yes
Promoting human security of migrants and mobile population in Somali through humanitarian assistance	Yes	Yes	Yes
Somalia Rights Programme	Yes	Yes	
FAO Resilience Sub-Program (whole of Somalia)	Yes	Yes	Yes
Women Economic Empowerment			
Alternative Livelihoods to Piracy in Puntland and Central Regions - Phase II	Yes	Yes	
Improving sustainable access to Water, Sanitation & Hygiene Promotion	Yes		
Improved access to basic services and protection for vulnerable communities in Somalia	Data not available		
Improved Access to Basic Social Services and Protection for Vulnerable Communities in Somalia	Yes	Yes	Yes
Resilience Programme-Community Based Basic Services in Bay & Gedo Regions	Yes		
Improve and maintain optimum child and maternal nutrition status for U5 boys and girls and PLWs by ensuring access to and utilization of a quality integrated Basic Nutrition Services Package in all regions of Somalia	Yes	Yes	Yes
Protracted relief and recovery operations – somalia 200443.	Yes	Yes	Yes

⁴² UNOCHA, *Somalia Resilience Activities as of June 2015*.

Table 11. Projects implemented by sector and sub-sector

Title	Sector	Sub-sector
Building Resilience to Water Stress in Somaliland- 'Preparation of Water Resources Management and Investment Plan'	NRM: Environment management (water, land, soil and biodiversity)	
Drought Resilience and Sustainable Livelihoods Program in the Horn of Africa	NRM: Environment management (water, land, soil and biodiversity)	
Somalia Resilience Program - Enhancing resilience in Somalia 2013-2016	Productive sectors: Pastoralism, farming and fisheries	Productive sectors: Pastoralism, farming and fisheries
Supporting productive capacities for food security and resilience in the Horn of Africa	NRM: Environment management (water, land, soil and biodiversity)	Employment creation, labour and vocational training
Economic Development Programme for Growth and resilience Phase III	Productive sectors: Pastoralism, farming and fisheries	Productive sectors: Information and communication technology (ICT)
FAO Resilience Programme	Productive sectors: Pastoralism, farming and fisheries	NRM: Environment management (water, land, soil and biodiversity)
Food Security and Nutrition analysis Unit (FSNAU)	NRM: Environment management (water, land, soil and biodiversity)	NRM: Environment management (water, land, soil and biodiversity)
Somali Water and Land Information Management (SWALIM) Phase V	NRM: Environment management (water, land, soil and biodiversity)	NRM: Environment management (water, land, soil and biodiversity)
Fisheries Sector Support Programme	Productive sectors: Pastoralism, farming and fisheries	Productive sectors: Pastoralism, farming and fisheries
Haraad Rheeb - Quenching the Thirst III	NRM: Environment management (water, land, soil and biodiversity)	
Rebuilding rural resilience in Southern Somalia	Productive sectors: Pastoralism, farming and fisheries	
Strengthening resilience of Somali population against natural disasters and conflicts.	Human Development: Gender, social protection and safety nets	
Integrated Health Care Programme	Service delivery: Health and nutrition	
Promoting human security of migrants and mobile population in Somali through humanitarian assistance	Service delivery: Health and nutrition	
Somalia Rights Programme	Inclusive political dialogue and social reconciliation	
FAO Resilience Sub-Program (whole of Somalia)	Productive sectors: Pastoralism, farming and fisheries	
Women Economic Empowerment	Employment creation, labour and vocational training	Employment creation, labour and vocational training
Alternative Livelihoods to Piracy in Puntland and Central Regions - Phase II	Employment creation, labour and vocational training	Employment creation, labour and vocational training

Improving sustainable access to Water, Sanitation & Hygiene Promotion	NRM: Environment management (water, land, soil and biodiversity)	NRM: Environment management (water, land, soil and biodiversity)
Improved access to basic services and protection for vulnerable communities in Somalia	NRM: Environment management (water, land, soil and biodiversity)	NRM: Environment management (water, land, soil and biodiversity)
Improved Access to Basic Social Services and Protection for Vulnerable Communities in Somalia	NRM: Environment management (water, land, soil and biodiversity)	
Resilience Programme– Community Based Basic Services in Bay and Gedo Regions	NRM: Environment management (water, land, soil and biodiversity)	Infrastructure: Urban infrastructure (Water and Sanitation, Solid Waste Management)
Boys and girls including Youth are protected from abuse, violence , exploitation and neglect through community based mechanisms and processes	Human Development: Gender, social protection and safety nets	
Improve and maintain optimum child and maternal nutrition status for U5 boys and girls and PLWs by ensuring access to and utilization of a quality integrated Basic Nutrition Services Package in all regions of Somalia	Service delivery: Health and nutrition	Other (specify below)
PROTRACTED RELIEF AND RECOVERY OPERATIONS – SOMALIA 200443.	NRM: Environment management (water, land, soil and biodiversity)	Infrastructure: Transportation (Roads, Airports, Ports)
PROTRACTED RELIEF AND RECOVERY OPERATIONS – SOMALIA 200443.	Productive sectors: Pastoralism, farming and fisheries	

3. Active consortia in Somalia

FAO | WFP | UNICEF (Somalia Joint Resilience Strategy)

FAO, UNICEF and WFP have identified three complementary core building blocks to promote resilience in Somalia that must be addressed comprehensively in order to achieve communities' resilience:

- 1) Strengthen the productive sectors
- 2) Improve basic social services
- 3) Establish predictable safety nets

The programme strategy also recognizes a need for an enabling environment, based on an understanding of local resilience and vulnerability, as well as a policy and regulatory framework for effective service delivery. There is also a crosscutting supporting role for local governance and institutional development with household, communities, CSOs and the private sector.⁴³

Despite very promising strategic commitments, however, many donors remain sceptical about the actual added value of the consortium approach, when it comes to the Joint Resilience Strategy: *'Resilience is needed in Southern areas and South Central. Puntland and Somaliland are coping for the most part. They have a remittance system, people are relatively wealthy; they have more access, more peace. The UN Joint Resilience Programme doesn't really have a strategy; they just align three different approaches. It looks like they jumped on the bandwagon of other agencies and are now trying to coordinate. I am sceptical of what they've achieved'. (Donor)*

SomRep (Somalia Resilience Program)

SomRep's activities are related to five main outcomes: resilient livelihoods, social safety nets, natural resource management, local governance and research.

Humanitarian action and stabilization used to be separate, but according to interviews the programme now looks more like stabilization with humanitarian assistance funding, which may raise some political and ethical questions. The new approach focuses on civil society. The need to build the capacity of some of these organisations was identified.

SomRep identifies its strengths as having a harmonized strategy: common agreement on goals, objective and activities; sharing and adopting best-practice, joint learning, joint comprehensive assessments and analysis; geographically coordinated approach – scale & coverage; common monitoring and evaluation framework; joint linkage with research institutions and cost efficiency through shared consortium expertise.

BRCiS (Building Resilience Communities in Somalia)

BRCiS approach balances the need for humanitarian assistance to specific shocks and stresses with the need to build local long-term capacity to deal with similar shocks in the future.

It addresses shocks and stresses by working on three levels:

- 1) Address the effects of the shock directly through immediate humanitarian/emergency interventions;
- 2) Reduce the duration of the shock through the immediate response and the long-term approach; and
- 3) Reduce the impact of the shock through the immediate response and the long-term approach.

The Consortium expands the adaptive capacities of targeted households and communities in two phases:

⁴³ FAO, UNICEF, WFP, A Joint Strategy on Resilience for Somalia, Brief, July 2012

Phase I - Understanding exposure to shocks and stresses together with the communities

Phase II - Enhancing adaptive capacity through the implementation of the agreed plans

Short-term humanitarian interventions and mid/ long-term interventions are implemented together, as they equally contribute to the resilience of targeted households and communities. BRCiS' approach is to link their humanitarian work to more development-oriented activities. They follow a community-based approach, where the composition of activities largely depends on the characteristics of each target location.

While BRCiS is clearly at the forefront of innovation, when it comes to M&E and learning agendas, there are some doubts about their capacity to properly assess the impact of their activities, as their annual survey lacks the granularity and frequency needed to provide accurate feedbacks.

ADESO/ACTED (Social Safety Net Programme – SSNP/STREAM)

ADESO has been involved in cash transfers (conditional and unconditional) in humanitarian contexts – pioneering different tools and training a wide range of humanitarian actors to ensure that cash is delivered appropriately. Both ACTED and Adeso have extensive experience of and presence in humanitarian programming in Somalia, in particular in South-Central Somalia and Lower Juba.

In December 2015, ADESO and ACTED, using a consortium approach, have developed a common safety net programme using cash transfer in Lower Juba, combined with livelihoods and community led preparedness, early warning and timely response systems. This network of absorptive, adaptive and transformative activities aims to provide a sustainable opportunity for resilience building for communities chronically affected by food insecurity and humanitarian crises in Lower Juba. *'We are working as equal partners – although ACTED takes a lead and is contracted by the EU directly. In meetings, we go there together. We are only two, which allows for more flexibility and optimis[ises] a strong common denominator, [as] we are both working in some difficult areas'.* (SSNP Consortium - ADESO)

One important limitation: despite promising preliminary discussions, however, the learning agenda seems relatively basic, using ex-post and ex-ante evaluations, and not adapted to such an ambitious and innovative approach for both ADESO and ACTED.

4. Rapid Context Analysis

Figures that matter on resilience in Somalia...


1. Civil war since 1991, with insecurity and terrorism, exacerbated by clan conflicts, resource distribution, and radicalized Islamist movements in South-Central Somalia;
2. Droughts and water scarcity, with estimates that the annual renewable freshwater is below 1000m³ per person/per annum and is forecast to fall below 500m³ in 2025;
3. Flooding around Juba and Shabelle rivers accelerating productive asset depletion and causing animal diseases;
4. Increasing land pressure due to increasing human population and settlements, reducing the area available for grazing livestock;
5. Persistent conflicts over natural resources leading to erosion of assets and decrease of mobility, essential to water and feed accessibility during dry season;
6. Declining livestock and agriculture production and productivity due to less favourable husbandry practices and technologies, environmental degradation and deterioration of natural resources;
7. Under-utilization of market-based solutions and diaspora's potential technical and financial resources, leading to poor transformative effects;
8. Endemic poverty, with extreme poverty (less than USD 1 person/day) estimated at 53.4% and general poverty (less than USD 2 person/year) reaching 73.4%. GDP per capita is estimated to be only USD 288 far below the Sub-Saharan average and unemployment is estimated to be 54%, one of the highest in the world;
9. Alarming food insecurity, with an estimated 1 million (13% of the population) in crisis, 215,000 children malnourished (14.5% of the <5 year population) and, of these, 45,000 children in acute malnutrition;
10. Poor feeding practices of infants and young children, with Infant and Young Child Feeding (IYCF) practices contributing significantly to morbidity, mortality and malnutrition in Somalia.
11. Inexistent Water, Sanitation and Hygiene promotion, with 7% of the rural population having access to improved water sources, in contrast to 66% of people living in urban areas. Nationally, only 23% of the population has access to sanitation;
12. Youth bulge with over 70% of the population in Somalia under the age of 30 years and fertility rates estimated at 6.2 births per woman between 2010 and 2015;
13. Alarming gender-based violence, with 54.6% and 34.9% of Somali women in Somaliland and Puntland respectively, believing it is appropriate for their husbands to beat them if they burn the food, neglect the children, refuse sex etc.
14. Displacement due to regular food security crises combined with conflict, leading to massive forced displacement affecting 1.1 to 1.36 million people and exhausting coping mechanisms of many vulnerable Somalis.
15. High rate of urbanisation (Mogadishu = 3rd fastest growing city in 2015) presenting serious challenges in delivery of social services, but also high potential for rapid development due to availability of labour force.

5. Methodology

Fieldwork and Data Collection

Following the resilience literature desk review, Samuel Hall conducted key informant interviews with members of the IHDG and implementing partners (IPs) at regional offices in Nairobi. Initial discussions helped guide the development of the fieldwork strategy, which would then take place in three field locations in Somalia.⁴⁴ The goal of this fieldwork was to gain a better understanding of how stakeholders: (1) define resilience and (2) view resilience and the local relationship between shocks, coping mechanisms and stability in the areas where they live and work.

Figure 32: How does each group view the situation?



The fieldwork was designed to target the following groups: Practitioners (international and local NGOs), local authorities (at the federal, regional, district, and village level); and beneficiaries (of various consortia programmes as well as 'resilience' related activities) with the intention of identifying if there are themes within and between groups. Furthermore, the strategy aimed to identify successful methods of implementation and potential areas for improvement.

At each stage, Samuel Hall was explicit that this effort was not intended to be an evaluation of individual programmes, projects or staff, but rather a snapshot of the resilience landscape in Somalia that would offer a greater window into the viewpoints of its many stakeholders, particularly those closest to activities on the ground:

1. **Practitioners:** International and local NGO implementing agency staff (programme management and M&E staff)
2. **Community representatives:** Male and female beneficiaries, consisting of elders, community members, and vulnerable groups from villages and IDP settlements that have taken part in resilience activities (SomRep, BRCIS, USAID's resilience programming, UN FAO, UNICEF, WFP, and VSF Suisse).
3. **Local Authorities:** Federal Government of Somalia (Office of the Prime Minister); Somaliland Office of the Ministry of Planning, Office of Ministry of Health, Mayor of Berato, District Commissioner of Doolow.

⁴⁴ Interviews with representatives from the Federal Government of Somalia were also conducted in Mogadishu.

Locations


In accordance with the Inception Report provided by Samuel Hall, Somalia field research focused on three geographic locations (Doolow, Hargeisa, and Bossasso) that were selected to capture a cross-section of the type of operating environments and variety of partners, activities, and beneficiaries. With guidance from Nairobi offices, Samuel Hall identified primary focal points (from SomRep and FAO) to coordinate logistics for each location. The map below provides geographic reference for each location within the wider context of Somalia.

Tools deployed

A number of qualitative tools were developed for use in the three field locations in order to better understand coordination efforts (within a particular consortium, between consortia members, and with government officials) as well as the perspectives around the relevance of programming.

- **Key informant interviews (26)** were conducted at each location, consisting of interviews with practitioners (international and local staff of NGOs and implementing agencies) and local authorities at national, regional, district and village levels.
- **Focus group discussions (14)** were conducted in the three locations with five to six male and female beneficiaries divided into separate groups based on their gender. Local relevant programme staff selected beneficiaries and FGDs took place near activity sites or commonly used community-meeting venues. Four interviewers (two male and two female) conducted FGDs over a two-three hour period in the various villages. As part of the FGDs, three additional exercises were conducted with participants:
 - **Associative Grouping Exercise:** Designed to explore how participants define certain resilience concepts.
 - **Participatory community mapping exercise:** Designed to encourage participants to highlight areas of shock, coping mechanisms and potential economic opportunities, perceived risk or insecurity in their community, as well as any positive or negative changes that have occurred over the years. The below key aligns with the graphic on the following page.
 - **Questionnaires:** Designed to gain a deeper understanding of how beneficiaries view their interaction with practitioners, government officials, and other stakeholders that may be involved.
- **Round Table Discussions (5)** were conducted with local NGOs in Doolow, Hargeisa (in the town of Burco) and Bossasso; and SomRep and UN (FAO, UNICEF, and WFP) members in Doolow in order to assess the coordination efforts within a consortium and the viewpoints of local NGOs.

Figure 33: Somalia Fieldwork
Bossasso, Hargeisa, and Doolow



Participatory Community Mapping Key



Areas of resilience and economic opportunity



Situation has improved in past 12 months



Situation has worsened in past 12 months



Meeting places



Situation has stayed the same in past 12 months

Focus Group Discussions and Associative Grouping:

Berato, Surgidud, Qotya, and Berato




Focus Group Discussions and Associative Grouping:

Doolow, Berato, and Doolow



Participatory Community Mapping Exercise: Doolow (Kabasa)

Figure 34: Participatory Community Mapping in Kabasa (April 2016)



6. Glossary

ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY: the first aspect of resilience, it describes the ability to bounce back quickly and not sustain fundamental harm or damage. Absorptive strategies can be an important resilience building process, e.g. when relying on a strong social network, stocking food or financial reserves or investing in a robust, flood resistant house. Absorptive capacities are based on characteristics such as robustness, resourcefulness and redundancy (IDS 2012).

ADAPTIVE CAPACITY: Adaptive capacity refers to various *'adjustments that people (or communities) undergo in order to continue functioning without major qualitative changes in function or structural identity'* (IDS 2012). Adaptive capacities enable a community to moderate potential damages, to take advantage of opportunities – that is *'to bounce forward'*. This requires flexibility, ingenuity and resourcefulness.

TRANSFORMATIVE CAPACITY: the most complex dimension of resilience since it involves fundamental changes that affect core structures, identities and processes within the community or system. Transformation becomes necessary if predefined coping strategies or incremental adjustments are no longer sufficient. Transformative capacity describes the ability to create a fundamentally new system when ecological, economic or social structures make the current system untenable (IDS 2012).

INSTITUTIONS: The norms and rules governing human interactions. These can be formal, such as rules and laws, but also informal, such as norms and conventions of society.

RESILIENCE: The capacity of a system – be it a landscape, a coastal area or a city – to deal with change and continue to develop. This means the capacity to withstand shocks and disturbances such as a financial crisis or use such an event to catalyse renewal and innovation. In a very thoughtful attempt to identify all the existing loopholes of the concept of resilience, Annelies Heijmans writes: *'Although the concept of resilience as a whole is receiving a great deal of theoretical attention, some of the areas where theoretical attention is most needed are being skated over and even masked by definitions or theories that hide the questions from scrutiny. Some of the issues which need analysing in any given situation but which are being obscured by frameworks include:*

- *The relationship between risk and resilience (when is risk to be avoided, and what are the opportunity costs of avoiding it?).*
- *How far is people's ability to withstand a shock related to their ability to recover from it? Is it right to equate (as a quicker recovery with a smaller loss in the face of shocks?)*
- *If not, when is it better to invest in one rather than the other? How do we best judge when it is better to invest in the ability to resist shocks, rather than in a new strategy that would avoid those risks?*
- *What is the relationship between humanitarian action and resilience-building? Although 'integrated resilience programmes' are called for, is the aftermath of a disaster the right time to make structural changes?*
- *Resilience is a quality ascribed to communities, systems and households. What is the relationship between these? Do more resilient communities have fewer vulnerable people? Which should be the objective of international aid?*

Toward that end, resilience is increasingly understood as a capacity that prevents individuals, households, and communities from falling below a normatively defined standard of living, whether defined in terms of poverty, health or nutritional status, subjective well-being, or some other measure (Barrett and Constanas, 2013).⁴⁵

⁴⁵ See Heijmans Annelies, 2013, *Reaching Resilience - Handbook Resilience 2.0 for aid practitioners and policymakers in Disaster Risk Reduction, Climate Change Adaptation, and Poverty Reduction*, CARE Nederland, Groupe URD, and Wageningen University:

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- ACCRA (2012). *The ACCRA Local Adaptive Capacity Framework*. An ACCRA Brief.
- Alinovi, L., Mane, E., and D. Romano. (2008). *Towards the Measurement of Household Resilience to Food Insecurity: Applying a Model to Palestinian Household Data*. In Sibrian, R., (ed.). *Deriving Food Security Information From National Household Budget Surveys. Experiences, Achievement, Challenges*. FAO. Rome: 137-52.
- Alinovi, L., D'Errico, M., Mane, E., and D. Romano. (2010). *Livelihoods strategies and household resilience to food insecurity: an empirical analysis to Kenya*. Paper prepared for the Conference on 'Promoting Resilience through Social Protection in Sub-Saharan Africa', organised by the European Report of Development in Dakar, Senegal, 28-30 June, 2010.
- Almedom A.M. and Glandon, D., (2007) *Resilience is not the Absence of PTSD and more than health is the Absence of Disease*, *Journal of Loss and Trauma* 12:127-143
- Barrett, C. (2014) *Measuring Resilience in a Volatile World, A Proposal For A Multicountry System Of Sentinel Sites*, 2020 Conference Paper 1, IFPRI and 2020 Vision Initiative, May 2014.
- Barrett, C. and Conostas, M. (2012) *Resilience to Avoid and Escape Chronic Poverty: Theoretical Foundations and Measurement Principles*. Paper presented at a roundtable discussion on resilience at CARE, Washington, 11 p.
- Barrett, C., Marenya, P., Mcpeak, J., Minten, B., Murithi, F., Oluoch-Kosura, W., Place, F., Randrianarisoa, J., Rasam-bainarivo, J. and Wangila, J. (2006). *Welfare dynamics in rural Kenya and Madagascar*. *Journal of Development Studies* 42(2), 248-277.
- Bauer, J.M., Pompili, F., and M. Ballo. 2013. *Recovering from drought in Niger: trend analysis of household coping, 2007-2011*. DRAFT. Paper presented to the Expert Consultation on Resilience Measurement Related to Food Security sponsored by the Food and Agricultural Organization and World Food Program, Rome, Italy, February 19-21, 2013.
- Béné C., Evans, L., Mills, D., Ovie, S., Raji, A., Tafida, A., Kodio, A., Sinaba, F., Morand, P., Lemoalle, J. and Andrew, N. (2011). *Testing resilience thinking in a poverty context: experience from the Niger river basin*. *Global Environmental Change* 21, 1173-1184.
- Béné, C., Wood, R.G., Newsham, A., and M. Davies. (2012). *Resilience: New Utopia or New Tyranny? Reflection about the potentials and limits of the concept of resilience in relation to vulnerability reduction programmes*. IDS Working Paper. No. 405. Institute of Development Studies, 61 p.
- Béné, C., Headey, D. and Haddad, L. (2013) *Understanding Resilience for Food and Nutrition Security, in 2013 Global Hunger Index: The Challenge of Hunger: Resilience*. Bonn, Washington, DC, and Dublin: Welthungerhilfe, International Food Policy Research Institute, and Concern Worldwide
- Berkes, F. & Folke, C. (1998). *Linking social and ecological systems for resilience and sustainability*. In Berkes F. & Folke C. eds. *Linking social and ecological systems Management practices and social mechanisms for building resilience*. (pp.1-25). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Brigulio, L., Cordina, G., Bujeda, S. and Farrugia, N. (2005). *Conceptualizing and measuring economic resilience*. Economic department, University of Malta.
- Cabot Venton et al (2012). *The Economics of Early Response and Disaster Resilience: Lessons from Kenya and Ethiopia*. London: DFID.
- Carpenter, S., Walker, B., Anderies, J. M. and Abel, N. (2001). *From metaphor to measurement: resilience of what to what? Ecosystems* 4(8), 765-781.
- Carter, M., Little, P., Mogue, T. and Negatu, W. (2007). *Poverty traps and natural disasters in Ethiopia and Honduras*. *World Development* 35(5), 835-856.
- Checchi F. and Robinson W.C. (2013). *Mortality among populations of southern and central Somalia affected by severe food insecurity and famine during 2010-2012*, A Study commissioned by FAO/FSNAU and FEWS NET from the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine and the Johns Hopkins University Bloomberg School of Public Health.
- Ciani, F. and D. Romano. (2013). *Testing for household resilience to food insecurity: Evidence from Nicaragua*. Department of Economics and Management. University of Florence.
- Collins, G. (2013). *Measuring resilience to recurrent crises in the Horn of Africa and Sahel: Initial approaches and challenges*. Powerpoint presentation to the Expert Consultation on Resilience Measurement Related to Food Security sponsored by the Food and Agricultural Organization and World Food Program, Rome, Italy, February 19-21, 2013.
- Conostas, M. and C. Barrett. (2013). *Principles of resilience measurement for food insecurity: metrics, mechanisms, and implementation plans*. Paper presented at the Expert Consultation on Resilience

Measurement Related to Food Security sponsored by the Food and Agricultural Organization and World Food Program, Rome, Italy, February 19-21, 2013.

- Delavalande, A., X. Giné, and D. McKenzie. (2011). Measuring Subjective Expectations in Developing Countries: A Critical Review and New Evidence. *Journal of Development Economics* 94 (2): 151–163.
- DFID (2011). *Defining disaster resilience: a DFID approach paper*. London: Department for International Development.
- Dutta, I., Foster, J., & Mishra, A. (2010). *On measuring vulnerability to poverty*. Institute for International Economic Policy Working Paper Series.
- Eriksen, S., Aldunce, P., Sekhar Bahinipati, C., d'Almeida Martins, R., Molefe, J., Nhemachena, C., O'Brien, K., Olorunfemi, F., Park, J., Sygna, L. and Ulsrud, K. (2011). *When not every response to climate change is a good one: identifying principles for sustainable adaptation*. *Climate and Development* 3, 7-20.
- FAO. (2016). *RIMA-II: Moving forward the Development of the Resilience Index Measurement and Analysis Model – Internal documentations*.
- FAO. (2016). *The Resilience Index Measurement and Analysis (RIMA) Model – Internal documentations*.
- FAO. (2011). *Baseline Report for impact assessment for the bara'ah project in South Kordofan*. Report prepared by M. d'Errico.
- FAO. (2010). *Sudan Household Resilience to Food Insecurity: Report based on the 2009 National Baseline Household Survey (NBHS 2009)*. Report prepared by M. d'Errico, E. Mane, and N. Tefera.
- Folke, C. (2006). *Resilience: The emergence of a perspective for social-ecological systems analyses*. *Global Environmental Change* 16(3), 253-267.
- Frankenberger T. and Nelson S. (2013) *Background Paper for the Expert Consultation on Resilience Measurement for Food Security*, TANGO International - Expert Consultation on Resilience Measurement Related to Food Security sponsored by the Food and Agricultural Organization and World Food Program, Rome, Italy, February 19-21, 2013
- Frankenberger T. and Nelson S. (2013) *Summary of the Expert Consultation on Resilience Measurement for Food Security*, TANGO International - Expert Consultation on Resilience Measurement Related to Food Security sponsored by the Food and Agricultural Organization and World Food Program, Rome, Italy, February 19-21, 2013
- Frankenberger, T., Langworthy, M., Spangler, T., and S. Nelson. (2012). *Enhancing Resilience to Food Security Shocks in Africa*. Discussion Paper. November 2012.
- FSIN (2014). *Resilience Measurement Principles, Toward An Agenda For Measurement Design*, Food Security Information Network, Technical Series n°1.
- Hallegatte Stephane, 2014. *Economic Resilience Definition and Measurement*, The World Bank, Working Paper 6852.
- Headey, D., Taffesse, A.S., and L. You. (2012). *Enhancing Resilience in the Horn of Africa: An Exploration into Alternative Investment Options*. IFPRI Discussion Paper 01176. April 2012.
- Heijmans A. (2013). *Reaching Resilience - Handbook Resilience 2.0 for aid practitioners and policymakers in Disaster Risk Reduction, Climate Change Adaptation, and Poverty Reduction*, CARE Nederland, Groupe URD, and Wageningen University.
- Hillbruner C. and Grainne M. (2012). *When Early Warning Is Not Enough—Lessons Learned From the 2011 Somalia Famine*, *Global Food Security* 1 (1): 20–28.
- Hughes, K. (2013). *A multidimensional approach for measuring resilience*. Paper presented at the Expert Consultation on Resilience Measurement Related to Food Security sponsored by the Food and Agricultural Organization and World Food Program, Rome, Italy, February 19-21, 2013.
- Hughes, K. (2012). *Oxfam's Attempt to Measure Resilience*. Power Point presentation at the American Evaluation Association (AEA) Meeting, October 2012.
- Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2012) *Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation. A Special Report of Working Groups I and II of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*.
- Krueger, A. B., and D. A. Schkade. (2008). *The Reliability of Subjective Well-being Measures*. *Journal of Public Economics* 92 (8/9): 1833–1845.
- Kurz, J. and Langworthy M. (2013) *Identifying reliable determinant of resilience*. Paper presented to the Expert Consultation on Resilience Measurement Related to Food Security sponsored by the Food and Agricultural Organization and World Food Program, Rome, Italy, February 19-21, 2013.
- Leach, M. (2008). *Re-framing Resilience: a Symposium Report*. STEPS Working Paper 13, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies.
- Levine, S., Pain, A., Baley, S. and Fan, L. (2012). *The relevance of 'resilience'?* HPG Policy Brief 49, London: Overseas Development Institute, Humanitarian Policy Group, 4 p.

- Macours, K., and R. Vakis. 2009. *Changing Households' Investments and Aspirations through Social Interactions: Evidence from a Randomized Transfer Program in a Low-income Country*. Policy Research Working Paper 5137. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- Manski, C. F. 2004. *Measuring Expectations*. *Econometrica* 72 (5): 1329–1376 Maxwell, D. & Cadwell, R. (2008). *The scoping strategy index: field methods manual*. Second edition, Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE).
- Osbahr, H. (2007). *Building resilience: Adaptation mechanisms and mainstreaming for the poor*. Occasional paper for the Human Development Report 2007/08 Fighting climate change: human solidarity in a divided world, Human Development Report Office, UNDP.
- Otero, R., and Marti, Z. (1995). *The impacts of natural disasters on developing economies: Implications for the international development and disaster community*. In: M. Munasinghe and C. Clarke (Eds), *Disaster prevention for sustainable development economic and policy issues*. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- Pingali, P., Alinovi, L., & Sutton, J. (2005). *Food security in complex emergencies: enhancing food system resilience*. In *Disaster*, 29(s1).
- Samuel Hall (2015), *Beyond Copenhagen: A Toolbox for Durable Solutions*, commissioned by UNHCR Somalia.
- Sellberg, M. M., C. Wilkinson, and G. D. Peterson. (2015). *Resilience assessment: a useful approach to navigate urban sustainability challenges*. *Ecology and Society* 20(1): 43.
- SomRep and BRCiS. (2015) *Resilience Systems Analysis - Somalia Results and Roadmap 24 to 25 February 2015*.
- Tulane University and State University of Haiti (UEH). (2012). *Haiti Humanitarian Assistance Evaluation: From a resilience perspective*. Tulane University's Disaster Resilience Leadership Academy.
- Ungar, M. (2008) *Resilience across Cultures*, *British Journal of Social Work*, 38.
- USAID, (2013). *Feed the Future Learning Agenda Literature Review: Improving Resilience of Vulnerable Populations*.
- USAID, (2012). *Building resilience to recurrent crisis - USAID policy and program guidance*. Washington: US Agency for International Development.
- USAID, (2011). *Enhancing resilience in the Horn of Africa: An evidence-based workshop on strategies for success*. USAID Workshop Proceedings. December 13-14, 2011.
- US Department of Defense, (2005). *Directive 3000.05 on Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*, USD(P), November 28, 2005.
- Vaitla, B., Tesfay, G., Rounseville, G., & Maxwell, D. (2012). *Resilience and Livelihoods Change in Tigray Ethiopia*. Feinstein International Center.
- Venton, C.C.; Fitzgibbon, C.; Shiterek, T.; Coulter, L. and Dooley, O. (2012) *The Economics of Early Response and Disaster Resilience: Lessons from Kenya and Ethiopia*, Economics of Resilience Final Report. London: UK Department for International Development.
- WHO (2006) *Guidelines for conducting cost-benefit analysis of household energy and health interventions*, World Health Organization, Geneva.



Samuel Hall is an independent think tank providing research and strategic services, expert analysis, tailored counsel and access to local knowledge for a diverse array of actors operating in the world's most challenging environments.

Through a combination of our rigorous approach, experienced staff and vast network, we have successfully accessed complex settings for organisations seeking to accurately gather data and have a positive impact amongst communities. Using our academic background, we bring innovative and game changing insights along with practical solutions to a variety of social, economic and political issues.

Samuel Hall has offices in Afghanistan, Kenya, Somalia, Senegal, and a presence in France, Germany, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates. We have worked with more than sixty-five organizations in Central & South Asia, East & South Africa and the Middle East.

For more information, please visit www.samuelhall.org

